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MINUTES 
South Carolina Historical Association 
Annual Meeting - 1982 
The Fifty-second Annual Meeting of the Association met at Lander College in 
Greenwood, South Carolina, on Saturday, April 3, 1982, in conjunction with the 
South Carolina Political Science Association. Some seventy-five members and 
friends of the Association were present. 
After registration and coffee in the Jackson Library, two sessions convened at 
10:00 A.M. In the South Carolina session Rodger Stroup, S.C. Museum Commis-
sion, presided as two papers were presented: "Lucy Pickens--First lady of the South 
Carolina Confederacy" by Emily Bull, USC-Aiken, and "Did the Lady of 
Cofitachique Live in Camden, South Carolina?" by Charles W. Bright, Midlands 
Technical College. John B. Edmunds, USC-Spartanburg, commented vigorously 
on the papers. 
A second session on the Ancient World met simultaneously Victor H. Mattews, 
Anderson College, presented "The Symbiotic Relationship Between King and 
Bureacracy in Ancient Mesopotamia," and Elizabeth Carney, Clemson, presented 
"Olympias, Would-Be Ruler." Ralph Mathisen, University of South Carolina, 
responded. 
After a break two additional sessions convened at 11:15 A.M. The Modern 
European session was chaired by Joel Cleland, Lander. Saadallah A.S. Hallaba, 
USC-Sumter, presented "Hitler and Zionism: The Haavara Agreement of 1933," 
and Valdis 0. Lumans, USC-Aiken, presented "Nazi Racial Doctrine and Policy: 
An Interpretation." Birdsall Viault, Winthrop commented. 
A Southeren United States session was chaired by L. Wayne Jordan, College of 
Charleston. Marcia Synott, University of South Carolina, read "Replacing 
'Sambo': Could White Immigrants Solve the Southern Labor Problem?" and Ar-
nold Shankman, Winthrop, read "The South Carolina Council for the Common 
Good." Alan Schaffer, Clemson, responded. 
The joint lunch session convened in the Grier Center at 1:00 P.M., Bob Hall, 
Director of the Institute of Southern Studies, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and 
Editor, Southern Exposure, spoke on "Sunbelt Glitter: Fact or Fantasy?" 
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After lunch President John B. Edmunds, USC-Spartanburg, convened the 
business meeting. He announced that the 1983 meetings would be held at Newberry 
College. Secretary-Treasurer A.V. Huff, Jr., Furman, presented the financial 
report and submitted the following slate of officers: 
President: Walter B. Edgar (University of South Carolina) 
Vice President: M. Foster Farley (Newberry) 
Secretary-Treasurer: A.V. Huff, Jr., (Furman) 
Editors of the Proceedings: Calvin Smith and Valdis o. 
Lumans (USC-Aiken) 
Executive Committee: Joseph T. Stukes (Francis Marion) 
They were elected unanimously. Incoming President Edgar adjourned the ses-
sion. 
At a South Carolina session at 2:30 P.M. in the Jackson Library Ken Donovan, 
staff historian at Fortress Louisbourg in Nova Scotia, presented a paper on "John 
Saunders: A Loyalist Captain in South Carolina, 1780-1782." Robert S. Lambert, 
Clemson, presided and commented. 
At the conclusion of the afternoon session the Association adjourned to Barret 
House, the home of former Congessman William Jennings Bryan Dorn. Mr. Dorn 
hosted a reception for the two associations to the delight of all. 




FIRST LADY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONFEDERACY 
Emily L. Bull 
In Willowbrook Cemetary in Edgefield, South Carolina, amid tumbled-over 
crosses and rusted iron fences, is a neatly kept square containing the remains of 
Governor Francis W. Pickens and his family. In the corner, two rows from Pickens, 
lies his third wife, Lucy Holcombe Pickens, the tame inscription on her concrete slab 
betraying the legends that live after her: 
THIS STONE IS ERECTED TO THE MEMORY OF A 
BEA TIFUL AND GRACIOUS LADY OF THE OLD 
SOUTH. SHE WAS THE WIFE OF FRANCIS WILKIN-
SON PICKENS, THE WAR GOVERNOR OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA FOR 1860-1863. Beautiful in person, cultured 
in mind, patriotic in spirit, she was loved by all who knew her. 
The legends say that Lucy, the beautiful daughter of a Texas family, was taken 
to White Sulpher Springs, Virginia, the elite resort, by her ambitious mother in per-
suit of a husband. A widower, Colonel Pickens, had brought his two daughters 
there for a vacation and was enchanted by Lucy. She agreed to marry him if he 
would get himself appointed ambassador to Russia, and, as a friend of President 
Buchanan, he did so. They were married in Texas and traveled to Russia, where the 
young Mrs. Pickens so charmed the czar that she was moved into the Winter Palace 
at the Romanoff Court. Whispers even hint that her daughter born there was the 
czar's child. 
When the South Carolina secession fever ran high, Pickens brought his wife and 
child home and was promptly elected governor. As popular in South Carolina as she 
had been in Russia, Mrs. Pickens had a regiment named in her honor, and her pic-
ture chosen for the Confederate hundred-dollar bill. After her husband's death in 
1869 she lived another 30 years at their home, Edgewood, just north of Edgefield, 
where she entertained beautifully, despite the financial devastation of the South. 
"The gossip will confirm the stories about her," said South Carolina author 
Elizabeth Boatwright Coker, who heard many of these tales in Edgefield years ago. 1 
But most of the legends are false, and, with the gossip dispelled, Lucy Pickens 
emerges all the more fascinating. She was all the things her tombstone attributes to 
her and more. She was a talented writer and an energetic citizen of the South and 
the nation. 
Lucy Petway Hunt Halcombe was born June 11, 1832, in LaGrange, Tennessee, 
an aristocratic but very small town in Fayette County, situated about six miles north 
of the Mississippi line and about fifty miles from Memphis and the Mississippi River. 
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She was the second of five children of Beverly LaFayette and Eugenia Dorthea 
Vaughn Hunt Halcombe. 
Her Halcombe grandparents had been large landowners, owned fine race horses 
and had been known for their hospitality in Mecklenburg County, Virginia. But as 
farming declined there, they had to move with their son and two daughters and 
husbands to Fayette County. Grandmother Halcombe, a beautiful woman who was 
descended from Austrian royalty, adored Lucy. "There was never a sweeter child," 
she would say as she petted her. 3 
Lucy's mother wanted her two daughters to have an education so that they could 
be independent--forward thinking for the period. They attended LaGrange Female 
Academy and in the late 1840s went to the Moravian school in Bethlehem, Penn-
sylvania. Numerous letters of this period attest to Lucy's growing popularity.' 
Beverly Holcombe, Lucy's six-foot-tall father,' had prospered in Tennessee until 
he signed a bad loan for a friend and was forced in the late 1840's to move to Mar-
shall, Texas, for a fresh start. The friend later recovered his finances and repaid 
Holcombe, who consequently in 1848 began construction of a large brick home sur-
rounded with Greek Revival columns. 6 
The elegance of the Holcombe girls' early lives, despite the family's financial set-
backs in Virginia and Tennessee, is evident by the jewelry seen in pictures of Lucy 
and her older sister, Anna Eliza; by silver in Lucy's possession bearing her mother's 
initials;7 and by the education the girls received. The family traveled up and down 
the Mississippi, frequently going to New Orleans, the nearest center of culture. 
From there they would send a bit of elegance, such as a rosewood piano, home to 
Texas.• 
Lucy's mother kept a diary in which, when Lucy was 17, she wrote of being at 
the legislature meeting in Jackson, Mississippi, with her daughters "where all join 
me in thinking and expressing their admiration for two of the loveliest of their sex.' ' 9 
That entry adds credence to what has been considered a romanticized version of 
Lucy's and her daughter's lives ·by General George F. Alford in a Chicago 
newspaper.'0 Alford said when Lucy was visiting the family of Governor John A. 
Quitman11 in Mississippi, "she captivated the entire state legislature and when she 
departed for New Orleans, the General Assembly adjourned and went with her. 
What he meant, a family history explains, 12 was that so many young Mississippi 
legislators escorted her to the dock when she departed for New Orleans that a 
quorum could not be found. 
A love letter to her confirms she did visit with kinsmen in " Jackson or 
Vicksburg" and she did go from there to New Orleans, 13 accompanied by her 
mother and probably her sister. 1' The letter attests to her captivating charms in her 
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seventeenth year, but does not indicate that she returned affection for the 
mysterious source of the letter, a friend of her father's and, thus, perhaps older than 
she. 
There are numerous references to Lucy being, "The rose ofTexas," 1' the "rein-
ing belle of the South, known in New York and all the way from Washington to New 
Orleans." 16 Occasionally she has been said to be the subject of the song "The 
Yellow Rose of Texas." It was written for minstrels prior to the Civil War and was 
very popular with the North and the South during the conflict. It is apt to have been 
played in honor to Lucy, but only the initials of the writer, '' J .K.,'' remain, and its 
inspiration is unknown. 17 
Lucy had numerous admirers and suitors, including General Alford, who admit-
ted he left Texas for California with the hope of striking gold and returning to marry 
Lucy. But apparently her heart was reserved for a "Lt. Crittenden," who was killed 
in an effort to free Cuba from Spain. While Lucy was in Jackson her family friends, 
Governor Quitman, entertained Narcisco Lopez and Jose Ambrosio Gonzales at the 
Governor's Mansion. 11 It is probable that Lucy met Lopez, who wanted Quitman's 
help in freeing Cuba from Spanish rule. Mississippians wanted Cuba freed with the 
hope that it would be another pro-slavery vote in Congress. 
An effort to free Cuba by Lopez in the spring of 1850 was aborted; but on 
August 3, 1851, Lopez sailed from New Orleans again, convinced the time was right 
to lead a revolt. The Cuban uprising failed to materialize, however. A Col. William 
L. Crittenden of Kentucky and fifty other southern volunteers were captured August 
13, tried and executed in Havana September 1. Nearly half of Lopez's 162 sup-
porters sent to Spain as prisoners were Americans. The effort in Cuba set off anti-
Spanish riots in New Orleans, and the Spanish consulate was wrecked. The 
American prisoners were not released until the United States provided Spain with 
$25,000 for restoring the consulate. 19 
Family tradition says that "Lt. Crittenden" was killed in this aborted Lopez ef-
fort. Nothing more than this is known about him. In her grief Lucy wrote a 
romance, The Free Flag of Cuba: or The Martyrdom of Lopez. A Tale of the 
Liberating Expedition of 1851, under the pen name of H.M. Hardiman, which was 
published at family expense. 20 Her phrases are beautifully descriptive and confirm 
her education in the classics and talent. As an example, in reference to Lopez's 
corpse, whe wrote: 
Like the marble triumph of some sculptor's skill, he lay in 
the silent majesty of death. Hard, indeed, must have been the 
heart that could have looked unmoved on the still death-
beauty of the form. The gory stains had been removed, he lay 
calm and serene as though life had sighed itself away at his 
mother's breast ... 
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Perhaps in a call to arms to avenge her lost love, she asked, "Shall it (American 
blood on Cuban soil) call in vain for vengeance?" 
A fading critique is penciled in the margin of the copy of her work at South 
Caroliniana Library, written by someone who seemed to know her personally: 
The plot is beautifully simple and worked out with great 
power. There is brilliant purpose in the writer of this 
romance. 
And on another page, referring to a line, "The Creoles have never deserted me," 
the critic wrote: "Great, but merited compliment de la N. Orleans worthy of Lopez--
and of you." 
Her descendants have believed this to be her only literary effort except for letters 
from Russia published in the Memphis Eagle and Enquirer, but a note found in 
Edgefield to "Miss Pickens" refers to her gloomy tragedy of Gonzalvo, suggesting 
that she never forgot this sadness and wrote more about it. (Gonzales, Lopez's part-
ner, came to South Carolina and indeed had a gloomy life. His son was founder of 
The State newspaper.) Perhaps because the critique was unfavorable, she destroyed 
the manuscript. 
Regardless of the male attention--perhaps because her grief for Crittenden--it 
was not until the age of twenty-six, in 1858, that Lucy married the twice-widowed, 
53-year-old Francis W. Pickens, a planter and congressman of South Carolina. 
Pickens first felt the enchantment of Lucy when he took his daughters to vacation at 
the fashionable White Sulpher Springs resort in Virginia. Legend says Lucy's 
mother was ambitious for her and "felt that Pickens, though much older, would be 
a suitable match. Lucy, ambitious herself, and wishing to make a good, socially cor-
rect marriage, was impressed yet hesitant about tying herself down at an early age to 
such an 'old man'. " 21 Eugenia Holcombe's ambitious attitude came across in 
several articles, even though family correspondence indicates that Lucy's parents did 
not favor the marriage at first. 22 Pickens did not waste any time, once struck by 
Lucy's charm; he wrote her father for permission to marry while at the resort. 
"Tall, willowy, with titian hair said to resemble a woof of sun beans spinning out 
like a flower at the ends, with eyes to shade that two men could never agree upon,'' 21 
is the penned portrait of Lucy in this period. She was "master of every situation she 
met," creating a sensation when she entered the room. No wonder, that in addition 
to writing her politics and national issues, Pickens wrote her, "Forgive me, forgive 
me it. I tremble for I love you madly, wildly, blindly . . . " 23 There is no conclusive 
proof of Lucy's feelings for Pickens at that point in her life, although she must have 
considered him dearly later in their marriage. She had lost Crittenden and perhaps 
considered him a stepping stone to a different sort of life. 
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She demanded, according to Edgefield stories, that Pickens get himself ap-
pointed ambassador to Russia, if she was to become his bride. He went immediately 
to his friend, President Buchanan, and did so. Family sources believe, however, on-
ly that she expressed an interest in travel, and he willingly obliged. Her uncommon 
love for her mother and home would seem to contradict such a suggestion on her 
part, but this conflict of desires might be attributed to impetuous youth. There is 
good reason to believe that Pickens wanted to do everything he could to please her, 
even though he had refused earlier offers of ambassadorships to France and 
England. 
They were married April 25, 1858, at the Holcombe family home in Marshall, 
"Wyalucing". The town's leading citizens entertained the couple the following 
evening with a reception at the Adkins House, the largest place in Marshall. The 
new Mrs. Pickens did not, as legend says, come to Pickens' plantation in Edgefield 
to train their servants before going to Russia. Instead, the newlyweds sailed out of 
New York on the steamer "Persia" and were only one day from Liverpool by May 
28. 
From London Lucy reported to the Memphis newspaper that the English royalty 
did not go out in finer style than she and her husband did, only "with greater 
display" of servants. 25 In that same city on her first birthday away from her family 
her writing gives a clue about Picken's adoration of her: 
The first thing (I saw) when I opened my eyes this morning 
was a beautiful basket of hot-house flowers, half hid in them 
a bo" containing earrings, breast-pin and a bracelet of 
wrought gold, with bunches of violets enamled on them, with 
a diamond in each violet. 26 
Still in London in June, they went to an exhibition of paintings, saw Kean in 
Macbeth; heard Dickens read, which inspired a knowledgeable critique from her; 
and attended a service at Westminister Abbey.27 
From London the Pickenses went to France. Lucy was far more enchanted by 
Paris than she had been by London. She visited the Louvre and other places of in-
terest, continuing to take advantage of the culture wherever she was. Although she 
was bothered by shopping and bills, she relished the gowns of Paris. At great length 
she described the dress she would wear to be received by Napoleon: "a blue silk lace 
with three-point lace flounces over which a long train of lace is worn, looped with 
diamond sprigs, jewels of the same--breastpin, earrings and bracelet. " 21 
After a stop in Prussia they arrived in St. Petersburg on July 6. Their first in-
troduction to the czar was to have been on a Sunday at Peterhof, Nicholas' favorite 
summer palace thirty miles away. But because it was Sunday, a day for worship, so 
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Lucy felt, Ambassador Pickens attended alone. Several weeks had passed befor.. 
Lucy met the czar at Peterhof. According to her correspondence, the food was 
beyond imagination, and the music was by the son of the great Strauss. For dinner 
she chose a gown with two skirts of white tulle, puffs of whitetulle and lemon silk 
and stripes of black velvet. She wore satin slippers embroidered with gold, which 
showed when she sat in the drawing room with her feet resting on a silk pillow. 
After a merry gathering there she went to her room to rest and re-dress for the ball in 
white moire satin and lillies of the valley. 
Under the watchful eye of her husband she attracted much attention from Czar 
Alexander II, thirty-eight and restless, and whose passion for his wife was fading. 
He was good-natured, charming, and attractive, but also a bit timid and sensitive. 10 
His interest in Lucy assured her the entire court's attention. He singled her out for 
dances, called her to stand above the ballroom on the platform reserved for the royal 
family and insisted they converse in French. Attesting his good nature, when Lucy 
apologetically said her French was not of the quality required for royalty, Alexander 
said he had no doubt that her republican tongue could not speak the language re-
quired by royalty. The half-hour conversation with a foreigner was heretofore an 
unheard-of event. 11 In a letter to her sister Lucy acknowledged that she passed for a 
"great beauty at Court" and that the emperor and grand dukes danced with her but 
not other ministers' wives. Their virtue, however, did not please her. She wrote: 
In a society like this, where the existence of virtue is not 
believed in by men, mine has not been a position free from in-
cidents but I have conducted myself with such prudence that 
my husband tells me he loves me more for my dignity and 
goodness, than for my beauty and intellect. I mention it only 
to you (her sister) (in that) I have endeavored to fulfill the 
duties which I owed to my position to society, but I would 
shrink from giving my mind, soul and body to worldly 
pleasures and gratifications as the people around me do. 31 
Learning of her pregnancy, the czar moved her into an apartment in the Winter 
Palace which provided a view of the frozen Neva River's ice skaters to amuse her. 33 
His attentions have been misconstrued by some to imply that the czar might have 
fathered the child. The timing of the Pickenses' arrival in Russia, however, makes 
that impossible. There is nothing in her correspondence to indicate that the 
Pickenses' daughter was not a full-term baby, and she was born on March 14, 1859, 
which puts the conception in London or Paris. On July 2 from Prussia, Lucy wrote 
her mother that she was "sick this morning and in much pain. "3' They did not ar-
rive in Russia until July 6, eight months before their daughter's arrival, and it was 
several weeks before she even met the czar. 35 The czar is said to have had her 
features carved in marble, but it was Pickens who suggested she have this done. 
Pickens had a similar bust of himself carved. 36 
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When Lucy had been as young as seven her mother had noted that Lucy seemed 
strangely devoted to her. 37 Letters from Russia express Lucy's profound grief at not 
being able to see her mother, distress at not hearing from her mother or sister, and 
her recall of memories of home. She obtained a promise from Pickens to live in 
Texas at one point, but she wrote a bitter letter after he did not allow her to go to her 
mother, whom she believed to be ill. She was ready to leave him and her child and 
sail the dangerous Baltic Sea to see about her mother when Pickens became ill; hence 
she stayed in Russia. 31 
In the same letter she exposes her dislike for the idea of living at Edgewood "in 
the midst of all the children, grandchildren and relations of No. 1 and No. 2 (his first 
and second wives)". Although she later apologized for the letter, Lucy had revealed 
some of the difficulties of step-mothering. His daughters by his second marriage, 
Rebecca and Jennie, had accompanied them to Russia. The latter had been only 
twelve when Francis and Lucy married, and there was a mutual bond of love bet-
ween them. Jennie even called Lucy "Mama". But Lucy was not fond of Rebecca, 
who married Pickens' secretary, James C. Bacon, while in Russia. 
Pickens apparently had a good rapport with Lucy's family, however. Using af-
fectionate terms, he wrote to them asking for preserves and bought gifts for them. 
He was generous to them as well as to Lucy. When he spent forty dollars for a lace 
handkerchief for Lucy, she thought it was foolish, but was gracious enough not to 
tell him so. 39 
Lucy faced her motherhood more with the attitude of a modern mother than that 
of a Victorian shrinking violet, not fearing the pain and wanting to nurse her child. 
Her doctor said she was so popular and would want to go out that nursing her 
child, therefore, would not do. He said she was "nature's model" and predicted 
things would go well. ' 0 Sometime after her seventh month, when she was still going 
out a great deal, Pickens did write her family that she had been ill, but evidently the 
birth was not remarkably difficult. •1 The child was nursed by a Russian wet-nurse, 
Mumka, who, contrary to legend, remained in Russia when the Pickenses returned 
home. Although Lucy had written she would be greatly disappointed if she did not 
have a son, she seemed to take great pride in her daughter. 
The baptism of their child has been greatly romanticized. Lucy preferred to wait 
until their return and let the Presbyterian minister adored by her family do the 
honors, but she was concerned about traveling the treacherous seas without the in-
fant having been received into the Kingdom of God. In mid-August, 1860, she was 
considering having her christened when they reached England. 0 Nevertheless, the 
child was baptized before they left Russia. Legends say it occured in the company of 
diplomats from all foreign nations in the Russian capital, and that the czarina nam-
ed her "Douschka", meaning "Little Darling" during the ceremony, the name 
which stuck with her.0 She had been "Eugenia Dorothea Holcombe Pickens", at 
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her birth, 44 but her tombstone bears the name, "Frances Eugenia Olga Neva ... ", 
the latter two names apparently belonging to Russian Godmothers. 
Besides mothering her child in Russia, Lucy continued to study French and took 
voice lessons from Mon. Rubini, studying Italian music . ., Although she seemed to 
enjoy staying abroad, she disliked the Europeans' complete disregard for anything 
but rank and fortune. Both her republicanism and liberated view of womanhood 
caused her disdain for the nobility's disregard for women of lesser social status, 
regardless of their wit or charms. 46 
The Russian sojourn ended as the North-South conflict loomed in America. 
Pickens had stayed in contact with friends in South Carolina and, knowing of grow-
ing sentiment against the government, he resigned his post in Russia and traveled 
home in the fall of 1860. He wanted to cool the "hot-heads" and prevent war. Both 
he and President Buchanan were willing to maintain the status quo, although South 
Carolina, under the newly elected Governor Pickens' leadership, seceded from the 
Union in December, 1860. 
Evidently, when Pickens felt the call to return to South Carolina and lead his 
state, his promise to Lucy to live in Texas was erased. Lucy's mother came to 
Edgewood to visit when they were settled, and later Lucy visited her in Texas.47 But 
primarily Lucy was by her husband's side. "Francis and Lucy were so much a part 
of a team that it is difficult to think of one without the other ... Lucy Pickens was 
of great comfort to her husband through these trials. In all the councils of state held 
at Edgewood, she was an active participant, recognized by the men as a woman of 
unusual intelligence. She was an inspiration to her husband, the South Carolina peo-
ple and the soldiers in battle. " 41 Pickens believed in confiding in his wife and not 
sheltering her from the truth. While Lucy may have played a role in the war, there is 
nothing to substantiate a printed legend that says the match that lighted the first can-
non fired in the war was held by Douschka. 
Public service was distasteful to Pickens, and he had a reputation for being a 
"wind bag" who enjoyed speaking and writing, for being bombastic, verbose and 
loud with a cold personality, 49 -although an Edgefield friend's biography disagrees. 50 
But if any of his charms were lacking, Lucy made up for them. The chattering Mary 
Boykin Chesnut, at her first meeting with Lucy, observed: 
Met the lovely Lucy Holcombe, now Mrs. Governor 
Pickens, last night at the Issac Haynes's. Old Pick had a bet-
ter wig. I saw Miles begging in dumb show for three violets 
she had in her breastpin. She is silly and affected, looking for 
love into the eyes of the men at every glance. 51 
Mrs. Chestnut's writing suggests that Lucy was not intimate, but rather someone 
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on a pedestal to be sought after and observed. The feeling is apparent even in 
Edgefield stories in this era. Mrs. Chestnut confirms that Lucy was a "lovely and 
charming hostess" and some of their entertainments were embellished with Russian 
culture. After an 1862 party for wounded Wade Hamton, Mrs. Chestnut wrote: 
For us, they have never put the servants in Russian livery . 
. . but I must confess, the Russian tea and champagne always 
set before us left nothing to be desired. 52 
Both Mrs. Chestnut and the men of thier day recognized Lucy as clever. She 
drew on her study of history to defend an attack on herself and other ladies "lolling 
in their landaus": "Why not? General Washington attended the Assembly Balls 
and wanted everything done that could be done to amuse his soldiers and comfort 
and refresh them, and give them new strength for the fray."" 
As the governor's wife, Mrs. Pickens was protected from hardships other 
southern women endured, enjoying bacon and hominy for breakfast, cornbread a11d 
milk and sasafras tea for supper. ' 4 In the records of the United Daughters of The 
Confederacy there are no references to her sewing cartridge bags or rolling bandages 
as others did. Enduring only the hardships of having no escort, she and other 
leaders' wives ·were attending concerts in Columbia." 
A woodcut in the February, 1861, Harper's Weekly depicts her reviewing the 
Holcombe Legion named in her honor. The soldiers loved her. Hers was the only 
woman's portrait selected to adorn the Confederacy currency, and when the 
hundred-dollar bills bearing her profile were no longer legal tender, they were put in 
gift decorations and distributed as souvenirs at a convention of veterans." 
The Pickenses retired to their 2,250-acre plantation," "Edgewood," just north 
of Edgefield village in 1863 when Francis, fading in popularity, had decided not to 
seek another term. The plantation house had been built in 1832 as the home of 
Pickens' first youthful bride, a place "where ladies spoke French and danced 
candlelight polkas." There were great pantries, mahogany furniture and an English 
garden with mazes and statuary tucked away among its camellias and boxwoods. A 
wide vista through the avenue of cedars provided "a clear glimpse of horsemen or 
carriages as they turned away from the public road more than half-a-mile away 
(Center Springs Road). On festive occasions, red bonfires of fat pine guided the 
welcome guests through its dark length."" 
The original house was moved to Aiken in the 1920s and enhanced with hand-
some woodwork and other changes, but the front porch, with its arched entablature 
over Roman columns, appears to be identical to the home as it stood in Edgefield. 
From the memory of the one who lived there, the description was of "far-flung pro-
portions" and a front porch high above the ground, extending in full length of the 
house: 
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The dining room and perhaps the other of the reception 
rooms were papered in rich, red paper, having in the dining 
room a wide plate rail where art objects and china were 
displayed ... The library was separated from the large parlor 
by a carved archway, and French doors also led into a small, 
but very beautiful study panelled with blond and red 
mahogany. Opening from this study was the bedroom in 
which Gov. Pickens died. ' 9 
The library contained about a thousand volumes of books, from Locke's Essays 
to Life of Jefferson, from Shakespeare's Works to Mrs. Browning's Poems. The 
parlor furnishings included a piano, marble-topped tables, mirrors, two sofas, six 
chairs, the marble busts, chandeliers, a brass fender, portraits of the czar and a 
variety of porcelains, paintings, and candelabrum. Her jewelry was itemized in an 
impressive 55-item list. 60 
The Pickenses attended the Episcopal Church in the village where Lucy was con-
firmed on March 29, 1868. In Russia she had taken a great interest in the religious 
ceremonies; and her letters attest to her belief in God. Francis was a pillar of the 
church, serving as vestry chairman and paying the rector's salary during the im-
poverished years of the war and afterward. His death on January 25, 1869, was 
almost the death of the church. 61 
After Pickens' death Lucy converted Edgewood into the "most attractive home 
of Upper South Carolina. Her hospitality was widely known; visitors from far and 
wide sought the honor of her acquaintance. " 62 At thirty-six her compelling eyes and 
attractive features were not dimmed by the black of her widow's attire. Her pictures 
illustrate her love of jewelry; her writing, and her pleasure at fine gowns from 
Paris, but she never appeared ostentatious. 
Lucy was sad to know her widowed mother had to take in boarders in post-war 
years as she, herself, struggled to overcome the deprivation. Having lost all 
Pickens' property but Edgewood, in 1871 she made a trip with her step-son-in-law, 
Judge Bacon, to sell sotne jewelry in an effort to secure Edgewood and help her 
family. 63 In 1866 she had advanced her husband $13,900 from properties, 
presumably jewelry, sold in New York.64 Legend says the czar sent a jewel each 
year, and these were sold to sustain the family; but this is likely, since by 1865 the 
czar was separated from his wife and in love with Catherine. 
Douschka, calling her mother "Mamaska" in Russian tradition, was an indepen-
dent spirit, by her own admission a natural flirt like her mother and very responsive 
to her mother's wishes. She is heralded as the "Joan of Arc" of local history, hav-
ing led a band of Red Shirts to frighten blacks away from the polls, which assured 
the election of Wade Hampton and closed the chapter on South Carolina 
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Reconstruction. Lucy, while not active politically, surely applauded this election of 
a military hero she had entertained in her finest days. 
Evidently the sale of jewels in England was successful because Edgewood re-
mained in Lucy's possesion until her death, and in the fall of 1881 she gave a wed-
ding for Douschka, who married Dr. George Dugas of Augusta, Georgia. 
Douschka later moved from Augusta back to Edgewood with their children and ran 
the farm. Her husband came on weekends. 
Despite an earlier dread of having to contend with Pickens' kin and those of 
wives Number One and Number Two, Lucy felt enough compassion for his second 
wife, buried at the childhood home of his first wife, that she had servants move her 
to Pickens's side at Willowbrook. 65 Her cousin, Confederate Brigadier General 
Beverly Holcombe Robertson, lived with her for some time after the war, as did her 
brother, John T. H. Holcombe, and a Major Kirkland "who came for tea and 
stayed thirty years." 
She continued to be active in causes she considered important. In 1866 she was 
appointed second Vice Regent of Mount Vernon's Ladies' Association for the state 
of South Carolina, although she did not become active until 1876. She served for 
many years as Chairman of the Garden and Greenhouse Committee. 66 She founded 
the Maxie Gregg Chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy and in her last 
years organized a fund drive to place a monument to the Confederate dead in 
Edgefield's town square. 
Lucy was sixty-one when she buried her daughter and found herself with two 
grand-daughters to raise. She was grief-striken by her loss. A biography of Pickens, 
published during Lucy's lifetime, describes her: 
The graceful and accomplished mistress who presided 
over all this lovely scene and whose smile was wont in happier 
days to light up as with magic the long galleries . . . still 
remains--chastened, and in her widow's weeds.67 
On August 8, 1899, after being ill for several weeks, the "uncrowned queen of 
the Southern Confederate States" died at Edgewood of a blood clot. Lucy Pickens' 
obituary calls her "one of the most famous women of the South, and one whose 
name will live in history. " 68 Yet, like a good romance, read and laid aside, she has 
been nearly forgotten, her life cut into the yellowed clippings scattered here and 
there in attics and library stacks. These remnants of her life are like a challenging 
jigsaw puzzle. When put together, they yield the true picture of Lucy Pickens. It is a 
picture of utter enchantment, embodying all the elements of the romantic myths of 
the Old South. 
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DID THE LADY OF COFITACHEQUI LIVE 
IN CAMDEN, SOUTH CAROLINA? 
Charles W. Bright 
Only God and the Indians know how to pronounce correctly an 1ndian name 
recorded and pronounced in several different ways by the Spanish in 1540 and later 
translated into English. Inquiries made concerning correct pronunciation included a 
University of Georgia Anthropologist, a University of South Carolina Archeologist 
and a University of South Carolina Spanish Professor--none of whom agreed. The 
word was not included in any available dictionary. 
Previous interest in this topic was renewed in the summer of 1980, when the 
magazine, Early Man, reported the discovery of a Spanish document from the 1560s 
never before translated. It contains clues about the location of the home town of 
The Lady of Cofitachequi. 
There seems to be little doubt that De Soto met her in South Carolina--but where 
in South Carolina? Was it near Columbia, Camden, Aiken, historic Manchester in 
Sumter County, or just on a river? De Soto, a Spanish explorer, is famous because 
in 1541 he became the first white man to cross the Mississippi River. Born in Bar-
carota, Spain, he came to the New World when he was about nineteen. He accom-
panied Pizzaro in his conquest of Peru and acquired his share of plundered gold. 
While Governor of Cuba in 1538, he decided to explore Florida, which had been 
reported to be a land of gold and perhaps silver. Little did he know that the gold 
would turn out to be copper and the silver to be mica. 
De Soto landed at Tampa Bay with about 600 men in May, 1539, and moved 
toward an Indian town called Appalache. It is worthwhile metioning that, by error, 
this Appalache is the source of the name of the Appalachian Mountains. Thereafter, 
De Soto crossed Georgia to the Savannah River and entered South Carolina, where 
he met an Indian ruler whom he called "The Lady of Cofitachequi". As De Soto 
looked accross the river, he saw four canoes approaching, one of which contained 
an Indian woman who gave him an appropriate greeting. This was a relative of the 
ruler of Cofitachequi who was prudent enough to remain on her side of the river 
while she made an estimate of the situation. Later, she crossed over to meet De 
Soto. She traveled in a large canoe which had an awning over the stern, a mat on the 
bottom and two large cushions. She was an attractive woman about thirty-five, 
brown of skin, well formed and appropriately clothed. Her house in Talimeco, the 
principal town, was large, high, broad and decorated with handsome mats. This 
was reported by Ranjel, De Soto's secretary, who spelled the word Cofitachequi.' It 
is similarly spelled in the majority of other sources. 
The title of a female ruler of a number of Indian towns or villages or areas was 
19 
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the Queen. 2 Don't be surprised that a woman was an Indian ruler. There is evidence 
that American Indian women had more rights than did European women of the 
same and later centuries. Among the Natchez women only the oldest male born of 
the sister of the nation's ruler could succeed him at his death--not the ruler's oldest 
son. Among the Iroquois descent was traced on the mother's side; a matriarch ruled 
each longhouse--a residence for 50 or more persons. When a couple married, it was 
the husband who moved; women owned the house, belongings and fields--to the ex-
tent that Indians believed in land ownership. 3 
The Southeastern Indian women sometimes played a man's role. Nancy Ward, 
an eighteenth century Ch~rokee woman, fought like a man in battle, and the men 
gave her the title of "war woman" or "beloved woman." She spoke in Cherokee 
councils and, in 1781, conducted negotiations with an invading American Army. 
Years before, Little Carpenter, her uncle, while on a visit to Charleston, found no 
women present among the representatives of the British Colonists. When Little 
Carpenter asked whether it was not true that "White men as well as Red were born 
of Women," he left the British stammering for an answer.' 
We know that De Soto was in the midst of a group of Indians known as Mound 
Builders. The National Geographic Society reports: 
"Who were the Mound Builders? Survivors of sunken 
Atlantis, some said. Egyptians and Pheonicians wandering 
far from home, ventured others. The real story is just as in-
triguing, and it does concern sophisticated people. Not a 
mythical super race, but American Indians--ancestors of the 
Creeks, Cherokees, Natchez and others who first greeted the 
White Man."' 
The Burial Mound Period started shortly after 100 B.C., when a new wave of 
people entered the lower Mississippi Valley from the west and spread north and 
east. 6 They merged with the Archaic Indians already in the area. Sometime around 
800 A.O. the Burial Mound culture was displaced by a group of round-headed peo-
ple from the southwest who practiced skull deformation. The bow and arrow 
replaced the spear, and the Temple Mound period started. This included a pattern 
of life called Mississippian, which had Middle American influences. A highly 
ritualistic religion, the Southern Cult arose sometime in the 14th century. Mulberry 
Plantation, Camden, South Carolina, is considered to have been one of its centers. 1 
In South Carolina the Indians along the lower Santee and Peedee Rivers were ap-
parently round-headed and practiced skull-deformation similar to the Waxhaw In-
dians. There is no historical evidence of head-deformation among the Creeks or the 
Cherokees, but archeological evidence is that their ancestors followed the practice.• 
Available sources have made no mention of head-deformation among the 
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Cofitachequi Indians. However, since they have not been positively identified 
nothing can be made of this one way or the other. There are good indication~ 
though that they belonged to the Peedee-Santee River Culture. 
As early as 1521 the South Carolina Indians told Gordillo that they knew their 
land by the name "Chicora. " 9 Chicora and Cofitachequi may have been Indian 
towns located in the vicinity of Columbia, Camden or historic Manchester. 
Cofitachequi also seems to have been an Indian Province or Confederacy. Pending 
the availability of new information, it is believed that the Cofitachequi Indians can 
be identified as Temple Moundbuilders, ruled by a Queen in the Province of 
Cofitachequi, in the Land of Chicora, located in the Piedmont and Atlantic Slope 
areas of South Carolina. This group of Indians was around for at least another 150 
years as Dr. Henry Woodward, the mentor of early Charleston, made an alliance 
with their Emperor in 1671. 
Various references describe the society in which the Lady of Cofitachequi lived. 
Charles Hudson states in his history of The Southeastern Indians that Cofitachequi 
was one of the most impressive Indian societies De Soto encountered. The Indians 
gave De Soto and his party gifts of "well tanned skins, 'blankets', strips of venison, 
dry wafers, and a large quantity of ' very good salt'." They were attired in "usual 
leggings and moccasins ... " and wore "matchcoats made of 'sable'and' wildcat 
(probably cougar) skins." Hudson adds that the "Spaniards found beads, rosaries, 
and Biscayan axes" which were thought to have been transported inland from 
"Ayllon's ill-fated colony." 10 
Talimeco, the religious center of the society, Hudson indicates, is purported to 
have contained "five hundred houses built on a bluff overlooking a gorge of a 
river." Its main temple (100 feet long and 40 feet wide) was situated on a high 
mound. It had " a lofty roof covered with finely made cane mats ... decorated in-
side and out with large conch shells and strings of freshwater pearls." Inside the 
large entrance doors were rows of large, life-like wooden statues--six pairs in all . 
"The first pair carried maces with diamond-shaped heads, reminiscent of the 
'batons' depictd in Southeastern Ceremonial Complex motifs. The second pair held 
wooden 'broadswords'; the third, . . . clubs made of two parts connected with a 
swivel; the fourth, .. . 'battle axes'; the fifth, .. . bows and arrows; and the sixth, .. 
. pikes with copper spear points." Resting on low benches along the walls were " 
carved wooden chests containing the remains of dead notables." Also in the room 
were "breast-like corselets and headpeices made of raw-hide, round and oval-
shaped shields, chests filled with pearls, and bundles of furs and skins." Eight small 
annexes surrounded the temple. In them were a variety of weapons and shields--
many "decorated with strands of pearls, strips of colored leather, or with strips of 
copper.'' 11 
An article appearing in a 1969 edition of the National Geographic Society tends 
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to verify Hudson's account of De Soto's meeting with the Lady of Cofitachequi and 
makes reference to a museum at Etowah, Georgia wherein: 
A silhouette suggests a great temple such as might have 
topped the mounds at Etowah. De Soto had visited a similar 
structure . . . in the provence of Cofitachequi ... 'Now this 
temple was large, being more than a hundred feet in length 
and forty in width' ... In the mortuary temple ... he saw 
wooden chests containing bodies, and a yard above each of 
them was a statue carved from wood and placed on a pedestal 
against the wall. This was a personal likeness of the man or 
woman within the chest and was made at the age he or she had 
attained at death. De Soto also met the lovely mistress, of the 
province of Cofitachequi. She presented him with a large 
strand of pearls as thick as hazelnuts which encircled her neck 
three times and fell to her thighs ... De Soto bestowed upon 
her a Spanish ring of gold, set with a ruby." 12 
Pearls by the thousand are known to have been plucked from river mussels, drill-
ed and used as clothing decorations or strung around the throat. There is evidence 
that diving may have been a respected occupation among the Mound Builders. The 
economic power and trade relations of inland Moundbuilding Indians should not be 
underestimated. Cahokia, along the Mississippi River, had conchshell beads from 
the Gulf of Mexico, rolled sheets of copper from Lake Superior and mica from 
North Carolina. Areas of dotted circles, where wooden poles may have been used 
for observations of the sun--perhaps in connection with a definition of a calendar 
year. 13 
Historians have never agreed on the location of Cofitachequi. Reports which 
seem to favor the Savannah River location include: D. D. Wallace, who said 
Cofitachequi was probably at Silver Bluff, Aiken County, South Carolina, thirteen 
miles from the present Augusta; 14 Henry Savage, who stated, that most say De Soto 
traveled along the Indian path from the coast to the mountains between Saluda and 
the Savannah; u and Herd, who seems absolutely convinced that Cofitachequi was 
at Silver Bluff. 16 
The site of Silver Bluff in Aiken County, South Carolina, may indicate that they 
were Creek Indians. One source, Indians and Artifacts in the Southeast, indicates 
that in the time of De Soto Cofitachequi seems to have been either Kasihta or 
Coweta, both Creek Indian towns. 11 Herd seems to support this position by saying 
that the Indian boy whom De Soto had used as a guide and interpreter in lower 
Georgia and Florida could speak the language of the Cofitachequi Indians. 11 
Reports which favor the Columbia, South Carolina, location include that of 
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Henry Savage, who remarked that others say the town of the Lady of Cofitachequi 
was on the Congaree where Columbia now stands, and from there De Soto marched 
up the Broad River to the mountains. Also in 1566 Pardo traveled the banks of the 
Congaree River, where in later years the Indian trading post known as The Con-
garees was located. 19 Bert W. Bierer cites two fellow historians who placed 
Cofitachequi in the Congarees in the vicinity of the old Indian trading area near 
Thom's Creek near Cayce, South Carolina. 21) 
The site of Thom's Creek as the possible location of Cofitachequi may indicate 
that they were Congaree Indians. Bierer states that the Congaree Indians were 
located on the Congaree River, centered in the neighborhood of Columbia, South 
Carolina.21 Stephen G. Baker said that Lawson, in 1701, found the Congarees 
located on the Wateree River at about the location of Cotachico on the Matthews 
map of 1685, near greater Camden. Lawson found no other Indians there. The 
Congarees are the most likely descendants of the Cofitachequi Indians of 1670. 
There is no eyidence that they were all in the area known historically as The CoJ1-
garees until well into the 18th century. 22 
Those who favor the Camden, South Carolina, location are Charles Hudson and 
associates at the University of Georgia. Hudson states that in November, 1566, Par-
do left Santa Elena and traveled approximately 100 miles to Guiamae (De Soto's 
Aymay) and, a few miles farther, found Cofitachequi. 23 The Summer, 1980, edition 
of Early Man (an archeology magazine) refers to a previously unknown Pardo docu-
ment discovered in the North Carolina Archives in the 1950s, now being translated 
at the University of Georgia. This document is an official report on journeys inland 
by Captain Juan Pardo, then a resident of Santa Elena, a Spanish town located at 
Paris Island, South Carolina, from 1566 to 1587--once the capital of Spanish Florida 
Territory. This ancient town is now being excavated by archeologists from the 
University of South Carolina. This report mentions the building of at least five in-
land forts, and locates Cofitachequi in the vicinity of Camden, South Carolina--
considered to be the location of several Mississippian period (1000-1400 A.D.) 
sites. 24 Gascoyne's 1682 map of The Country Carolina shows Cofitachequi at the 
headquarters of the Santee River. The Stuarts of the National Geographic Society 
said; 
"We decided to visit the Indian Mounds on Mulberry 
Plantation ... near Camden. The Wateree River over the 
years has eaten into the large mound until the place has 
dissolved. Pottery fragments found were from the 16th and 
17th centuries. An engraved map from Ancient Monuments 
of the Mississippi Valley printed in the 1840s shows ten 
mounds in the Camden Area surrounded by an earth enbank-
ment. "2! 
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Bierer refers to "Maps of the Camden Area" which show Taylor's Mounds, "a 
circle of nine with a large one (12 to 15 feet high) in the center, to be surrounded by a 
low enbankment." There, Bierer, recalls arrowheads, axes, urns, marine shells and 
human bones have been found. Of the Mounds, he says: 
"Harrison's is the highest in position of any on the river, 
480 feet in circumference at the base, 15 feet high and a level 
area of 120 feet in circumference at the surface. A mound 
near Mound Creek is the largest on the river--500 feet in cir-
cumference at the base, 225 feet in circumference at the sur-
face, 34 feet high and slightly oblong. An urn with cover was 
discovered which holds 46 quarts. Contents include a number 
of large shell beads about the size and shape of nutmegs. An 
old Indian villiage is nearby. An Indian Trail is across the 
river. " 26 
Any of these sizable mounds was large enough to accommodate the temple De 
Soto saw in 1540. 
The area of Camden, South Carolina, as the possible location of Cofitachequi 
could indicate that its people were Wateree Indians. Their most historic location 
places them on the Wateree River below the present Camden, South Carolina. 
However, Douglas Brown's The Catawba Indians places them in the upper Yadkin 
area in Pardo's time--the 1560s. 27 This may be connected with a general movement 
inland about 1550--reversed about 100 or more years later. Baker indicates that no 
known documentary evidence places the Waterees near Camden in the late 17th and 
early 18th centuries. 21 
The available information about exactly which group of Indians lived in what 
specific area during the time of De Soto and Pardo is so incomplete that it is not now 
possible to identify positively the Indians of Cofitachequi. If agreement is ever 
reached on the exact location of Cofitachequi, it is possible that extensive excavation 
might positively identify them. 
The University of South Carolina has partially excavated a mound located on 
Mulberry Plantation at Camden; so far no Spanish artifacts have been found. Did 
the Lady of Cofitachequi live in or near Camden? The issue is not settled. It is 
hoped that a book to be published--based on Captain Juan Pardo's rediscovered 
document--by Professor Charles Hudson and associates at the University of 
Georgia--will decide the issue once and for all. A reconstructed Indian Mound, such 
as the one at Etowah, Georgia, would be a boon to South Carolina. Professor Hud-
son wrote a letter dated August 4, 1981: "We do not believe that we have evidence 
that Cofitachequi was near Camden."29 
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In connection with Professor Hudson's statement, mention must be made of 
what is probably the most detailed study ever made concerning the location of 
Cofitachequi--350 pages, plus, by Steven Baker as a part of a Master's Degree re-
quirement at the University of South Carolina. In part, Mr. Baker's study indicates: 
(1) Cofitachequi was at the confluence of the Wateree and Congaree Rivers. (2) 
This was where De Soto was taken across the river by the Lady of Cofitachequi. (3) 
De Soto visited the temple in the "Lady's" own town of Talimeco--one long league 
(5 miles) from where the army was located. (4) Talimeco, with an estimate 500 
houses, was on an eminence overlooking a gorge of a river. The most likely location 
for this is on the high sand ridges overlooking the confluence of the Wateree-
Congaree Rivers at the south end of the High Hills of the Santee. This would be in 
Sumter, near historic Manchester. (5) Lawson's description of the Santee Indians 
fits the historical description of the Cofitachequi Indians. Lawson located them 
near the area where De Soto crossed and where they had long lived. (6) The High 
Hills of Santee have had significant Indian occupations similar to those in the 
Camden area. (7) De Soto traveled up the East bank of the Wateree River to Ilapi 
which was 12 leagues (or 30 miles) above Cofitachequi. This would be near 
Camden. (8) Camden, alone, may have been the geographic focus of Cofitachequi 
in the late 17th century. And (9) a large chiefdom once centered Cofitachequi and 
extended from the coast to the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains and from the 
valley of the Savannah River to that of the Peedee River. 30 
It could be that Professor Hudson's findings will finally pinpoint Cofitachequi--
possibly between Camden and the confluence of the Congaree-Wateree Rivers on 
the east side of the Wateree. Anyone trying to solve a problem like this should keep 
in mind a statement by James Mooney: "War, pestilence, whiskey and systematic 
slave hunts had nearly exterminated the aboriginal occupants of the Carolinas 
before anybody had thought them of sufficent importance to ask who they were, 
how they lived, or what were their beliefs and opinions. " 31 
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THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
KING AND BUREAUCRACY AT MARI 
Victor H. Matthews 
The process involved in the formation of a centralized government in ancient 
Mesopotamia, like that in late medieval Europe, was dependent upon the effective 
utilization of the royal bureaucracy. This specialized group of officials managed the 
wide-ranging affairs of the riverine civilizations of Babylonia and Assyria. While 
they were not as sophisticated as modern diplomats, they did face many of the same 
problems: touchy negotiations with neighboring kingdoms, trade agreements, 
military recruitment, and espionage. 
The royal archives discovered at Mari in Northern Syria (dating to c. 1800 B.C.) 
demonstrate just how important a well-run bureaucracy could be to the monarch. 1 
A king who could command the loyalty of his provincial officials and depend on 
them to handle local matters with dispatch would sit more securely on his throne. 
Clearly, a symbiotic relationship existed between these two integral parts of govern-
ment. 
A great deal can be told about a government and its workings by examining the 
political situation faced by the monarchs. The basic political structure of the Mari 
region can best be described as feudal. There were a number of small kingdoms, 
loosely allied to each other. 2 Each kingdom in turn had vassal states which served 
them in a constant series of petty wars. An assessment of this situation is provided 
in a letter to the king of Mari, Zinri-Lim: 
There is no king who, of himself, is the strongest. Ten or 
fifteen kings follow Hammurabi of Babylon, the same 
number follow, Rim-Sin of Larsa, the same number follow 
Ibal-pi-El of Esnunn, the same number follow Amut-pi-il of 
Qatanum, twenty kings follow Yarim-Lim of Yamhad. 3 
Within this precarious balance of power the Mari kings had to strive to maintain 
their position--shifting alliances back and forth, arranging diplomtic marriages, and 
keeping order within their own territory. The kingdom also had to weather changes 
in the ruling dynasty three times in sixty years. 4 
The kings of Mari maintained a high visibility, traveling regularly throughout the 
kingdom. 5 They constantly sent and received reports from governors, military per-
sonnel, and fellow rulers. 6 The region which they claimed as their domain contained 
a mixed population of urban dwellers and pastoral nomadic tribes. Collectively, 
they formed what has been described as a dimorphic society (i.e., one in which there 
is the double process of interaction between nomad and sedentary and between tribe 
and state). 7 
27 
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Administering such a diverse region necessitated the use of a variety of groups 
and officials. For example, the royal family was often put into positions of authori-
ty. The Assyrian king, Samsi-Addu, used his two sons to help govern his kingdom. 
Each ruled territory as governors for their father, probably as a means of gaining ex-
perience for when they would succeed him. The younger son, Yasmah-Addu, served 
as a regent in Mari. However, his performance was not always up to his father's ex-
pectations, and in several letters we find harsh reprimands and demands that he 
shape up his administration. 1 
Zimri-Lim, the Amorite king who reclaimed Mari from the Assyrians, also 
engaged in royal nepotism. His many wives and daughters served as advisors9 and 
proxies at sacrifices as well as managers of the royal household while he was away 
from Mari. 10 His chief wife, Sibtu, appears to have held particularly important 
supervisory status in both mundane as well as cultic tasks." In ARM X 128 she 
escorts the sacred image of the god Hisametum to the city of Hisamta for a seasonal 
fesitval and sacrifice. 
Additional evidence of her importance is shown in the fact that so many of her 
husband's officials and allies apparently found it necessary to send her progress 
reports on their work in additon to the usual courtesy notices. One example of this 
is found in ARM X 157 in which Hali-hadun, a provincial governor presently engag-
ed in a diplomatic mission, outlines his negotiations for the queen. He assures her 
that progress is being made and makes it clear that it is his efforts which are the 
primary reason for the establishment of "good relations" 12 between two tribal 
groups and a troublesome ally named Qarni-Lim. Undoubtedly, Hali-hadun hoped 
to influence the queen as a means to future advancement within the government. 13 
Most of the details of government on the local level were handled by an assort-
ment of career officials like Hali-hadun. The kingdom was divided into territorial 
units called halsum or matum. 14 The governors of each province varied in authority 
and responsibility according to a complex formula based on proximity to the 
capitol, make up of the population," strategic position, and economic importance. 16 
The kings of Mari knew the importance of maintaining continuity and loyalty 
within this bureaucratic structure. In a letter to Yasmah-Addu (ARM I 61: 27-33), 
Samsi-Addu strongly urges his son to quickly replace a household official who had 
died: 
If a bureaucrat does not give orders for a few days, would 
the position not be neglected? Why did you not appoint on 
that very same day someone to that position?" 
Zimri-Lim shows how much the loyalty of his administrators meant to him in an 
apologetic letter to a woman named Malik-Akka. He tells her that he has had to 
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delay sending her a servant11 because every war captive taken in campaigns since his 
return to power has had to be given to his bureaucrats. 
The primary function of the district governor was to· keep order and keep the 
king informed of even the smallest detail. A typical message of this type is found in 
ARM XIV 36, a letter from the governor of Sagarattum, Yaqqim-Addu: 
To Sunuhhurahalu, speak! Thus says Yaqqim-Addu, 
your friend. (5) On the day which I have had this tablet sent 
to you, the asses of the messenger of the Yamhadians arrived 
at Dur-Yahdun-Lim. (10) Zu-Hatni ( ... ). Tommorrow 
they will receive their feeding. I had not written to (15) 
Habdu-Malik concerning this announcement. On another 
matter 30 truffles have been collected and I have requisitioned 
them as supplies for the king. I have had nine truffles sent as 
your portion. (20) This is only a small number, but I have 
not taken advantage of you. 
A variety of items are detailed here. Probably the messenger of the Yamhadians 
is mentioned first because the king must be constantly aware of the movements of 
foreign nationals. 19 The governor is careful to note his solicitousness in caring for 
the animals of this messenger, since diplomatic gaffes must always be avoided. 
Yaqqim-Addu also demonstrates his wisdom by noting that he has passed on this in-
formation to both the king and to a fellow provincial official, Habdu-Malik. 20 
A post scriptum is added in the letter concerning the sending of truffles for the 
king's table. An exact count is given and careful attention is exercised to show that 
one third of them have been reckoned as the share of the bureaucrat addressed in the 
text. This man, Sunuhhurahalu, was a very powerful palace official. He apparently 
served as the "personal secretary" 21 of the king and thus was in a position to aid his 
friends. 22 As a matter of discretion, it is unlikely that the bribe and gratuity in ques-
tion would have been mentioned when the letter was read to the king. 
These communications often contain self-serving statements as well as criticisms 
of fellow administrators. Thus in ARM V 65, Asqudum, a palace official who serv-
ed both the Assyrians and Zimri-Lim, reports on various activitites to Yasmah-
Addu. 23 The organization of the letter shows his intent. First, he points out the 
failure of a fellow, perhaps rival, official named Zunan to conduct extispicies. 
Then, in great detail, he describes his own dutiful performance of this important 
function. Finally, he attempts to further ingratiate himself by passing on the news 
of a particularly favorable extispicy: 
The left side of the "finger" (of the liver) was split, the 
middle "finger" of the lungs was bent toward the right: a 
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sign predicting fame. Rejoice my lord! 24 
The Mari bureaucracy, of course, did more than seek ways to undermine each 
other. There is ample evidence in the arcliive to demonstrate their real worth to the 
monarchy. Each official had everyday tasks which required his attention. Here are 
selections from a few letters describing typical matters to be tended to: 
I have gathered working men of the district and the men 
of Terqa for labor on the canal of Mari. (ARM III 6: 5-7) 
I have inspected the Haneans of the encampment and I 
have assigned 2,000 men who are going on the campaign with 
Yasmah-Addu. (ARM VI 42: 5-6) 
I have visited the dam, and all is well. The upper sluice 
gate of stone that you made is letting water through. (ARM 
VI 1: 10-14)25 
I have not been negligent in gathering into Terqa the rent-
grain of my district and the grain from (the fields of) the 
palace. (ARM III 17: 27-31) 
Such diligence is admirable. However, it is the extraordinary bits of service 
which demonstrate the administrator's true loyalty and concern for his monarch. A 
good example of this type of service is found in a letter from Yasim-Sumu, one of a 
group of factotum officials, to the king's personal secretary, Sunuhhrahalu.26 The 
subject is the proposed year-date. 
Apparently, a memo had been sent to all provincial officials that the current year 
would be named in honor of the king's dedication of a throne to the god Dagan. 
Yasim-Sumu tactfully points out that the throne has not yet been presented and he 
suggests an alternative year-name: "The year in which Zimri-Lin went to the aid of 
Babylonia, (and) for a second time (marches) against the country of Larsa." His 
aim seems to be to save the king some official embarrassment as well as to appear 
the dutiful servant. 
In another case (ARM III 8), the governor of Terqa, Kibri-Dagan, attempts in a 
diplomatic way to refuse an order from the king when he feels it is ill-timed and 
could hurt productivity in his area: 
My lord has sent me an order to go to Mari to appear 
before the junior ugbabtum priestess. 21 I have to direct work 
here and the field on which I am directing work is in actual 
danger; in fact, the (situation at the) field is difficult and 
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troublesome. If I stay here myself right now I can certainly 
keep the entire crew together, but once I have dropped the 
work and have left, the crew will disperse, the well be aban-
doned, and the country of my lord will be in dire need of ir-
rigation water. 
May my lord go without any worry and kiss the feet of the 
god Dagan who loves him, while I get the work done here. I 
just cannot posibly leave. 21 
Since it was impossible for the king to know everything that was going on in the 
various sections of his realm, it is probable that he was unaware of Kibri-Dagan's 
predicament. Zimri-Lim's well-known piety toward the god Dagan could have also 
led him to assume that his governor would drop whatever he was doing to consult 
the priestess. 29 
Such simple, blind obedience to orders might seem desirabe to the king at first 
glance. However, it is the bureaucrat who can think on his own that is truly a useful 
servant. Kibri-Dagan did not refuse his lord. Instead, he presented a reasonable 
argument for why he should delay his departure for Mari. He cited commonly 
understood labor difficulties, probable dire consequences of delay in completing his 
present task and the obvious need for his presence to insure success on this project. 30 
The king might have found fault with his devotion to the gods, but certainly not in 
his attention to the kingdom's economic welfare. 31 
In addition to the urban-based administrative responsibilities, the provincial 
governors and the officials who served them also had to deal with the activities of 
several large, semi-nomadic tribal groups. The Mari dynasts managed to subdue the 
autonomous tribal chiefs through open warfare and a "divide and conquer" 
stratagem. 32 This latter tactic was implemented by ignoring "the Jaminite kings and 
dealing directly with the sugagum chiefs. " 33 
The use by the central government of local tribe leaders like the sugagu was 
beneficial to both parties. These leaders served as a conduit between the tribe and 
the state. 34 The special status given them by the government provided them with 
even greater influence over their individual tribal groups than might otherwise have 
been the case. Their elevation to positions of responsibility also aided the govern-
ment's attempts to drive a wedge between the tribe and the traditional tribal elite. 
Thus, the tribal chiefs could form a controllable link which would allow for com-
munication and resolution of differences in a manner easier than if the tribes retain-
ed complete autonomy. 35 
The government official who had the greatest degree of responsibility anJ in-
teraction with tribal activites as they affected the policies of the state was the 
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merhum. 36 In terms of the authority structure in the provinces, this official would 
direct the efforts of the sugagu as well as other governement servants. One text 
which illustrates some of the duties of the merhum is ARM XIV 86: 17-27: 
... The men (sagbu) whom Ibal-pi-El, the merhum, has 
appointed as guards over the pasturage encampment of my 
lord, saw the Uprapeans driving away their flocks. 37 This in-
formation, I (Yaqqim-Addu) heard from my retainers, and I 
have written to my lord. Also I have sent the men of the 
bazahatum for a distance of two double miles to block (the 
Uprapeans') passage. 11 
From this report it can be surmised that the merhum held prime responsibility 
for the happenings in his section of the pastureland (nawum). 39 He could delegate 
some of his authority to various levels of the district's police forces, thereby keeping 
illegal activity to a minimum. He also was under the surveillance and possibly the 
supervision of the provincial governor. ' 0 
In the Mari kingdom there was a well defined governmental chain of command 
drawn from the merhum, or provincial governor, through the sugagu and down to 
the individual tribal member. 0 This channeling of instructions and the resulting 
mediation of conflicts through an administrative hierarchy allowed vested interests 
and varied social units to become more equalized. Additionally, the buffer, which 
the mediator-official provided, eliminated many of the clashes between tribe and 
state which would otherwise have occured because of differing social traditions and 
practices. 0 
The Mari texts document the various capacities of service performed by the 
sugagum. These include bureacratic, judicial, and military roles. His respon-
sibilities also covered the recruitment from the tribal groups of men to engage in 
various work projects and for service in the military. ' 3 This authority and heighten-
ed status also carried with them a price. The sugagum must have often felt 
pressured by the need to perform his duties quickly and efficiently. In addition, per-
sonal ties to the family and tribe might at times have necessitated making hard deci-
sions. In one instance, ARMXIV 46: 6-10, Yaqqim-Addu describes a sugagum who 
chose to relinquish his office: 
... Ahamnuta spoke to me in this manner: "This office 
of sugagum of Dur-Yahdun-Lim I cannot exercise, (thus) I 
have resigned. (Therefore) one (who has the right to be nam-
ed) should be named." 
Such a decision, while rare in the texts," is understandable considering the 
language contained in several letters from the provincial governors to the sugagu: 
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Whoever among you who does not seize any man from 
your villages who leaves for the Upper Country and does not 
bring him to me, most assuredly, you shall not (be allowed to) 
live! (ARM II 92: 14-18). 
Heaven forbid that the sugagu will (attempt to) make the 
excuse that, "The Haneans are scattered from the villages 
(with) not one among the Haneans (still) existing in the 
district." (ARM XIV 80: 16-20). 
The system of administration that ruled the Mari region was complex and not 
always as efficient as its monarchs desired. Due to the fact that there existed several 
levels of authority and numerous management units, it is not surprising to find that 
corruption and mistakes did occur. However, even in a case where a crime, such as 
embezzlement, had taken place, the government was usually willing to settle for a 
lesser punishment rather than lose the services of a trained administrator. 4 ' Thus, 
Idin-Sin, who had apparently been caught red-handed, was told if he would repay 
double the amount of silver missing, he could have his position back. 46 
Leniency in this case may seem unusual, but a slap on the wrist meant continuity 
of administration, and his dismissal would have necessitated training a replacement. 
The evidence seems to indicate that Mari was hard-pressed to maintain a sufficient 
number of officials who had both the ability to carry out orders and to read and 
write. 47 
In the face of what must have seemed at times an impossible task, some officials 
did try to police areas outside their juridiction and thereby cut through the layers of 
red tape. In one instance Bahdi-Lim wrote directly to the king in hope of breaking a 
supply deadlock (ARM VI 39): 
I checked on the members of the (royal) household; of 400 
members only 100 men are provided with garments while 300 
are without garments. I questioned Bali-Erah and Mukan-
nisum on account of the men without garments, and Mukan-
nisum answered me as follows: "This is not my duty, Bali-
Erah has to give them garments." And, Bali-Erah answered 
me as follows: "I provided garments for 100, the balance 
Mukannism has to provide with garments."•• This is what 
they answered me. 
It so happens that Sidqi-epuh is now in the presence of my 
lord. 0 My lord should instruct Sidqi-epuh (what to do) and 
he should give me the necessary orders to provide the 
members of the household with garments. ' 0 
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Perhaps a text like this is the best way to sum up a discussion of the symbiotic 
relationship between the king and his officials. Here two supply personnel have 
become obsessed with the importance of their position and are thus playing the age-
old game of "pass the buck" to avoid taking responsibility for an obvious mistake. 
However, this all too familiar situation does have a solution: A higher ranking 
supervisor recognizes what has happened and takes the initiative to end the problem 
by going to the center of authority, the king. 
Note that Bahdi-Lim does not take any action on his own. He merely presents 
the facts of the problem and the testimony of those officials involved. He then sug-
gests a possible course of action (i.e., the introduction of a neutral, high ranking 
party, who can mediate between them). This suggestion leaves the decision and the 
solution up to the king's judgement. The fact that Bahdi-Lim felt he could do this 
demonstrates the effectiveness and general healthiness of communication in the 
Mari bureaucratic structure. 
It is this type of collective activity, reaching from one level to the next, which 
shows the useful symbiotic arrangement which made the Mari kingdom prosperous 
and relatively stable in the 18th centuy B.C. The complexities of administration re-
quired varied talents and dispositions. By maintaining an efficient bureaucratic 
structure, the kings of Mari retained their autonomy for sixty years until the ambi-
tions and armies of Hammurabi of Babylon absorbed them c. 1758 B.C. 
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" J. MacDonald, "The Identification of the Bazahatum in the Mari Letters," RA, 69 (1975), 145, 
describes these men as a "sort of state secret police,'' who were moved about according to royal com-
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,. For discussion of this term, see A. Malamat, "Mari and the Bible," Journal of the American Orien-
tal Society, 82 (1962), 146, J.T. Luke, "Pastoralism and Politics in the Mari Period,'' Dissertation, p. 
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168-173. 
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" W.G. Irons, "Variation in Political Stratification Among the Yomut Turkmen,'' Anthropological 
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The Symbiotic Relationship Between King and Bureaucracy at Mari 37 
" Rowton, "Dimphoric Structure and the Tribal Elite," pp. 244-24S. 
" ARM I 119 and V 24 report the position of 1u1a1um changing hands only on the death of the 
previous officeholder. 
•• G. Dossin, "Archives de Sumu-Iamam, Roi de Mari," RA, 64 (1970), 41, A. 12. See also ARM X 
90 which also mentions this case. 
•• Sasson, "Archive Keeping," p. 62. 
•
1 Ibid., p. 63, describes an incident in Ann X 82 in which eight officials were sent to the archive to 
retrieve a tablet. He suggest that so many were needed because of rampant illiteracy in the Mari 
bureaucracy. 
•• ARMT XIII 1 :xiv:6S mentions Mukannisum as in charge of female weavers and thus might be ex-
pected to be able to supply the needed garments. 
•• Cf. ARM X 160 and B.F. Batto, Women, 32, n. 41, for this high ranking official. 
'° Oppenheim, Letten, p. 107. 
OLYMPIAS, WOULD-BE RULER 
Elizabeth Camey 
Scholarship has long neglected Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great and 
best known of the wives of Philip II of Macedonia. Despite the recent boom in 
studies of the reigns of her husband and son, no consistent evaluation of her policies 
and political aims has ever been attempted, and Grace Macurdy's brief and occa-
sionally sensitive biographical essay is now dated.' 
The scholarly neglect is not accidental. The extraordinary hostility of virtually 
all extant sources to Olympias makes analysis of her career difficult. It is traditional 
to blame this hostility on an ancient smear campaign waged by Cassander, 
Olympias' final enemy and the man responsible for her death. Other, less recogniz-
ed factors are at work as well. As Macurdy realized, 2 our sources tend to react more 
negatively to violence and murder engineered by Olympias than they do to similar 
acts of mayhem or murder committed by her husband or son. In addition, ancient 
sources blame Olympias rather than Alexander for reprehensible actions which can-
not plausibly be supposed to have been committed without, at the least, her son's ac-
quiescence. Olympias makes a more acceptable "heavy" than Alexander. 
Too often, after at best a cursory recognition of the bias of our sources, modern 
scholarship has then proceeded to accept them fairly uncritically. 3 Similarly, 
scholarship has mirrored the obssession of the ancient sources with the colorful per-
sonality of Olympias and failed to ask important questions. Olympias has, oddly, 
become a stock figure of melodrama, somehow laughable in a gruesome sort of way, 
certainly not a political figure to be taken seriously. 
Olympias' career was a kind of watershed. Before her, royal Mactdonian 
women were virtually invisible; while after her, in the Hellenistic period, queens ap-
pear as powerful political figures, co-rulers, and regents. Although Macurdy was 
the first to notice this,4 she attributed the difference to Olympias' powerful per-
sonality. But Olympias' personal drive was not the only reason for the expanding 
role of royal Macedonian women. Macedonian kingship, rapidly changing under 
Philip and Alexander, had much to do with this change too. 
I shall begin my analysis of Olympias' political career by considering the public 
position of the women of the royal family of Macedonia. Although Greek writers 
may call Olympias Basilissa (queen), she appears in inscriptions with no title, as 
"Olympias," much as do Macedonian kings.' The only indication of any quasi-
official role for royal Macedonian women is the tendency for many royal brides to 
change their names upon marriage; Olympias herself seems to have done so. In 
many cases, though not that of Olympias, the name appears to have dynastic 
significance. 6 Aside from this mere hint at a public role, the women of the royal 
family appear in our sources only in terms of their marriages and occasional 
references to domestic tasks. 7 
38 
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We know that Philip and Alexander practiced polygamy, and probably so did 
earlier kings. But was there a chief wife, an official consort? Although many 
scholars have argued that only some of the seven women connected to Philip whom 
Satyrus (ap. Ath. SS7b-d) mentions were wives, and others merely concubines, and 
that he had only one chief wife at a time, neither Satyrus himself nor other evidences 
supports such an arguement.' Yet this conclusion need not mean that all seven 
women had equal importance in Philip's eyes or at court, but only that their legal 
situation did not determine their status. (Misunderstanding has arisen because 
Greek sources expected monogamy and imposed that e.xpectation on their reading of 
Macedonain court life.}1° Giallombardo has argued persuasively that the ap-
propriate model for Macedonain marriage is archaic, and thus polygamous; 11 in 
this, as in so many other ways, Macedonia was backward, at least by Greek stan-
dards. In such a marriage, the amount of time (honor, public recognition) determin-
ed a wife's status, and in this determination the major concern was fertility and the 
production of male heirs, although the social and political standing of the woman's 
family may have also have signified. 12 
Olympias brought to this nebulous position of royal wife a powerful personality. 
She was devoted to several cults, but especially that of Dionysus (Plu. Alex, 2; 
Athen. 13.S60, 14.6S9), as her son would be. Disallowing the most obviously hostile 
remarks of the sources, it seems fair to say that Olympias was an unusually deter-
mined person, vengeful, ruthless, devoted to her son's success, a better dynast then 
politician. It is not an accident that his list of characteristics would suit her son as 
well as herself. Olympias did not, however, have Alexander's arena. 13 
Her public career begins when she, a daughter of the king of the Molossians, was 
married to Philip in 3S7. The marriage was clearly a political alliance arranged by 
Philip and Olympias' uncle, then king of the Molossians (her father had died), and 
intended to tie these two nothern semi-Hellenic kingdoms together, primarily 
against the Illyrian menace. •• The marriage was Philip's first move toward turning 
the Molossian kingdom into a puppet state. 
Alexander was born about a year after the marriage. Since Philip's only other 
son Arrhidaeus was mentally defective, Alexander must have begun to be treated as 
heir quite early, and Olympias as the mother of the heir. While it is doubtless true 
that Olympias' status and importance at court was exaggerated by later writers who 
assumed she was Philip'.s only legitimate wife and whose views were colored by the 
later career of her son, 1' Olympias, as mother of the heir, probably was in a rough 
sort of way the most important of Philip's many women. Her status may have 
varied from one period to another as she jockeyed for postion with the other wives, 
but the growing importance of her son was a constant. 
There is no evidence to support any conclusion that Olympias had political in-
fluence with her husband. Philip removed her brother Alexander from Arybbas' 
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control and later placed her brother on the Molossian throne, having driven Aryb-
bas out. It is often assumed that Philip's sponsorship of Olympias' brother was 
through her efforts, 16 but such a supposition reverses Philip's priorities: Philip mar-
ried Olympias because he was interested in Molossia, not the reverse. 
On the other hand, she may well have exercised considerable influence in the 
matter of her son's education. Certainly his early tutors were chosen from her 
friends and relatives; perhaps she herself chose them. Scholars tend to picture her as 
an overindulgent mother, but Alexander's tough northern tutors were not generally 
indulgent. 11 No evidence supports the suggestion that Philip sent Alexander off to 
study at Mieza in order to remove him from the influence of his mother. 18 Such an 
assumption arises from reading later events back into the years before 337. 
Similarly, some have assumed that relations between Olympias and Philip 
deteriorated over years, 19but little evidence supports this conclusion. There is only a 
passage in Plutarch (Alex. 9 .3) which speaks of the troubles of Philip's womens' 
quarters and says that Olympias made these worse, thanks to her ill temper, by urg-
ing on a disagreement between father and son. Since this remark is followed by 
Plutarch's account of the marriage to Cleopatra, there is no reason to assume any 
great passage of time, even if he is correct. Until after the battle of Chaeronia 
Alexander was clearly Philip's heir and Olympias enjoyed the prestige of being 
mother of the heir. 
Then Philip, busy with preparations for the joint Graeco-Macedonian invasion 
of the Persian Empire, took his last wife Cleopatra, a Macedonian aristocrat. 20 This 
marriage was different. It is clear that both Alexander and Olympias felt threaten-
ed, but it is not clear why they felt threatened. According to Plutarch (Alex. 9.4-5) 
and Satyrus (ap. Athen. 12.577d-e), at the wedding feast Cleopatra's guardian in-
sulted Alexander by implying that he was not Philip's legitimate heir and by sug-
gesting that Cleopatra would provide such. Alexander and Olympias then left 
Macedonia together.21 We know that Alexander was, at least officially, reconciled 
to his father and that he returned to Macedonia, but we do not know whether Olym-
pias returned before Philip's death. 22 Olympias spent her time in exile with her 
brother in Molossia and according to Justin (9. 7 .7) she tried to get her brother to in-
vade Macedonia to punish Philip. 
Many have seen Philip's next move, the marriage of his daughter by Olympias, 
Cleopatra, to Olympias' brother, as an attempt to re-establish the alliance, or at 
least smooth over troubles. 23 At the public festivities celebrating this marriage 
Philip was struck down by one of his own bodyguards, Pausanias. Pausanias did 
have a personal grievance against Philip, but many ancient and modern writers have 
assumed that he was only a tool, and that behind him were more important figures, 
possibly Olympias, or Olympias and Alexander. 24 Certainly the result of the 
asassination was Alexander's immediate succession to the throne, just in time to lead 
the great invasion himself. 
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There is absolutly no consensus about this tangled series of events. The murder 
of Philip is probably the most popular who-done-it in ancient history. The 
discovery of a tomb believed to be that of Philip orily deepens the mystery, a mystery 
I shall not attempt to solve in this brief space. Instead, I shall content myself with 
making a few suggestions about Olympias and the plausible limits of her role in all 
of this. It seems impossible to deny that in some ways Alexander felt his succes-
sion to be threatened by the wedding to Cleopatra. Some see his reconciliation with 
his father as genuine, others see it as a hollow public gesture, but something about 
the last marriage caused problems, whether temporary or long-lasting. 2 ' Alexander 
took his mother back to Molossia, clearly because he felt her status, her time, was 
jeopardized. As we have seen, Olympias' time depended on her son's, not on any 
ranking other than that. If Olympias' time was denied, then so was Alexander's. 
Justin (9.7.2) says that Philip repudiated Olympias; whether this is true or not,26 or 
whether Philip questioned her fidelity, probably does not matter. It signifies that we 
do not even know whether Olympias returned to Macedonia; she was no longer im-
portant. The suggestion that Philip treated Olympias in the way he did because he 
wished her to curtail her influence is untenable. 27 She had influence only with her 
son, and embarassing her in a public way would hardly lose her son's allegiance. 
As for the murder itself, I will only say that I do not think that Olympias could have 
acted alone. Olympias and Alexander necessarily functioned as one political unit 
until he took the throne. Possibly one could have been more actively involved with 
the asassination and the other merely accessory after the fact, but Olympias cannot 
have acted without Alexander's cooperation. The risk would be too great. 21 
Whatever their involvement in Philip's death, mother and son benefitted by it. 
Olympias played an expanded political role during her son's reign, which is to say 
relatively little: she had had virtually no political influence with her husband. Our 
sources tell us regularly about Olympias' involvement with political intrigue after 
336, but they do not really tell us that she had much political influence over her son, 
but rather that she tried to. Perhaps part of Olympias' greater prominence results 
from the fact that Alexander did not marry until 327, and he married only eastern 
princesses who produced no heir in his lifetime. 
Alexander's reign began with a more or less traditional purge of rival claimants 
of the throne. Tradition blames Alexander for the elimination of Cleopatra's family 
in general (Just. 11.5 .1), but attributes the killing of Cleopatra and her daughter to 
Olympias (Just. 9.7.12; much exaggerated in Paus. 8.7.7). Plutarch (Alex. 10.4) 
says that Alexander was annoyed with Olympias for treating Cleopatra badly , but, 
in fact, she could not safely have been allowed to live. All these deaths are part of 
the same purge. 
Although Alexander left for Asia in 334 and never saw his mother again, ancient 
sources preserve fragments of what would appear to have been a voluminous cor-
respondence between mother and son. It is doubtful how genuine any or all of these 
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snippets of correspondence are; certainly each letter must be considered individual-
ly. 
There are numerous references to a fued between Olympias and Antipater which 
caused both of them to send letters to Alexander accusing the other (Arr. 7.12.5-7; 
Diod. 18.118.1; Just. 12. 14.1-3; Plut. Alex.39.7). There is little evidence as to her 
exact charges, but later events certainly suggest very strongly that Olympias felt that 
she, rather than Antipater, ought to be regent in Alexander's absence. 29 If the 
regency was what Olympias wanted--unprecedented in a woman--Alexander did not 
give it to her. When, in the last year of his life, he tried to replace Anti pater, he 
meant Craterus not Olympias to succeed him (Arr. 7.12.4). The decision to remove 
Antipater, however, both Diodorus (18.118.1) and Arrian (7.12.5-7) attributed to 
the gradual effects of Olympias' complaints. 
Olympias also attacked other figures at court, with mixed results. Diodorus 
( 17 .114.3) says that she attacked Hephaestion, Alexander's closest associate, with so 
little effect that Hephaestion dared to write back to scold her. Curtius (7 .1.10-14, 
36-40) says that she made some sort of accusation against Amyntas, son of An-
dromenes, which, along with his family's association with Philotas, caused him to 
be tried. He was, however, acquitted. In the matter of the arrest of Lycestian Alex-
ander she may have had more influence; Diodorus (17 .32.1-2) makes his arrest 
primarily a matter of Olympias' warning to her son, but of course, our sources dif-
fer on this matter. 30 
Not enough attention has been paid to why Olympias so regularly tried to in-
tervene in political affairs. Personal jealousy may have been a factor with Hephaes-
tion, 11 and rivalry with Anti pater might even explain her charges against his son-in-
law, Lyncestian Alexander, but only in part. In so far as we know what her objec-
tions to these various figures were, they seem centered around threats to Alexander's 
power and Olympias' suspicions about others as possible rivals to her son. Even her 
objections to Hephaestion may have had a political side as well: she felt no one 
should outshine Alexander. 
In the year 331 Olympias began to do more than attempt to influence events 
through her son. In that year she moved back to the homeland of Molossia. There 
she seemed to have succeeded in what she failed to do in Macedonia; apparently she 
became or acted as regent. (Her brother Alexander had died in campaign in Italy.) 
She may have begun as co-regent with her daughter Cleopatra for Cleopatra's son, 
but Cleopatra soon went back to Macedonia. Diodorus (18.49.4) says that Olym-
pias fled Macedonia because of her quarrels with Anti pater, but it may be mistaken 
to assume that she was driven out by the regent. 3 2 Olympias certainly did not best 
Anti pater, but she may have withdrawn to Epirus in order to rule there. Whether 
her daughter returned to Macedonia because of her disputes with Olympias or 
because Olympias wanted her to watch Antipater can only be a matter of surmise. 33 
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In any case, something unusual had happened: a woman was regent, partly because 
of her Epirote royal blood (more of course, than her daughter's) and partly because 
Macedonian domination of the area made the return of the obvious male heirs, 
Arrybas' family, unacceptable. 3• An unusual amount of central power exercised by 
an unusually powerful Macedonian family made a female regency possible, and 
Olympias' personal drive for power made it plausible. Her son seems to have ac-
cepted her new role. 
For Olympias, as for all the other successors of Alexander, everything changed 
with her son's death. Initially the situation looked grim: in the confusion after 
Alexander's death in 323, Antipater became the kingpin of power politics and An-
tipater was Olympias' greatest enemy. With Anitpater's approval and probable con-
trivance, the collateral branch of the Molossian royal family returned from exile and 
Olympias was no longer regent. 35 Oddly enough, the new king, Aecides, son of 
Arybbus, seems to have done exactly what Olympias wanted him to, so the change in 
power was superficial rather than real. 
Reunited with her daughter, Olympias' policy in the years after 323 was two 
fold: never-ending opposition to the family of Anitpater, whom she seems to have 
blamed for her son's death (Diod. 19.11.8), and a consistent attempt to keep her 
part of the royal family (Cleopatra and her grandson, Alexander IV) in control of as 
much of her son's old empire as possible. She promoted Cleopatra's marriage with 
several of the successors and opposed Philip's other son, Arrhidaeus and his wife 
Eurydice (Philip's granddaughter) were eliminated because of Olympias' efforts and 
Aecides' help (Diod. 19 .11.1-9), but Olympias was unable to oppose Cassander with 
success. Surrounded and besieged, she surrendered, and Cassander arranged her 
death at the hands of the relatives whom she had killed (Diod. 19.35, 49-51; Just. 
14.6.6-12; Plaus. 9. 7 .2). 
In many ways Olympias' career is a series of pathetic failures. Again and again 
Anti pater and his son defeated her. Briefly she held something like royal power in 
Molossia and perhaps Macedonia near the end of her life, but she lacked secure 
military support, and her autocratic manner tended to alienate supporters. 
Nonetheless, she was the first royal woman to attempt to acquire real political power 
and manage to remain a contender until she died. Clearly, her remarkable 
character, iron-willed but undisciplined, is partially responsible for her unusual 
career and her unusual ambitions. 
But equally responsible for Olympias' career was the rapidly changing nature of 
Macedonain kingship. Prior to Philip kingship in Macedonia had been weak, the 
king standing out only a little from the rest of the aristocracy and often the victim of 
violence by marauding barbarians or aristocratic cabals. Philip built a central state 
and a successful war machine, which his son Alexander used to conquer the Persian 
Empire. Philip, and much more Alexander, were moving quite rapidly toward a 
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more absolute kingship, influenced by eastern models. Philip may very well have 
been assasinated because of these innovations; Alexander struggled against 
aristocratic oppostion to futher innovation throughout his reign. Inevitably these 
changes in the nature of monarchy affected Olympias, and in some degree, other 
royal women as well. 
As the royal family became more powerful and separate, so did all its members, 
women as well as men. Royal blood, that of Philip and Al,xander, came to matter a 
great deal, particularly granted the increasing scarcity of male successors. This 
phenomenon exlains the political stuggles surrounding Cleopatra, Olympias' 
daughter, and her efforts to marry one of the successors. Similarly, Diodorus tells 
us that a Macedonian army once changed sides in favor of Olympias (19.11.2) out of 
respect for her, and that when Cassander wished to kill her (19.51.2-S), he feared to 
put her in front of an assembly, lest the Macedonian change their minds because of 
Philip and Alexander. Indeed, according to Diodorus (19.51.5) the soldiers sent to 
kill her refused to do so because of her rank, and the relatives of her victims did the 
deed instead. It is no accident that Cassander was quick to marry Thessalonice, one 
of Philip's daughters by another wife. 37 
Whether another factor influenced the growing status of royal women, par-
ticularly Olympias, is more difficult to determine. Alexander borrowed consciously 
from Persian monarchy and in some degree from Egyptian. Possibly the increasing 
power and status of royal women may owe something to foreign influence as well. 
Certainly Curtius remarks about Alexander's intention to deify Olympias upon her 
death (Curt. 9.6.26; 10.5.30) are suggestive, if they are to be believed. Alexander's 
probable flirtation with deification and known interest in divine sonship could only 
serve to elevate his mother's status. 38 
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" Berve, II 286-7, believes that Olympias supported Alexander's divine sonship (though he admits that 
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about Alexander's intention to deify Olympias. Strasburger, p. 180, rightly urges caution. 
HITLER AND THE ZIONIST CONNECTION IN RETROSPECT 
Saadallah A. S. Hallaba 
FOREWARD: 
In 1869 when the Suez Canal was opened. the activities of Theodor Herzl and the 
Zionist movement were also first started under the auspices of Bismark and William 
11. Zionism would develop in three stages, serving in turp three world powers which 
got interested in the mastery of the Near East, since they were striving to exert an ab-
solute control over Europe. These three powers were the German Empire, the 
British Empire, and the United States. The three corresponding figureheads of the 
Zionist movement were Theodor Herzl, who cooperated with William II and thus in 
1898 welcomed him to Jerusalem; Chaim Weizmann, the Foreign Office Hegeman; 
and David Ben Gourion, the Washington agent. 
Contemporary historical studies have certainly stressed the obvious relationship 
between the Zionist promoters and the Anglo-Saxons. Yet, these studies make no 
mention of the deeply-involved and long-lasting cooperative effort made by Germ-
any and Zionism. Indeed, this cooperation, as decided by William II and Bismark, 
continued with their successors, Hitler and Federal Germany. 
Thus, by linking quite logically anti-Semitism and Zionism, Hitler signed, as ear-
ly as 1933, an important agreeement, called the Haavara Agreement, with the 
leaders of world Zionism. This agreement was renewed and later extended to 
Bucharest and Warsaw by the accord reached with Weizman in 1937 at the Zionist 
Congress held in Evian, France. It provided for the displacement of about four 
million Jews from Central Europe to Palestine. On February 1, 1939, a confidential 
agreement was finally reached by Hitler and Roosevelt, called the Rublee-Wohlthat 
Memorandum, according to which Jews would be allowed to leave Germany for 
Palestine, provided Zionist committees throughout the world would strive to pro-
mote German exports. Moreover, Berlin would agree to pay back a Zionist loan 
amounting to one billion and a half marks at four percent. Despite war threats and 
inflamed reactions from London, Hitler-Zionist cooperation did not stop. Two 
representatives from the Jerusalem Agency settled down in Berlin, and convoys of 
German Jews organized by these representatives were bound for Palestine under the 
Gestapo protection. 
After the German defeat the United States tried to take over the German ambi-
tions in Europe as well as in the East. This study emphasizes the importance of this 
cooperation between Hitler and Zionism. 
48 
Hitler and the Zionist Connection in Retrospect 49 
HITLER AND ZIONISM 
The National Socialist leaders, at the start of their political careers, had a 
friendly attitude toward international Judaism. Since they wanted to make the Jews 
leave Germany, they quite naturally had Palestine in mind. It happened that the 
Zionists themselves were ready "to free Germany from its Jews". And since this 
was a top objective, Hitler would accept--as he was well known to be very 
pragmatic--to palter with his own beliefs and teachings. 
At the Wilhelmstrasse, the German Foreign Office, it was believed that this 
category of Jews (at the front of which stood the Zionists) who refused assimilation 
and would prefer to see all Jews reunited in a national homeland, had chosen objec-
tives which were the nearest those actually persued by German policy as regards the 
Jews.• The only Jews with whom various organizations of the Third Reich--
especially the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Economy--would establish good 
working relationship were indeed the Zionists. 
The first official agreement between the Hitler government and the Palestine 
Jews was reached as early as May,1933. Although this agreement was apparently 
basically technical, it did have some political significance. The boycott day of April 
1, 1933, and, to a still greater extent, the laws promulgated during the same month, 
prompted thousands of Jews to leave their own country. However, restrictive im-
migration laws in most European countries as well as in the United States were 
already at that time quite stringent. But they were certainly less severe for those im-
migrants who could prove they were wealthy. Yet, since foreign currancy laws 
limited the export of foreign monies from Germany, those who could afford to leave 
the Reich were compelled to abandon most of their funds. Thus, as early as 1933 
many were trapped. The wealthy, who could fairly easily get a visa from foreign 
consulates, hesitated to leave Germany and abandoning most of their funds. The 
poor people, whom nothing retained in Germany, could hardly get a visa. 
Palestine was no exception. The British authorities governing this territory as a 
result of the mandate given them by the Allies and the League of Nations had in-
deed worked out for the Jews an immigration plan, according to which only the im-
migrants acknowledged as capitalists were admitted without any restriction--that is 
to say, those who had at least one thousand pounds sterling. 
Despite foreign currency regulations in force in Germany, the authorities, accor-
ding to instructions from Hitler, did not refuse to Jews emigrating to Palestine the 
right to take with them one thousand pounds sterling. This was intended to urge 
them to emigrate, and more specially to urge them to leave for Palestine. Yet, for 
the very wealthy Jews who wanted to emigrate to Palestine, an allowance of one 
thousand pounds sterling was not a satisfactory solution. Indeed, several thousand 
of Jews in the German Jewish community (which amounted in 1933 to over half a 
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million persons) had funds to over one thousand pounds sterling. As they could not 
take all their money, they kept putting off their departure. These delays were neither 
in their best interests nor in those of the German govenment. 
This complicated problem gave to a Palestine Jew, Sam Cohen, the director of 
the colonization company Ha'notea, a clever idea which would lead to the signature 
of the Haavara agreement. In April, 1933, Sam Cohen was received by the German 
Consul in Jerusalem, Heinrich Wolff. Cohen proposed that he could switch from 
Czechoslovakia to Germany his order for agricultural equipment and building 
materials. 
Wolff expressed his surprise, but Cohen then explained to him that purchases of 
Ha'notea in Germany could very well be financed from funds from which Jews 
planning to emigrate were not allowed to transfer to a foreign country. After their 
arrival in Palestine, the emigrants would cash in pounds sterling the corresponding 
value of marks which they would have paid to a frozen account in Berlin. 2 In fact, it 
was a clearing transfer. Germany would have to pay any currency and the emigrants 
would not have to lose their funds. Wolff fully understood that the Ha'notea firm 
had a two fold interest. On the one hand, the company would not have to pay for its 
own purchase in a foreign currancy; on the other hand, Ha'notea would urge 
wealthy Jews to emigrate to Palestine. At the same time Wolff saw the numerous 
advantages which the Reich government would get from such a deal: doing away 
with a major hindrance for emigration; getting more orders for German industrial 
firms which were under economic stress; and above all, countering the boycotting of 
German products. 
The deal got organized in less than one month, and once its principle was ac-
cepted by the Germans, things went fast. Sam Cohen went to Berlin, where he was 
welcomed by two high officials of the German Ministry of Economy, Hans Hartens-
tein and Joachim von Heinz. On May 19, 1933, a letter from the Economy Ministry 
addressed to the Ha'notea firm officially confirmed the agreement just concluded. 3 
According to this agreement the Palestine firm agreed to purchase from Germany 
the equipment it had been ordering until then from Czechoslovakia, it being 
understood that these materials would be reserved for the Ha'notea firm and could 
not consequently be sold. The deal amounted to one million reichmarks. 
Obviously those responsible in Germany for the World Zionist Organization--
who were not opposed to the principle of such an agreement--were not enthusiastic 
at all, because this deal had been made with a private firm with limited scope. They 
feared that the Ha'notea firm did not have sufficient funds in order to carry out pro-
perly a deal whose political importance outdid its commercial interests. 
Werner Senator, of the German Zionist Federation, and George Landauer, of 
the Jewish Agency, then started negotiations with the German Foreign Office and 
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Ministry of Economy about the agreement concluded with the Ha'notea firm.• At 
Jerusalem Haim Arlsoroff, in charge of foreign relations in the Jewish Agency, ask-
ed Sam Cohen to place the whole deal under the patronage of the Organization.' 
Meanwhile, Sam Cohen went once more to Germnay, where he had definitely made 
new friends. He succeeded in improving significantly the conditions of his first 
agreement with the German Government. 
The replacing on June 29, 1933, of Alfred Hugenburg by Karl Schmitt as Ger-
man Minister of Economy did not change at all the liberal policy adopted for 
emigrants wanting to leave for Palestine. It was true that in the meantime Consul 
General Wolff had again endeavored to convince the Berlin authorities that 
anything done in favor of German exports to Palestine would broaden the already 
wide gap for boycotting German products. 
These arguments were so effective that the new agreement with Cohen 
amounted to three million marks. Moreover, the Ha'notea firm was no longer com-
pelled to purchase equipment solely for its own colonization projects. Hencefor-
ward, it could act as an importer for the Palestine market. Sam Cohen even obtain-
ed the right for Jews, who were not planning to settle down soon in Palestine, but 
who evidently expressed their will "to contribute for the building up of Palestine 
and get ready a homeland for them," to deposit their funds on the frozen account of 
the Ha'notea firm. This formula, which could hardly be more Zionist, was reported 
in the letter dated July 19, 1933, addressed to Sam Cohen by the German Ministry of 
Economy. 6 
From the wording of this letter it was clear that the German authorities wanted 
Sam Cohen to establish good connections with the Zionist Organization. Indeed, 
the Minister of Economy stressed the fact that he learned with pleasure about the 
forthcoming setting up of Ha'notea branch at the Berlin Headquarters of the Zionist 
Organization, which had been established in 1897 during the first Zionist convention 
in Bale. This organization was officially recognized in most European and 
American countries and had branches in all important capitals, and, quite naturally, 
in Berlin. 
Yet, the German delegates of this Organization continued to distrust initiatives 
made by Sam Cohen. They therefore continued to convince the Berlin authorities to 
let an official Zionist organization control this agreement. Upon the insistance of 
George Landauer, Hans Hartenstein, a high official of the Ministry of Economy,1 
decided to put off executing the recent agreement made with Sam Cohen and asked 
for more information to the German Consul in Jerusalem.• The Germans, who 
evidently wanted to conclude this agreement quickly, finally took the initiative to 
convene a meeting attended by all Jews interested in this deal. The meeting was 
opened on August 7 in the offices of the Minstry of Economy. Present on the 
Jewish side were: Cohen and Machnes representing the Ha'notea firm; delegates of 
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the German Zionist Federation and two officials who specially came from Palestine; 
Hoofien, the Director of Anglo-Palestinian Bank whose interests were closely linked 
to those of the Zionist Organizaion; and Ruppin, a sociologist and specialist in the 
colonization of Jews in Palestine.9 
The specifications of the agreement reached by this meeting were the following. 
·Sam Cohen agreed to consider as null and void all agreements previous to August 7. 
A fiduciary firm would be established under the management of Hoofien and under 
the care of the Anglo-Palestinian Bank. This firm would have to manage the Jewish 
interests and to negotiate with German exporters and industrial firms. The deal still 
amounted to three million reichsmarks with the possibility of renewal. Two pro-
cedures were forseen: one for those Jews wanting to emigrate immediately, and the 
other for those who wanted to emigrate later. An exchange of official letters enfor-
ced the decisions thus reached. 10 
The agreement and all the transactions connected with it would be known as the 
Haavara Agreement (a Hebrew word meaning transfer) and which would also be the 
official name of the fiduciary firm (Haavara Trust and Transfer), whose head-
quarters were in Palestine. The firm which would be specially established as its 
representative in Berlin, would be named Paltreu (Palastina-Treuhandstelle zur 
Baratung deutscher Juden). "The first Hoofien agreement on Haavara as reported 
a few months later by a high official of the Wilhelmstrasse, had far more important 
political reactions than economic consequences." 11 
What were these political backlashes? On August 21, 1933, the 18th Zionist 
Congress opened in Prague, the first meeting since Hitler seized power. The situa-
tion of the Jews in Germany was evidently the central theme of the discussions and 
debates. Hoofien and Ruppin had come directly from Berlin to Prague. A large 
number of delagates reproached Hoofien and Cohen, two top negotiators, for hav-
ing acted in collusion with the devil by undermining, with Haavara Agreement, the 
fight of the Jews against the racial policy of the Reich. Impassioned discussion 
followed. But a motion for the actual participation of the organization in boycot-
ting efforts of Germany was not adopted. The Wilhemstrasse was satisfied that the 
Haavara Agreement "had strengthened the position of the moderate majority 
among the delagates." 12 
Despite the first difficulties, due especially to certain reserves made by Hoofien, 
both firms, whose constitution had been provided by the agreement, were founded. 
The part played by Sam Cohen became progressively insignificant, for, in spite of 
the credit he enjoyed in Berlin and with the Consul General Wolffe, the Zionist 
leaders unusually kept him off.1 3 On the other hand, the German authorities 
definitely preferred direct conversations with officials of the Zionist Organization 
and the Anglo-Palestinian Bank. 14 The agreement for the amount of three million 
reichsmarks was quickly inadequate. It was therefore renewed on February 13, 
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1934. '' The cooperation within the Haavara framework between the Zionist 
Organization and the Berlin government was becoming plain routine. In spite of an 
increasing opposition among the National Socialists for the enforcement of an 
agreement which would undoubtedly favor the work done by Zionists in Palestine, 
and despite some complication due to more strict regulations on currency control, 
the Haavara Agreement would periodically be renewed. Only when World War II 
broke out did this agreement come to an end. 
HITLER AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM 
When the German authorities signed in August, 1933, the Haavara agreement, 
they aimed simultaneously at two objectives: destroy the boycott organized against 
Germany by the Jews in various foreign countries, and make it easier for the Jews in 
Germany to leave for Palestine. 
Yet, Berlin increasingly considered the second objective to be more important. 
One the one hand, the consequences of the Jewish Boycott had considerably 
weakened, whereas, on the other hand, the expatriation of Jews had become one of 
the major objectives of the home policy of the National Socialist regime. But the 
Zionists were the only ones among the Jews to propose a positive solution for the 
Jewish problem in Germany and especially the only ones able to implement this solu-
tion. The Haavara Agreement had given them the means. It was amazing to see 
both the Minister of Interior and that of Economy cooperate to help the enforce-
ment of the Haavara Agreement and the development of the Zionist Organization 
activites in Germany! 
As early as in 1934 the Wilhemstrasse ordered to this effect the Reich administra-
tion to break off completely with all Jewish organizations in foreign countries. 
However, the relations with the Zionist organization were fully maintained. In spite 
of the hostility expressed by the Referat Deutschland (a special department responsi-
ble for Jewish affairs at the Wilhemstrasse), the leaders of German Zionism were 
allowed to continue relations with their colleagues through the world. 
Thus, the Haavara organization progressively acquired an outstanding position, 
even with preferential rights, for the German-Palestinian trade. Exports of oranges 
to Germany were made through Haavara agencies. The 19th Zionist Congress, spon-
sored by the Zionist leaders of Germany and meeting in Lucerne from August 20 to 
September 3, 1935, decided to place the whole Haavara system under the direct con-
trol of the Zionist executive committee. The activities done until then by the Anglo-
Palestinian Bank were consequently transferred to this committee. In 1933 the 
Haavara transfers amounted to 1.254,956,marks. In 1937 they reached the value of 
31,407,501 marks. 16 
The Zionist organization was authorized to open in Germany professional and 
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agricultural training centers for all those who wished to emigrate and who wanted 
some training in order to start a new life in the Middle East. Hebrew courses were 
offered in several towns. The Zionist paper, the Judische Rundschau, gave to 
thousands of Jewish homes the hope of a better life. The Ministry of the Interior 
allowed a delegation of German Zionists to take part in the 19th Zionist Congress. 11 
"There is no reason," wrote Bulow-Schwante to the Ministry of the Interior, "to 
impede with administration measures the Zionist activites in Germany, for Zionism 
is not inconsistent with the National Socialist program whose objective is to make 
the Jews leave progessively Germany." 11 
In connection with the emigration to Palestine that had been caused by the 
Haavara Agreement the Zionists established even their own Palestine Shipping 
Company, which brough the German passenger ship Hoenstien and renamed it Tel 
Aviv. This ship made its first trip from the German port of Bremerhaven to Haifa at 
the beginning of 1935. The Captain of the ship, Leidig, was a registered member of 
the Nazi party. 19 On this trip, the ship bore on its stern the Hebrew letters of the new 
name Tel Aviv, while from the mast fluttered the swastika. "A combination of 
metaphyical absurdity," wrote one of the passengers later. 
However, there were in Germany some groups strongly opposed to what they 
called support given by the Reich for the notion of national independence as extolled 
by the Zionists. The most important of these groups was the Auslandorganisation 
(AO). This agency of the National Socialist Party had been founded in 1930 under 
the name of Auslandsabteilung der National-socialistische Duetsche Arbeiterpartei 
(NSDAP) in order to organize National Socialist party groups in German com-
munities living in foreign countries. Since October, 1933, it came under the direct 
control of Rudolf Hess, in February, 1934, it received the rank of Gau Ausland as 
well as the title of Auslandorganisation. Its director, Ernst Bohle, got at the same 
time the rank of Gauleiter. On January 30, 1937, Bohle was appointed Chief of the 
AO at the Wilhelmstrasse and, soon after, he obtained the crowned title of Secretary 
of State. 
All questions related to the German colony in Palestine were naturally within the 
authority of the AO. Yet, these Germans (the vast majority of whom earned their 
living by working on their farms) had always been hostile to the Haavara Agree-
ment. 20 Walter Doble, who in 1935 had replaced Wolff as chief of the German 
General Consulate in Jerusalem, had completely shared their viewpoint and had 
become inturn an unyielding opponent of the Haavara. 21 
When the AO defended the interests of the Germans in Palestine, as early as 1934 
it had opposed the Haavara Agreement. 2 2 Since it did not have much influence, it 
could not impose its viewpoints on those of both the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of the Economy. 
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During 1936, however, the Referat Dueschland had a policy appreciably nearer 
that of Doble and AO. From that time, the AO, supported by the dynamic Referat, 
used its ever-increasing authority against what it considered to be a strengthening of 
the Palestine Jews to the prejudice of the Germans and Arabs. 
However, until the end of 1936 Berlin did not have to take any decision on the 
Jewish-Arab conflict. The policy adopted towards Zionism and therefore towards 
Haavra, far from reflecting a stand of the German foreign policy, was only the cons-
quences of the objectives pursued by the home policy of the Reich. But the develop-
ment of the situation in Palestine soon forced the German government to take a 
definite stand as regards its foreign policy. 
THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT HAAV ARA 
Only after the outbreak of the Palestinian Arab rebellion of April, 1936, did the 
first difference of opinion set in amongst the various German institutions about the 
usefulness of continuing the Haavara transfers. The Foreign office now realized 
that the de facto support for the Zionist policy would alienate Arabs against Hitler's 
Germany--a prospect that was not in the interest of the Nazi Reich. Dohle, the Ger-
man Consul General in Jerusalem, declared in an extensive memorandum dated 
March 22, 1937, that "through our promotion of Jewish immigration ... the posi-
tion that was again captured by the Germans ... would come to grief."23 
This was how between 1933 and 1937, 172,000 Jews, settled in Palestine, had 
emigrated from Germany. In 1935 only, this country under mandate had recorded 
65,000 immigrants. This sudden immigration alarmed the Arab population, which 
was the majority in Palestine. They feared they would soon become the minority. 2' 
In taking this stand Dohle was naturally not moved by concern for the Arabs as 
much as he was anxious about the political interests of Nazi Germany. He added 
that Germany need " not to worry unduly about the sympathies of Palestinian Arabs 
regarding Germany, since what is required is not even a question of an active Arab 
policy so much as the need to avoid the conspicuous promotion lent to the building 
of the Jewish national home. " 25 Dohle feared "that the Arab mood might turn 
around and that we m_ight be accused of actively participating in the fight against 
them." 26 
Dohle's fears were shared by other Nazi authorities. Thus the Office for Foreign 
Trade at the AO of the Nazi Party stated in all frankness: " Politically, the Haavara 
Transfer means giving valuable support to the establishment of a Jewish national 
home with the help of German capital. " 21 
Owing to these facts, the Referat Duetschland, holding the opinion that a Jewish 
State in Palestine, if it was ever founded, "would strengthen to a very great extent 
, 
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Jewish influence throughout the world," proposed on January 3, 1937, that the 
following points be examined: 
a. Whether it was still appropriate to urge the German Jews to emigrate to 
Palestine. 
b. Whether the time had to come to explain to the British government that Ger-
many did not wish that a Jewish state be founded in Palestine. 21 
This initiative had a lot of importance since therefrom a procedure would be 
developed which will lead the Wilhelmstrasse to declare that the founding of a 
Jewish State was not in conformity wiht the interests of the Reich. 
The first person to adopt this policy of the Referat was Ernst von W eizsacker, 
Chief of the Political Department and future Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs. 
While W eizsacker defined the policy which Germany should adopt in the immediate 
future, he recalled that the main objective of the Reich was still the emigration of the 
Jews. Nevertheless, Germany should no longer urge the Jews to go only to 
Palestine, for it was in the German interest that the Jews be dispersed throughout 
the world rather than helping them, even indirectly, to achieve their national ambi-
tions. 
In May, 1937, the Referat Dueschland started the procedure to abolish the 
Haavara; this procedure forced Reich Foreign Minister, Konstantin von Nuerath, to 
take a formal stand against the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. A circular 
letter from Bulow-Schwante warned all German missions that the new official policy 
of the Reich must be followed. And the Referat lost no time to drive the final 
onslaught against the Haavara. 
At first the Referat had to fight some opposition in the Department of Economic 
Affairs which, as it operated from within tht Wilhemstrasse, was of the opinion that 
the agreement concluded with the Zionists should be maintained. 29 Thus, on June 
11, 1937, Bulow-Schwante sent a memorandum to the Division of Economic Affairs 
urging it to respect instructions given by Neurath and views expressed by the AO. He 
demanded that the necessary measures be taken after consulting the Ministry of 
Economy, in order to "revise the Haavara agreement or abolish it. " 30 The Referat, 
as pointed out by Bulow-Schwante, felt that it was possible to increase considerably 
the emigration of Jews not so much by simplifying administrative procedures--which 
would even in some instances entail some sacrifice as regards foreign currencies--but 
by making imperative the need for emigration which the Jews themselves felt. This 
could be achieved by means of law much more strict for the Jews, for instance, by 
making them pay a special income tax which would automatically force the Jews to 
emigrate of their own free will. 31 
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By thus proceeding methodically, Bulow-Schwante sent to the Ministry of the In-
terior the circular letter which he had addressed on June 22 to German missions in 
foreign countries. But that Ministry did not even care to give a reply in writing. On 
July 8 Hering, the assistant of the Secretary of State Stuckart confirmed to the assis-
tant of Bulow-Schwante that the Ministry of the Interior had definitely decided to 
continue its policy of emigration as in the past. If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
wished to make some amendments or had any objection to bring forward, it would 
be up to the Foreign Office Minister to take this initiative if calling a meeting which 
would examine this problem. 32 As could be expected, the Wilhelmstrasse organized 
a meeting on July 29, at which the participants expressed their readiness to modify in 
depth the means of implementing the Haavara Agreement. The Ministry of 
Economy and the Economic Division of the Wilhelmstrasse dared not reject the 
arguments put forward by the Referat and the AO. More specially, an agreement 
was reached about taking away from various organizations the privilege they en-
joyed, forcing the Arabs and the Germans living in Palestine to use the Jewish Socie-
ty for their commercial deals with Germany. From the exclusive economic stand-
point, as pointed out by even an official of currency control, "The Haavara dealings 
were not interesting for Germany, since they did not bring any foreign currancy into 
the country." 33 
However, this meeting ended without any positive result, but the representative 
of the Ministry of the Interior made a statement that excited a lot of interest: ''Some 
time ago when this question had been presented to the Fuhrer," said the official 
from the Ministry of the Interior, "the Fuhrer had decided that the emigration of 
Jews should be directed towards Palestine." "It was out of the question," he con-
cluded, "to solve the problem put forward by the Haavara by simply taking 
measures which would, in the future, prevent the Jews from emigrating to 
Palestine." 34 
During another meeting which was called on September 21, Hering rectified the 
statements made by his colleague. The Fuhrer had not made a decision on the 
specific problem of emigration to Palestine, he said. His orders were only meant to 
urge in general the emigration of Jews. 35 "On the basis of this fact, " Hering added, 
"the Haavara proved interesting to the Ministry of the Interior only to the extent it 
can make as many Jews as possible leave Germany." If his Ministry was assured that 
the rhythm of departures would not slow down as a consequence of restrictions im-
posed to Haavara activities, he woutd see no objection to the revision of this agree-
ment. 
A new plan was then worked out by the Referat and the Ministry of the Interior, 
according to which the wealthy Jews would be retained in Germany and the others 
would be expelled. Thus, the Haavara would lie down on its own when there were 
no longer wealthy Jews wanting to emigrate. The winding up of the Haavara would 
be another advantage for the Reich. 
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Upon the intiative of the Ministry of the Interior another meeting was called to 
discuss, in the presence of an official of the Wilhelmstrasse, the importance of the 
new laws that had been promulgated to force the Jews to emigrate. 36 In order to 
promote this new policy Hering could then announce clearly that according to the 
Ministry of the Interior the Haavara Agency was no longer deemed to be of any 
use. 37 The Ministry of the Economy found itself henceforward completely isolated 
for taking the defense of the Haavara. Yet, on October 9, it was still explicitly ad-
mitted that "it was necessary to continue strongly urging the emigration of the 
Jews from Germany; that pressure was also valid for their emigration to Palestine, 
as long as decisions to the contrary had not been taken." 31 
For its part, the Currency Control Office, in spite of the recent stand of the 
Ministry of the Interior, sent again to the Four-Year Plan Agency of Herman Goer-
ing a lengthy memorandum in which are explained all the advantages that Germany 
, could get from Haavara as regards economy and emigration. 39 
At that time, Otto von Hentig's intervention started. Since July, 1937, he had 
replaced Pilger as the Director of the Middle-East Department (POL. VII), he had 
been endeavoring several times to calm down the Anti-Zionism of the Referat 
Deutschland. Since he did not believe that a Jewish State could be established in 
Palestine in the forseeable future, •0 he did not think that the Haavara was likely to 
speed up the founding of such a state. In agreement with officials of the Ministry of 
the Economy, he had striven to delay as much as possible the implementation of 
restricive measures contemplated against the Haavara. •• 
It seemed that with this objective in mind Otto von Hentig had strongly insisted 
that the complete Haavara record should be submitted to Hitler. Most likely Hentig 
had been convinced that the Fuhrer, fighting relentlessly so that the Reich should 
become Judenrein that is, free from Jews, would order the evacuation of Jews to 
any country, including Palestine, and would consequently decide that the Haavara 
should be able to continue its activities. The Director of POL. VII would not feel 
any regret that he had taken the defense of the Haavara since, as a result of a conver-
saiton with Alfred Rosenberg, Chief of Aussenpolitisches Amt (the Foreign Office 
of the National Socialist Party), on the policy that should adopt towards Jews, 
Hitler decided that the ''emigration of German Jews would continue to be encourag-
ed by all possible means. " 42 
On December 17, 1937, a memorandum of State Secretary Stuckart of the Reich 
Ministry of the Interior stated that since the beginning of the Arab rebellion in 
Palestine, "the advantages of the Haavara procedure have been dwindling while the 
disadvantages were increasing. "•3 Stuckart was of the opinion that if the establish-
ment of a Jewish state was unavoidable then "everything that would promote the 
growth of such a state should be refrained from." The Stuckart declared clearly: 
"There is no doubt that the Haavara procedure has made the greatest contribution 
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to the tremendously rapid building of Palestine (i.e. the Zionist colonies). " 44 
The fears of these officials (which contradicted the views of the SS and the 
Gestapo) were finally brought before Hitler. The Fuhrer, as reported in a memoran-
dum of the Political Trade Department of the Foreign Office, dated January 27, 
1938, decided that the ~aavara procedure should be continued . ., This positive 
stand taken by Hiter vis-a-vis the stregthening of the Zionists colonization of 
Palestine remained unchanged in spite of complaints emanating from the Foreign 
Office and the Auslandorganisation of the Nazi Party about the rising hostility of 
the Palestinians towards Germany. 
During a press conference called at the Air Force Ministry on November 12, 
1938, Goering ordered to speed up the emigration of the Jews by all possible means. 
Yet he stated at the same conference that there was no objection that steps be taken 
in favor of foreign organizations which were interested in this problem. 46 
Thus, according to the agreement made between Germany and the Evian Com-
mittee•1 with the support of Goering, Berlin was committed on February 1. 1939, to 
continue the Haavara deal.4' On July S, 1939, the Paltreu Agency (which 
represented in Berlin the Haavara Headquarters in Tel-Aviv) asked that the amount 
of the transfers, as previously agreed upon within the framework of the agreement, 
should be increases by 750,000 marks, to be used until December 31, 1939. On 
August 12, this request was approved. 49 On August 21, Schum burg, contradicted 
again by Hentig, did not hesitiate to fight once more a rear-guard battle against their 
decision.'° 
In spite of the enduring opposition of the Referat Duetschland, 51 the Ministry of 
the Economy granted once more on August 22, 1939, the permit to transfer to 
Palestine until December 31, 1939, the amount of 1,200,000 marks "for study ex-
penses,"52 which meant that although Hjalmar Schacht had left the Ministry of the 
Economy, the policy regards the Haavara deal had not changed at all. In 1939 the 
Platreu Agency was still employing one hundred and fifty persons. 53 Between 
January 1, 1938, and September 1, 1939, transfer deals amounted to almost 
27,000,000 marks. 54 
From 1933 to 1939 almost 140,000,000 marks were transferred to Palestine 
within the Haavara A~reement, thus enabling Jewish emigrants to get just over 
8,000,000 pounds sterling. During the same period, nearly 50,000 Jews left Hitler's 
Germany for Palestine. 55 
CONCLUSION 
To question the Zionist connections with German fascism is a taboo in the eyes 
of the Zionist leaders and their apologists. Yet it is possible to come across authentic 
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evidence or documents concerning these occurrences. The previous enquiry com-
prised information gathered about some important aspects of that cooperation. It 
remains beyond any doubt that Hitler was and remained the sole guarantor of the 
Haavara transfers, which were only halted in 1941, two years after the outbreak of 
the Second War. ' 6 A complete picture will only be possible when the archives (above 
all those in Israel), in which the documents concerning these events remain locked, 
are made available for scholarly research." 
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THE NAZI RACIAL DOCTRINE AND POLICIES: 
AN INTERPRETATION 
Valdis O. Lumans 
National Socialism, a doctrine of hate and intolerance towards non-German 
peoples, has generated countless studies, and presumably their lessons have not 
fallen on deaf ears. There was, however, another side of National Socialism, one 
that did not espouse hatred for others; rather it emphasized an extreme, obsessive 
concern for the welfare and enhancement of the German people or nation--the Volk. 
Once one distills the conglomoration of ideas, attitudes, prejudices, and individual 
philosophies that consituted the Nazi idealogy, one is left with an obsessive concern 
for the spiritual and biological purification, regeneration and preservation of the 
German Volk. All other features and attributes of National Socialism, such as anti-
modernism, anti-liberalism, anti-Marxism, anti-capitalism, and even anti-Semitism, 
revolved arom_1d the focal point of the Volk. 
This preoccupation with the Volk, although relatively neglected by many 
historians, who have traditionally focused on the more sensational diabolical 
feature:; of National Socialism, was indeed a crucial element of this movement. One 
may even argue that this "positive" aspect of National Socialism--"positive" only 
insofar as promoting something, and not working for its destruction--rather than its 
"negative" features, preeminently the physical eradication of those deemed racially 
inferior, was the central, essential precept of this doctrine. This all-consuming con-
cern for the Volk was the most attractive and most appealing component of Na-
tional Socialism, one which Hitler and other Nazis publicized and exploited to the 
fullest. This element of Nazism won more adherents and sympathizers for the Nazi 
cause than did anti-Semitism or any other of the "antis" in the Nazi idealogical 
arsenal. All deeds and misdeeds of the Third Reich could be traced to this preoc-
cupation with the Volk. The end of unemployment, the cessation of political 
violence and conflict, and the never-ending patriotic celebrations honoring and pro-
moting the unity and greatness of the German people were all manifestations of this 
obsession. 
When discussing the Nazi years with Germans who had lived through them, one 
so frequently encounters an explanation for supporting the Nazi cause that runs 
something like this: "Yes, it was terrible what the Nazis did to the Jews, BUT they 
did so many good things for us Germans." It was this side of National Socialism, it.s 
professed preoccupation with German welfare, rather than the destruction of Jews 
and other non-Germans, which for the average German was the essence of National 
Socialism and its most appealing trait. But the "positive" and the "negative" sides 
of National Socialism were inextricably interconnected. One could not have one 
without the other. These two sides were inseparable by virture of the Nazi racial doc-
trine, which divided humanity into two groups: the Herrenvolk, those racially and 
spiritually fit to rule; and the Untermenschen, subhumans, who, because of their in-
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herent racial inferiority, had to be liquidated or placed in perpetual subjugation to 
the ruling people. Nazi racists of course included the Germans as well as other Nor-
dic and Germanic peoples in the ruling Herrenvolk category. Jews, Blacks, Gypsies, 
Orientals and Slavs constituted the Untermenschen of the world. 
Due to their numerical inferiority, the racially superior German people were not 
assured their ruling status. According to the Nazis, conflict between the two groups 
would determine ultimate victory. Heinrich Himmler, writing in 1935, postulated 
that "as long as men live on earth, there would always be a struggle between 
Menschen and Untermenschen." 2 And although the struggle was inevitable, a vic-
tory for the Germans was not predestined. The Nazi racists feared above all that the 
continued mingling of the races and the resulting miscenegation lowered the racial 
purity of the Volk, and if allowd to continue, would lead to its demise. Hitler 
himself regarded "blood sin" and the pollution of race as "the original sins which 
would precipitate the end of humanity." 3 But by weeding out the inferior racial 
elements from the Volk and by enhancing selectively the reproductive capacities of 
the higher quality segments of the Volk, the nation as a whole could improve its 
racial composition and thereby strengthen itself for the imminent struggle. Nazis 
believed that strict racial segregation could halt and even reverse the trend towards 
racial degeneration that was leading the Volk to its doom. 
Out of concern for the racial welfare of the German people Nazi racists ad-
vocated complete apartheid. The physical annihilation of those regarded as 
subhumans exemplified the most extreme form of segregation. Thus the "Final 
Solution" and the destruction of Jews and others was not an end in itself, but for the 
Nazis served the ultimate purpose of protecting the racial well-being of the German 
Volk. This fact does not at all detract from the enormity of genocide; indeed, it 
amplifies the tragedy of it all: In the Nazi scheme of things some peoples and na-
tions had to be destroyed in order for the Germans to survive and thrive. 
The reprehensible "negative" features of National Socialism aside, the 
"positive" preoccupation with the Volk and its welfare contained its own innate 
dangers, both for the non-Germans--who by definition were excluded from the Volk 
and thereby denied the advantages of belonging--and ironically, for the Germans 
themselves. Nothing demonstrates as clearly the pernicious effects of this doctrine 
and its consequent policies upon the people it was meant to benefit as the wartime 
experiences of the German minorities of Europe. And nowhere in practice does the 
inherent connection between the "positive" and "negative" sides of National 
Socialism emerge so explicitly. 
The members of the German national minority groups, the Volksdeutsche 
(translated as ethnic Germans), lived as citizens of non-German states throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe. The estimated 10,000,000 Volksdeutscbe of post-World 
War I Europe constituted the largest national group living outside its own national 
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state. 4 Some, such as the Transylvania Saxons of Rumania and the Baltic Germans 
of Latvia and Estonia, descended from medieval knights, farmers, and merchants 
who had left an overcrowded Germany to seek their fortunes as pioneers in the 
East. Others, for instance the Volga Germans of the Soviet Union and the Banal 
Schwabians of Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, had been invited by local rulers 
to settle and farm lands won from the Turks in the Eighteenth Century. Most, 
however, including the Germans of Poland, the Memellanders of Lithuania, the 
South Tyroleans of Italy and the Sudetelanders of Czechoslovakia, constituted na-
tional minorities by virtue of the post-war settlement and the accompanying dissolu-
tion of the Habsburg Monarchy and the dismemberment of Imperial Germany. 
During the immediate post-World War I period many individuals and organiza-
tions, both inside the Reich and within the minorities, publicized the real and alleged 
persecution of the Volksdeutsche of Europe at the hands of their non-German 
governments and agitated for uniting these scattered groups of Germans with the 
main body of the Volk living in Germany. To the dismay of those who promoted 
the cause of the Volksdeutsche, the Weimar government did not share their sen-
timents. Even though Berlin acknowledged a responsibility for defending the in-
terests of former Reich citizens and provided them with moral, diplomatic and even 
some material support, it refrained from making any comprehensive claims for all 
Germans, everywhere. 5 
The German minorities received a more responsive hearing in Berlin after the 
ascendancy of Adolf Hitler in 1933. After all, the first point of the Nazi Party plat-
form envisioned the unification of all Germans in an exclusively German Reich, and 
Hitler's ultimate goal called for the creation of a new racial order encompassing all 
Germans, including the Volksdeutsche, who could not be left seperated from the rest 
of the Volk by political, artificial borders. 6 
Besides the general notion of the unity of all Germans, other features of National 
Socialism were especially appealing to the Volksdeutsche. The Nazi denunciation of 
parliamentary democracy was well-received by many of these people, for represen-
tative majority rule doomed the numerically inferior Germans living outside the 
Reich to perpetual minority status. Another factor favoring National Socialism in 
winning the hearts and minds of the Volksdeutsche was the social composition of the 
minority groups. The majority of the Volksdeutsche belonged to the two groups that 
provided the Nazis with their staunchest support inside the Reich: the lower middle 
class and the peasantry, in particular the latter. The predominately rural 
Volksdeutsche appreciated the Nazi advocacy of reuniting German people with the 
soil, thus restoring to the Volk the virtues inherent in the simple peasant life. Even 
anti-Semitism was understood very well by tqe Volksdeutsche. After all, anti-
Semitism was far stronger in the East than in Germany itself, and although Eastern 
anti-Semitism was economic, cultural and religious rather than racial, the 
Volksdeutsche could readily accept the racial anti-Semitism of the Nazis. Further-
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more, the Nazi emphasis on racial segregation simply restated in new terms the 
cultural and in many instances biological exclusivity practiced by these Germans for 
generations. 
Even though many elements of Nazism appealed to the Volksdeutsche, one can-
not presume that they all rushed to the Swastika banners of the Fuhrer. Indeed, 
many of them rejected National Socialism altogether. But as European-wide 
economic difficulties exacerbated nationality tensions, more and more Germans liv-
ing in foreign lands associated themselves, if not directly with the Reich and Na-
tional Socialism, then at least with the local German communities. Gradually, with 
the financial and diplomatic support of Berlin, pro-Nazis and co-travellers helped 
establish Nazi influence within the German communities of Europe. 7 The minorities 
as groups--irrespective of the preferences of individuals, became associated in the 
minds of non-Germans with Nazi Germany. 
Prior to 1933 surprisingly few Nazi notables had displayed any substantial in-
terest in the Volksdeutsche, but after the Nazi ascendancy several prominent figures 
came to realize the potential of the millions of foreign Germans as a source of 
political power within the Nazi system. A power struggle over the position of in-
termediary between the Reich and the minorities ensued among several rivals, and 
out of this contest emerged a victor, Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsfuhrer SS, head 
of the Schutzstaffel, or SS. 8 The SS, founded as a special body guard for Hitler in 
the early years of the movement, came under Himmler's leadership in 1929. Himm-
ler diligently labored to increase his personal influence within the Third Reich and 
to raise the status of his SS. By the end of 1936 Himmler had consolidated all Reich 
police and internal security agencies under his authority; concurrently he built up a 
concentration-camp network administered by the SS; and in addition, he won con-
sent from the Fuhrer permitting him to organize armed units within the SS which 
eventually evolved as the Waffen SS, or armed SS. By the late 1930s Himmler was 
on his way to becoming the second-most powerful figure in the Third Reich. 
Perhaps most importantly, at least in respect to the Volksdeutsche, Himmler was 
also establishing himself and his SS as the foremost proponents of the Nazi racial 
doctrines. 
Himmler molded the SS as an elite order dedicated to the creed that the future of 
the German Volk depended upon the maintenance of racial purity. 9 The 
Reichsfuhrer SS was one of the staunchest advocates of the notion of a racial 
dichotomy of Herrenvolk and Untermenschem. The Jew became for him the 
ultimate Untermensch, the predestined, mortal enemy of the German Volk who 
would destroy the Germans unless they destroyed the Jew first. 10 He also regarded 
other races, especially Blacks, Orientals, and Gypsies as dangerous to German racial 
integrity and was convinced that in the interest of enhancing the Nordic racial com-
ponents in the Volk, these deleterious racial elements would have to be isolated from 
the collective German bloodstream. But in Himmler's mind the "positive" promo-
tion of the racial health of the Volk through racial hygiene and the procreation of 
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racially valuable German children was far more effective and therefore more impor-
tant than the eradiction of the harmful influences in achieving the goal of German 
racial purity. One example of Himmler's priorities is the content of the SS weekly, 
Das Schwarze Korps. This tabloid reserved far more space to photographs and col-
umns featuring German children--usually blond and Nordic in appearance--than to 
anti-Semitic propaganda. A regular feature in Das Schwarze Korps was a column 
on infant care, as was an honor roll of SS families which had produced more good 
German blood. 11 
Himmler was also convinced that Germans must abandon the decadent life-style 
of modern cities and return to working the land as simple but happy and healthy 
peasants. He believed that only by returning to the soil could they ensure a great 
future for the Volk. Since there was not enough land in Germany for all Germans to 
farm and commune with, more Lebensraum, or living space, would have to be 
acquired--in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Himmler therefore envisioned 
creating a new class of soldier-peasants, who would conquer and then cultivate the 
lands in the East; and the SS would presumably fulfill that mission. 
Himmler became interested in the Volksdeutsche in the mid-1930's. He no doubt 
perceived them both as a source of politcal power--which would understandably 
devolve upon any intermediary between 10,000,000 people and the Reich--as well as 
a potential manpower pool for the expanding Waffen SS. He apparently also 
recognized their value as a supposedly unadulterated source of German racial stock, 
which over generations, in some instances even centuries, had maintained cultural 
and biological segregation. In Himmler's thinking, perhaps these Volksdeutsche, the 
majority being peasants, could provide the human building blocks for the new order 
in the East. 
Wartime circumstances presented Hitler with the opportunity to proceed with 
the fulfillment of his most cherished goal--the building of a new racial order in the 
East with the SS serving as the vanguard. What prompted Himmler to take the first 
steps towards realizing his and the Fuhrer's ultimate goal was the development of a 
sensitive international situation involving the Volksdeutsche. On October 6, 1939, a 
little more than one month after the German invasion of Poland, Hitler announced 
before the Reichstag and the world that he intended to remove the Germans from 
Eastern Europe and resettle them in the Reich and its newly acquired territories. By 
repatriating these people, the Fuhrer explained, he was unilaterally eliminating the 
sources of potential conflict in the region. 12 
Hitler's surprise announcement culminated a chain of events that began in 
August, 1939, with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Agression Pact. A secret 
clause in the agreement, revised in September, divided much of Eastern Europe into 
spheres of influence dominated by Germany and the Soviet Union. 13 Germany was 
allotted Western and Central Poland, while the Soviets would enjoy a free liand in 
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the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, and Northern Rumania. On September 25 Hitler 
received notice that Stalin was about to redeem the Fuhrer's promise to allow him 
his way with the Baltic States.•• It was presumed that the Soviet leader would shortly 
tender his claim to the other areas in question. Consequently, in the interest of main-
taining good relations with his ally, Hitler decided to relocate those Volksdeutsche 
living in areas designated to fall within the Soviet sphere. He thereby hoped to avoid 
a situation in which he would be compelled to choose between defending the 
Volksdeutsche--who undoubtedly would clamor for the Reich's intervention as soon 
as Stalin began sovietizing these territories--and continuing his alliance with the 
Soviet leader. Hitler still regarded Soviet friendship--or at least neutrality--as essen-
tial while he dealt with Poland's western allies. So, a wholesale evacuation of the 
Germans from the territories in question seemed the most prudent course of action. 
Although the resettlement could have been construed as a retreat of the German 
position in Eastern Europe, it was also consistent with Hitler's ultimate goal of 
uniting all Germans in an exclusively German Reich. A similar, less publicized 
evacuation was already in progress in the South Tyrol, in consideration of preserv-
ing the friendship of Hitler's Italian ally, Mussolini. 
It was far easier to announce the evacuation than to accomplish it. The process 
would involve the transfer and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of people, 
who would have to be fed, housed and cared for throughout each step of the opera-
tion, from their homelands to their final placement in the Reich. 1' Himmler, by 
then the Reich's foremost authority in Volksdeutsche affairs, was determined to 
supervise this momentous task. In a meeting with Hitler, Himmler persuaded the 
Fuhrer to appoint him Reichskommissar fur die Festigung deutschen Volkstums 
(RKFDV)--which translates as the Reichs Commisar for the Strengthening of 
Germandom--and charged him with the responsibility for completing the resettle-
ment operation. 16 
No record exists of the conversation between Himmler and Hitler, but the results 
of the conference, especially the commission for strengthening Germandom, far ex-
ceeded the limited scope of an evacuation. A subsequent Fuhrer decree of October 7 
revealed the comprehensive scope of the operation. Not only was Himmler to 
retrieve all Volksdeutsche from the designated lands and resettle them in the Reich, 
but he was also authorized to eliminate all harmful, alien influences from the Ger-
man Volk and its living space. In addition, he was to plan and execute the settlement 
of the land assigned for the repatriated Germans. 11 The building of the new order 
was to commence. 
The ideological possibilities presented by the resettlement, no doubt explicitly 
pointed out by Himmler, must have convinced Hitler that he should reconsider his 
initial plans for a limited evacuation and commission Himmler with these more am-
bitious responsibilities. The idea of proceeding with the construction of the new 
order may not have occurred to Hitler, who, since the outbreak of hostilitie~. preoc-
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cu pied himself exclusively with waging war. Himmler presumably had argued that 
victory on the battlefield had liberated former German territories as well as acquired 
additional Lebensraum, and the hundreds of thousands of Volksdeutsche 
designated for evacuation could populate these areas as the first step in constructing 
the new order. Furthermore, the SS, which had proven itself under Himmler's 
leadership as the most steadfast proponent of the racial idea in the Third Reich and 
had demonstrated its administrative skills through the management of the concen-
tration camps and the reorganization of the Reich's security forces, was capable of 
assuming the momentous task of building the new order. Hitler must have thought--
why not let Himmler make a go of it? 
Excepting a few flashes of interest, the supreme war lord, Adolf Hitler, busy 
with military affairs, granted the leader of the SS a free hand in constructing the new 
order in the East. Having gained the Fuhrer's confidence, Himmler began organ-
izing the RKFDV program. The program, planned and implemented by the various 
branches of the SS, amounted to the materialization of the Nazi racial idealogy, as 
conceived by Heinrich Himmler. 
The SS assumed responsibility for all three provisions of the RKFDV commis-
sion. First, it directed most of the evacuation operations involving the 
Volksdeutsche, including their registration, evacuation, housing, feeding and their 
final placement. These activites could be regarded as "positive," serving the pur-
pose of promoting the welfare of this particular segment of the German Volk and 
thereby contributing to the overall well-being of the entire German nation. In 
fulfilling the other two responsibilities of the RKFDV commission--the elimination 
of harmful, alien elements from the German Volk and its living space, and the plan-
ning and settlement of the newly acquired territories--Himmler also turned to his SS. 
From the moment of the inception of the RKFDV program as executed by the SS, 
the evacuation and settlement of the Volksdeutsche, was bound to the most 
abominable "negative" actions of Nazi Germany. 
In order to accomplish the second goal of the RKFDV project, the elimination of 
the allegedly dangerous elements from the German population as well as from the 
lands set aside for the Volksdeutsche, Himmler relied on the SS-controlled German 
police and other security agencies, such as the infamous Gestapo. The concentration 
camp network was also drawn into this operation to help deal with recalcitrant alien 
elements who refused to be removed from the German Volk or from the lands in-
tended for German resettlement. Eventually the "Final Solution," the most 
reprehensible action attributed to the Third Reich, was implemented as the ultimate 
means to achieve this second provision of the RKFDV commission. This action, 
too, was the responsibility of the SS. A practice aimed at fulfilling this second goal 
and directly related to the resettlement was that of forcibly evicting non-Germans 
from their homes, farms and businesses to make room for the incoming 
Volksdeutsche. Frequently the same transportation that brought the Germans to 
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their homes carried away the former occupants. 18 The most tragically ironic exam-
ple of the intimate connection between the first and second goals of the RKFDV 
commission, and therefore of the "positive" and "negative" aspects of the Nazi 
racial doctrines, was Action Reinhardt. This program entailed distributing the per-
sonal belongings of the victims of the extermination camps to resettled 
Volksdeutsche as Christmas presents. 
The SS also planned and prepared the new Lebensraum for the arriving German 
residents, thereby fulfilling the third responsibility of the RKFDV program. Here, 
too, the police and the other SS security forces were involved, since the initial step in 
preparing the land for the new order demanded the removal by deportation of the 
original population, which consisted of the designated Untermenschen, Jews, Poles, 
Czechs and all others deemed racially inferior to the incoming Volksdeutsche. 
Thus, the SS, the organizational embodiment of the Nazi racial doctrine, per-
formed both the "negative" and "positive" tasks related to the resettlement of the 
Volksdeutsche and the preparation of the new order. All activities serving these pur-
poses were integral parts of the same comphrehensive RKFDV program, which, in 
the expectations of Himmler and other Nazis, would ensure for the German Volk a 
prosperous and glorious future. The results were, of course, anything but that. 
When the Volksdeutsche answered the call of the Fuhrer and opted for resettle-
ment, few if any could have imagined the succession of personal hardships that 
awaited them in the Reich. They first experienced a tedious round of physical, 
racial, occupational and political examinations that determined their degree of Ger-
manness and consequently their future status in the Third Reich. Those designated 
as superior Germans were selected for settlement in the East, a fate regarded by the 
SS as an honor. Those appraised as somewhat lacking in their Germanness, either 
for racial or political reasons, would remain in Germany to work in the war in-
dustry. Ironically, the same examinations and physical standards were applied by 
the same SS examiners in the evacuation of Poles, Czechs and others to determine 
the prospects of salvaging an individual for the Volk. In short, the same criteria 
were applied in weeding out undesirables from among those. presumed to be 
members of the Volk as in selecting from among the Untermenschen the privileged 
few for inclusion in the German Volk. 20 
Resettlers of military age discovered that the "blood and soil" (referring to race 
and Lebensraum) SS doctrine was no mere metaphor, but that they were indeed ex-
pected to bleed for the new land. Waffen SS recruiters quickly swept up all eligible 
candidates for the ranks. 21 Others found that their unsettled state of transition from 
one home to a new one would not be alleviated in the immediate future. The SS of-
ficials responsible for the care and housing of the resettlers organized a vast camp 
network to provide temporary shelter while they waited for final placement. For 
many Volksdeutsche these camps became a permanent way of life, as the promised 
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resettlement, for one reason or another, never materialized. The resettler camp 
system provides yet another illustration of the racial dichotomy in practice: The SS 
administered its consentration camp system for the purpose of isolating racial and 
political enemies from the German people; but it also managed a camp system for 
those for whom the racial program was to benefit. 
Those Volksdeutsche actually settled in the East lived out the war years in an un-
familar, hostile environment. Many fell victims to the vengeance of the dispossessed 
non-Germans, whose homes, farms and businesses they had accepted. Those that 
survived the experience of resettlement enjoyed only a fleeting respite before they 
were on the road again, this time as refugees or expellees, fleeing to the sanctuary of 
the Reich that had promised them so much. Some fled in advance of the ap-
proaching Red Army, others were expelled at the end of the war. The implementa-
tion of the doctrine which had envisioned a great future for them had instead led 
them to utter ruin, at the cost of their homes and in many instances their lives--not to 
mention the lives of countless people these doctrine considered to be their racial in-
feriors. 
The resettlement operation did not extend to all Volksdeutche. Those living in 
lands not threatened by an imminent Soviet takeover at the time of the inception of 
the resettlement remained in their homelands. Large communities of Germans 
therefore lived out the war in Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and the two successors 
states of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Serbia-Banat. The governments of these states 
were either willing or reluctant allies of Germany, and the need to relocate the local 
Volksdeutsche did not arise--at least not until the end of the war. In fact, in the 
long-range plans of the Reich these lands eventually would be integrated into the 
new order, and at some time in the distant future the local Volksdeutsche would pro-
vide a nucleus for a Germanized Southeastern Europe. 22 Consequently, the policies 
of the Reich towards the remaining minorities were formulated in consideration of 
the same goal as the RKFDV program--the creation of the new racial order for the 
benefit of the German Volk. 
In the Southeast Himmler and the SS promoted the elite status of the 
Volksdeutsche during the war years and raised them to a privileged position in the 
midst of non-German populations. Ironically the policies intended to promote the 
welfare of the privileged elite in the long-run affected them negatively. With the ex-
ception of Yugoslavia and Greece, Reich policy regarding the rest of the Southeast 
and the peoples of the region was relatively benign--at least in comparison to Ger-
man actions elsewhere. As a result, hatred of the Germans, both Reich and 
Volksdeutsche, as a rule was not as pronounced here as in other parts of Europe. 
Nevertheless, the exactions demanded by the Reich of the Southea1ern regimes as 
well as the privileged treatment of the Volksdeutsche took their toll in the growing 
resentment towards Germany, and especially towards its most visible exponents, the 
local German communities. As the German military withdrew from Southeastern 
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Europe, and as the underpinnings for the privileged position of the Volksdeutsche 
eroded, the simmering indignation erupted with a fury--particularly in Yugoslavia. 
The Volksdeutsche bore the brunt of the hatred their historic maintenance of Ger-
manness and their more recent association with the Reich had generated. 
Tragically, many of these pitiable people perceived nothing wrong with having 
maintained their separateness, nor even with having received privileged treatment, 
and were at a loss to explain the animosity of their non-German neighbors. They 
had nurtured their exclusivity, so they believed, out of their love for their own Volk, 
not out of hate for others. But again, as in the Nazi racial scheme, the two attitudes 
could not be neatly separated, for in practice one seemed to accompany the other, 
especially during the war years. At least this is what the non-Germans perceived. 
Throughout Eastern and Southeastern Europe during the last year of the war 
and the immediate post-war period the Volksdeutsche, resettlers as well as those who 
had remained in their homelands, suffered grievously for their association with the 
Reich. The non-Germans attributed to them responsibility for the misdeeds of the 
Third Reich. In Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslavakia, where the Reich's occupa-
tion had been particularly brutal and where the building of the new order had 
already commenced, all Germans endured the consequences. In these states and 
others the expulsion of all Germans became official policy. 23 Even more injurious 
than official action was popular anti-German sentiment, which manifest itself in 
persecution and countless atrocities against the Volksdeutsche. 
In conclusion, the Nazi racial doctrine and resulting policies as formulated by 
Himmler and his SS cohorts had envisioned elevating the German Volk to un-
precedented heights, an elevation justified in their minds by a presumed racial 
superiority. But instead of raising the Germans to new prominence and ensuring 
their future greatness, these schemes has plunged them into abysmal despair and 
ruin. The Volksdeutsche of Europe, along with their fellow Reich Germans, had 
been taught the lesson of the folly of their obssesive concern for their Germanness 
and their Volk. But one cannot single out for blame that particular generation of 
Germans for allowing themselves to be seduced by the doctrine of the Volk, which, 
after all, was no more than an exaggerated form of nationalism and super-
patriotism, twin nemeses plaguing our own contemporary world. The same mentali-
ty as theirs is today responsible for numerous conflicts in far corners of the world, 
and closer to home, even for the no-less dangerous "we" and "they" distinctions set 
by the so-called "moral majority." 
It is human nature to want the very best for one's own kind and to show a 
preference for the same. But when exaggerated to the point of arrogance and a con-
viction in one's own superiortity, this prefernce for one's own kind--as 
demonstrated by the fate of the Volksdeutsche--can lead to devastating results, not 
only for the excluded, but also for the privileged. Rather than culitivate an intense 
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awareness of one's own kind, as defined by a common nationality, culture, language 
or even presumed race, those seeking an identity might better focus on their com-
mon human conditions and human identity. 
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"REPLACING 'SAMBO': COULD WHITE IMMIGRANTS SOLVE THE 
LABOR PROBLEM IN THE CAROLINAS?" 
Marcia G. Synnott 
From the end of the Civil War until the mid-1920s white southerners periodically 
proposed various immigration schemes to solve their recurrent labor problems, 
specifically the difficulties of acquiring and retaining agricultural workers. They 
hoped that European workers, deflected from other destinations, would replace 
blacks, who, since emancipation were no longer a "faithful" labor force. Instead of 
continuing the plantation system, some southerners proposed to rebuild agriculture 
on the basis of family-sized farms, cultivated by model farmers, especially those 
brought from the ·fields, gardens, and vineyards of Europe. Most of their various 
schemes had little chance of success, however, because the Southeast did not offer 
the two inducements which immigrants found in the North and the West: high 
wages and cheap land. 
With the exception of businessmen and landowners like Hugh MacRae, David R. 
Coker, and Richard I. Manning, the proponents of immigration to the Carolinas 
made no serious study of what prior preparations were necessary, with the conse-
quence that most immigrants left the region within a few years. Not only did im-
migrants earn meager returns from the lands they had to clear and drain, but they 
also experienced southern racial prejudices against foreigners--from both blacks and 
whites. While blacks feared the economic competition of immigrants, whites 
suspected them of political racialism and softness on racial segregation. Even before 
the Immigration Quota Acts of the 1920s became fully effective, most southerners 
realized that white immigrants would not replace "Sambo," given the limited in-
ducements offered. 1 
Nevertheless, the immigration schemes proposed by Benjamin R. Tillman, E. 
[Ebbie] J. [Julian] Watson, and the members of the South Carolina Land Settlement 
Commission (notably, chairman Richard I. Manning and David R. Coker)--and by 
North Carolinian Hugh MacRae--should be studied for several reasons. First, they 
illustrate the efforts made by politicians, state officials, landowners, and 
businessmen to relieve the South of its dependence on black labor. Second, they 
reveal the attitudes of southern whites toward both blacks and the foreign-born. 
Third, their plans are an index to the economic vicissitudes of the region. Finally, 
they suggest a persistent concern--and hope--for the future of southern, defined as 
"white," civilization (and show an enthusiasm for ambitious projects, but not for 
shouldering the cost of implementation). The proposals of Tillman and Watson 
lacked the careful planning necessary for success, but the recommendations of the 
South Carolina Land Settlement Commission might have worked if the state had 
been willing to fund them. Of the four, only Hugh MacRae's colonization projects 
in eastern North Carolina generally succeeded, because he committed his time and 
personal resources to their achievement. He was not able, however, to secure the 
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kind of state or federal funding that would have permitted the duplication of his 
projects in every southern state. 
The recruitment of immigrants between 1865 and 1925 waxed and waned with 
the demand for farm or mill workers. These were four periods in which recruitment 
efforts were most intense: 1865-67, 1880 to the early 1890s, 1900-08, and 1920-24. 
During·the first period at then end of the Civil War, South Carolina appropriated 
$10,000 to hire a Commissioner of Immigration, who would open an office in 
Charleston, advertise the benefits of the state's soil and climate, and send agents to 
Europe. This hasty postwar scheme, which brought only about 400 immigrants to 
South Carolina--the largest contingent being 150 Germans from Bremen--has rightly 
been dismissed as an "immigration craze" stirred up by the pressing need to adjust 
the southern economy to the fact of emancipations. 2 
Although blacks were fearful that they would "be crowded out" by white im-
migrants, a concern they voiced at each new scheme, southern landowners were all 
too willing to exploit their labor. The blacks' lack of mobility and subjugation 
under Jim Crow laws rendered them more "dependable" than immigrants, many of 
whom could use ethnic networks to find more favorable employment conditions 
elsewhere. In fact, the percentage of European immigrants residing in the South ' 
declined from 40/o in 1870 to 2.80/o in 1900. Not until intolerable conditions drove 
blacks out of the South in the Great Migration, 1890-1930, did southern whites 
seriously consider launching a movement, as opposed to sporadic efforts, to replace 
them with European immigrants. 3 
Between 1880 and 1910, in tune with "New South" economic development, most 
southern states established immigration bureaus and held promotional conventions 
to advertise opportunities to farmers, mechartics, miners, and factory workers. But 
it cannot be determined how many of the 860 immigrants that South Carolina's 
bureau brought in between 1881 and 1886 (at a cost of about $8,900) stayed. At a 
convention in Richmond in 1893, eight southern governors extended "to the worthy 
immigrant ... the hand of welcome ... without regard to his religion, his politics, 
or his nativity." Governor Benjamin R. Tillman reassured his listeners that "the 
foreign citizens of South Carolina are among the best," none of ''low character" 
who would "menace our free insitutions. "• 
Fifteen years later, as a United States Senator, Tillman addressed the South 
Carolina House of Representatives on "The Negro Problem and Immigration." 
Because blacks outnumbered whites by 225,000 and were "becoming more and more 
worthless, more and more uncontrollable, more and more resentful of white super-
vision," hundreds of thousands of immigrants from northern and western Europe 
were needed as "white reinforcements." Since Tillman was one-half English and 
one-fourth each of both German ancl Irish, he favored these nationalities, but not 
southern, and eastern Europeans. While Italians" 'from Rome·northward' "had 
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made a favorable enough impression on him, those from Naples were "not the type 
we would like to have.' " In order to attract the right kind of immigrants, lands had 
to be drained and the blacks totally subjugated by the repeal of the 15th Amend-
ment, lest they "act as a scarecrow to keep your white Dutchman, or Belgian, or 
Scotchman, or German away.'' In rosy colors Tillman painted a South Carolina 
landscape reclaimed by one hundred thousand energetic Hollanders. "They would 
turn that wilderness of bog and swamp into a garden," he boasted, "and Charleston 
would leap forward to her proper place as a great commercial seaport." Although 
Tillman was warmly applauded for his views, he had offered no pratical suggestions 
beyond observing that the South needed federal money for reclamation, and that its 
representatives should vote accordingly. If the federal government was "going to 
put water on that land," he stated, in reference to irrigation projects in the West, it 
was "their duty to come down here and take the water off ours." 5 
Since federal assistance for reclamation projects in the South would not be forth-
coming until the 1930s, the proponents of immigration had to find other means of 
attracting hard-working Europeans. From 1904-1908 South Carolina actively 
· sought to recruit European immigrants through its Departm.ents of Agriculture, 
Commerce, and Immigration. Because the state's businessmen were eager to 
employ skilled textile workers, the Cotton Manufactorers' Association contributed 
funds to Commissioner E.J. Watson's ambitious project to secure immigrants for 
the two voyages of the S.S. Wittekind from Bremen to Charleston. Watson had per-
sonally gone to Europe and offered individuals of various nationalities--Austrians, 
Belgians, Croatians, Dutch, French, Germans, and Hungarians--what amounted to 
a quasi-alien labor contract in exchange for free passage. Although Commerce and 
Labor Department Secretary Oscar Straus interpreted the Alien-Contract Law to 
allow South Carolina to import immigrants, Congress soon closed this loophole by 
penalizing with deportation any immigrant whose passage had been prepaid, 
whether by an individual or by a state. The Wittekind's arrival on November 4, 
1906, with 476 passengers, and again on February 9, 1907, with 121 passengers, 
made it the first immigrant ship to enter South Carolina since the 1860s. & 
Watson also persuaded Charles Weintraub, an emigre piano polisher from St. 
Petersburg then living in New York City, to locate his Incorporative Farming 
Association of 25 Russian and Jewish families on a 2,200-acre tract near Mont-
morenci in Aiken Courny. Due to their inexperience and to unfavorable economic 
and weather conditions, the socialist colony of Happyville lasted a little more than 
two years, from Decmber 1905 to May 1908. Understandably discouraged, most of 
the 54 colonists left the South, as did many of the 2,500 immigrants who came to 
South Carolina during the early 1900s from the eastern and northwestern United 
States and from Europe. As of 1920 just one percent of the state's population were 
foreign-born or the children of foreign-born parents; the foreign-born themselves 
numbered 6,401. 1 
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According to R. Beverly Herbert, whom Watson had hired to recruit immigrants, 
the newcomers were dissatisfied with the low wages and limited employment oppor-
tunities for their particular trades. Moreover, after the initial welcome in 
Charleston, the immigrants found that they were treated not much better than black 
laborers and housed in the same type of cabins. Instead of relieving the South's 
racial problem, the presence of immigrants actually created "a new problem." In 
1908 South Carolina dropped immigration recruitment-from the work of Watson's 
department, which henceforth would concentrate on Agriculture, Commerce, and 
Industries. The state, Herbert observed, would "never have another department of 
immigration which will do business on a shoe string in the same grand manner as 
was done by Commissioner E.J. Watson.•~• 
Rather than seeking immigrants, said Herbert, South Carolina should try to keep 
its native-born white citizens from leaving the state by improving education, 
agriculture and manufacturing. Something had to be done to halt the emigration of 
agricultural workers (30,000 during the first six months of 1923), who sought jobs in 
towns, cotton mills, lumber camps, and northern factories. Of the tenants who con-
tinued to farm (65% of South Carolina's lands were tenant-operated in 1920), more 
than one-third moved every year in a hungry search for a better living. Between 
1918 and 1922 cotton acreage had declined by almost one million acres because of 
falling prices, the invasion of the boll weevil, and lack of knowledge about new seeds 
and sprays. 9 
The region could endure the out-migration of blacks, so southern businessmen 
and landowners believed, but it could not sustain the loss of white labor without 
jeopardizing the future of rural civilization. In response to the agricultural depres-
sion of the 1920s, both North and South Carolina created Land Settlement Commis-
sions which conferred with each other and investigated projects in other states and 
foreign countries with the purpose of developing plans to help their own tenant 
farmers become landowners. Their proposals included yet another immigration 
scheme. Land, in the form of small homesleads located in planned colonies, would 
be offered as bait for several hundred skilled farmers from northern Europe, who 
would serve as models for native-born whites. The work of Hugh MacRae in eastern 
North Carolina was a convincing demonstration that carefully planned and operated 
immigrant agricultural colonies could dramatically increase yeilds on old lands 
through proper cultivation, drainage, and the use of improved seeds and sprays. 10 
MacRae, a mining engineer (Massachestts Institute of Technology, 1885), 
banker, and president of his family-owned Wilmington Cotton Mills Company, 
decided in the early 1900s to devote his life to the improvement of southern 
agriculture. He recognized that the Coastal Plain from Norfolk, Virginia, to 
Jacksonville, Florida, was suitable for intensive farming of a diversity of early 
spring and summer vegetables. The produce of this "Great Winter Garden could be 
shipped to northern cities on the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad. Using a survey by 
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soil experts and drainage engineers to indentify the areas most suitable for intensive 
farming, the Carolina Trucking Development Company, formed by Mac Rae and 
other Wilmington businessmen, purchased for $12 an acre or less almost 70,000 
acres, mostly Norfolk sandy loam, in six locations in New Hanover and Pender 
Counties within 40 miles to the north and west of the port city. Mac Rae was a 
painstaking developer, in contrast to the politicians and state officials who were 
usually just promoters. Prior to bringing in immigrant families, the Carolina Truck-
ing Development Company built roads, drained and divided land into ten and twen-
ty acre plots--parts of which were cleared and ploughed--and constructed small 
houses and outbuildings. Settlers could buy woodland for $30 acre and farm land 
for $50 to $150 per acre, by putting one-fourth down and paying the balance within 
five years, or longer, if necessary, at 60Jo interest rate on the deferred amount. The 
company provided the newcomers with jobs clearing the land until they could begin 
farming and then gave them tools, livestock, seed, and fertilizer. The settlers raised 
not only cash crops--cabbage, carrots, cucumbers, lettuce, snap beans, spinach, 
squash, strawberries, and later, fortuitously, daffodils, gladioli, irises, and tulip 
bulbs and flowers--but also a good deal of their own food. 11 
Cooperative ownership of heavy machinery and cooperative marketing organiza-
tions reduced costs for the individual farmer and promoted efficiency. Just as an 
agricultural expert advised the men on farming techniques, so also a social worker 
helped the women adjust their housekeeping to a new enviornment. The small size 
of the farms made close-knit communities feasible. Within a year or two MacRae's 
colonies became communities with one or more churches, a school, and a recrea-
tional center, and they contributed to the Americanization of the immigrants. His 
most successful colonies--Castle Hayne, St. Helena, and Marathon--exemplified the 
principals he enunciated in a 1908 address on "Bringing Immigrants to the South." 
"The failure of the Wittekind and other experiments," he said, "demonstrated that 
the immigrants should be directed to agriculture, and from this source the other 
demands for labor may later be supplied." Using an agricultural metaphor, he 
warned that ''the first immigrants to be brought to the South cannot be broad-
casted," but "must be treated with great care, just as one would do with rare plants 
being brought to a new locality. " 2 
MacRae had his failures, however, and learned from them. He decided to bring 
in Europeans after failing to interest in his projects a trainload of farmers from the 
western states. Because they lacked familiarity with English, he reasoned, prospec-
tive European settlers were less likely to be discouraged by the tales of economic woe 
told by the local inhabitants. The Carolina Trucking Development Company 
printed and distributed promotional pamphlets with maps of the farm colonies and 
price lists for land in the language of the nationality--Dutch, German, Greek, 
Hungarian, Italian, or Polish--that it wanted to recruit for a particular colony. The 
pamphlets explained "How to Own a Truck Farm in the Eastern North Carolina 
82 The South Carolina Historical Association 
Colonies" or how to be "King of a Farm rather than the slave to business. " 13 
The first colonists brought over in 1905 were seven Italian families from 
historically crime-free Rovigo in the province of Venetia. At St. Helens, named in 
honor of the Italian queen, these colonists successfully raised grapes and marketed 
wine until the North Carolina legislature enacted a prohibition law. Although most 
of the original colonists left, St. Helena prospered again by 1920, following the set-
tlement of a mixed group of immigrants: Italians, Poles; Hungarians, Ukrainians, 
Belgians, Danes, Slovaks, Serbs, Germans, and English, many of whom had earlier 
lived in the northern United States. 14 
Other colonies also prospered from the intermingling of nationalities, which 
shared agricultural techniques and the common experience of learning English. In-
deed, colonies settled by only one nationality or by single men were less likely to suc-
ceed than colonies inhabited by families from several nationalities. This lesson was 
illustrated by the failures of Artesia (Poles), Marathon, (single Greek men), 
Newberlin (Germans, Hungarians), later renamed Delco, and Van Eeden (Dutch). 
Marathon succeeded after Polish families settled there and began truck gardening. 
Within a few years its identity merged into that of neighboring Castle Hayne, 
MacRae's most successful colony. Located eight miles north of Wilmington on the 
site of a pre-Revolutionary War plantation, Castle Hayne brought together the hor-
ticulture skills of the Dutch (bulbs, flowers, and shrubs) and of the Hungarians, 
Poles, and Norwegians (vegetables and fruits). This colony appeared to visitors as 
"a beehive of concentrated, scientifically conducted activity, the direction of it com-
ing within, from the closely co-operating colonists themselves, ... in every direction 
health-restoring impulses radiate across the surrounding country.'' Although some 
American farmers were among the 600 to 700 settlers in MacRae's colonies, it was 
doubtful whether most tenant farmers in the region adopted the agricultural prac-
tices of the immigrants. After raising their one crop cash--cotton or tobacco--
native-born farmers perferred to " 'sit on the front porch,' " rather than working 
year-round cultivating a diversity of crops. 1·' 
Nevertheless, MacRae optimistically believed that the immigration of European 
farmers would either solve or at least minimize the race problem, by making "the 
negro incidental instead of the controlling factor" in the southern labor force. While 
the South still depended on the black laborer, the Great Migration provided, he 
argued, "the one great opportunity that we have had, and in fact the necessity for 
replacing him with something better.'' ''Where the population consists of seventy-
five negroes to twenty-five whites," he said, "there our Anglo-Saxon civilization in 
the end is doomed ultimately to decay." The solution was to dilute the black 
population by a two-way process: the emigration of blacks to other sections of the 
United States and the immigration of Europeans to the South. To be sure, "a small 
proportion of negroes," not more than 250/o, could find "a place of usefulness and 
social progress" in a society whose standards were defined by southern whites. 
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MacRae hired black laborers on a daily wage (at twice the going rate of $1.00) to 
ditch, clear, and fence land, but would not sell them lots in his farm colonies. All 
deeds contained a clause which would "forever prevent the land from passing to a 
negro," no exceptions made. The Carolina Trucking Development Company was 
anxious to counteract the unfavorable publicity given the South by steamship and 
railroad agents who distributed maps labeling the region as the "Country of the 
Black Man." Although MacRae had put aside his Anglo-Saxon prejudices to the ex-
tent that he would recruit skilled farmers of any European nationaltiy, he was un-
willing to include in his "human engineering" projects blacks, whom he viewed as 
"unreliable," unskilled, and possessing more brawn than brains. 16 
Having invested heavily in his farm colonies, on which he made some profit, 
MacRae realized that no private individual had the resources to apply his concept 
on the scale required for the agricultural rejuvenation of the South. In 1923 he tried 
to persuade the North Carolina legislature to fund the Land Loan bill introduced by 
state Senator D.F. Giles. But North Carolina did not have the money to finance 
adequately a Farm Land Board authorized to undertake land settlement. Thereafter 
MacRae directed his efforts to securing federal assistance for reclamation and land 
settlement projects in the southern states. 11 
Meeting in Columbia during January 1923, concerned citizens and represen-
tatives of colleges, cotton manufacturers, chambers of commerce, newspapers and 
railroads organized the South Carolina Land Settlement Association and elected of-
ficers: as president, former Governor Richard I. Manning; as a vice-president, 
David R. Coker, the Hartsville pioneer seed and plant breeder; and as secretary 
W .H. Mills, professor of rural social science at the Clemson Agricultural College of 
South Carolina. Two months later, in March, the South Car9lina General Assembly 
empowered Governor Thomas G. Mcleod to appoint a commission to investigate 
land settlement policies in such others states as California, North Carolina, Utah, 
and Wisconsin. Manning was appointed chairman of the seven-member commis-
sion which included Coker and Mills. Hugh MacRae accompanied the members on 
their western trip in July. Learning from visits to farm colonies of 100 to 300 
families in California and Wisconsin, the commissioners recommended in their 
report to the governor that the South Carolina legislature pass two bills and a bond 
issue. Using the California Land Settlement Act as a model, a State Land Owner-
ship Board of South Carolina should be created with the authority to locate lands 
for planned colonies, which would be financed by a $300,000 loan at no more than 
4 Yi OJo interest from the Sinking Fund Commission. The legislature should also 
enact a statute similar to the Wisconsin Land Mortgage Association Act to facilitate 
the participation of individuals and corporations in the projects. Finally, the 
legislature should submit to the voters a $1,000,000 bond issue, which would be used 
as a revolving fund for loans to settlers, who would have up to thirty-six years to 
repay at 60Jo interst. To benefit the whole state the commission recommended that a 
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supervised group settlement be developed in each major agricultural section: truck 
farming in the lower counties; general farming in the coastal plain; and fruit and 
berry-growing in the sandhills. 11 
After serving the needs of the landless South Carolina farmers the settlements 
would welcome "men with a knowledge of special phases of agriculture, which our 
own people lack ... from other states in this country and from England, Ireland, 
Scotland, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, France, and Germany, the coun-
tries from which the best citizens of the United States came ... " the commission's 
invitation explicitly excluded "the anarchists, communists, or bolsheviki from the 
industrial centers of Russia, the Balkan States and Southern Europe."" 
In spite of the endorsement of Governor McLeod and the support expressed for 
land settlement in public meetings and in magazine and newspaper articles, the 
legislature failed to pass the bills during its 1924 session. Three major factors con-
tributed to their defeat: lack of money, partisan politics, and growing national sup-
port for immigration restriction. In March the Sinking Fund Commission reported 
that it had no money available in 1924 because of having to finance the construction 
of the State Office Building. Many legislators reacted negatively to the bills, believ-
ing that they were "a scheme to aid some of the large wealthy land owners in dispos-
ing of their lands," or that they were a part of "an effort to bring Governor Mann-
ing back into the politics of the state." Although these charges were refuted, it was 
difficult to keep "politics out of the state land schemes. "2o 
Finally, national politics in 1924 worked against the proposals to bring in skilled 
European farmers. The Reed-Johnson Act of 1924 limited immigration annually to 
20Jo of the number of each nationality in the Census of 1890. Although this law 
favored northern Europeans, it set a quota of about 165,000 for the coming year and 
required immigrants to obtain special visas overseas from an American counsel, so 
that their number could be counted before departure rather than on arrival. The 
Land Settlement Commission did persuade South Carolina Senator Nathaniel B. 
Dial to speak out in favor of an amendment endorsed by MacRae and introduced by 
North Carolina Senator Furnifold M. Simmons which would permit "a selective 
method" of immigration, with preference to agriculturalists. But Representative 
James F. Byrnes publicly criticized those in South Carolina who wanted to bring in 
European immigrants to replace black laborers. The failure of the Wittekind experi-
ment showed, Byrnes acgued, the folly of importing immigrants unfamiliar with the 
English language, cotton farming and southern labor conditions. "What will it pro-
fit us," he quoted, "if we grow a few more bales of cotton or operate a few more 
spindles and yet suffer the loss of our civilization?" During his unsuccessful cam-
paign for the Democratic nomination for the United States Senate in which he lost to 
Coleman Blease Byrnes expressed what was probably a widely held view. He would 
"rather have one big black nigger (sic) on [his] cotton farm than half a dozen 
Italians." That statement may indicate why the proposals of the South Carolina 
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Land Settlement Commission and of Hugh MacRae did not win adequate legislative 
and popular support. 21 
By the mid- l 920s most of the southerners who had earlier viewed immigration as 
a means of solving their labor problems changed their minds and supported the 
quota laws. The settlement of Europeans involved a sttbstantial financial invest-
ment and posed a social risk. When plans for model agricultural communities were 
implemented during the 1930s, they were federally-funded and were for native-born 
whites. But if "Sambo" could not be replaced by an influx of white labor, he would 
still be kept in his place. The exploitation of black labor was the basis of the 
southern economy until the New Deal and World War II stimulated a revolution in 
southern agriculture and industry. Linked to the West in an expanding Sunbelt, 
which attracts capital and workers from the other regions of the United States and 
from abroad, the South bears today little resemblance to the "farm ownership in 
communities" envisioned by Hugh MacRae and David R. Coker, but it does offer 
new economic opportunities to both blacks and whites. 22 
1 The following articles have provided useful background information for my study of immigration 
to the Carolinas: Rowland T. Berthoff, "Southern Attitudes Toward Immigration, 1865-1914," The 
Journal of Southern History, 17, No. 3 (August, 1951), 328-60; Robrt L. Brandon, "The End of Im-
migration to the Cotton Fields," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 50, No. 4, (March, 1964), 
591-611; Dan T. Carter, ''Faithful Legacy: White Southerners and the Dilemma of Emancipation,'' The 
Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association (1977), pp. 49-63; Bert James Lowenburg, "Ef-
forts of the South to Encourage Immigration. 1865-1900," The South Atlantic Quarterly, 33, No. 4 (Oc-
tober, 1934), 363-85; Arnold Shankman, "This Meanacing Influx: Afro-Americans on Italian Immigra-
tion to the South, 1880-1915," The Mississippi Quarterly; 31, No. I (Winter, 1977-78), 67-88. Also of use 
were Henry Booker, "Efforts of the South to Attract Immigrants," Diss. University of Virginia 1965, 
and Jean Scarpaci, "Italian Immigration in Louisiana's Sugar Parishes: Recruitment, Labor Conditions, 
and Community Relations, 1880-1910," Diss. Rutgers University 1972. 
' "To Encourage Immigration," in Walter L. Flemmg, editor, Documentary History of Reconstruc-
tion: Political, Military, Social, Religious, Educational & Industrial, 1865 to the Present Time, 
(Clevland, Ohio: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1906-07) 299-300; Lowenberg, p. 369; Bertoff, pp. 
336-37; and Carter, pp. 59-60. Less than 3,000 of the 250.000 immigrants entering the United States in 
1865-66 came to the cotton and cane fields; and of the 3,000 who settled in the southern states, most chose 
Tennessee and Virginia. 
• "Negro Opposition to Immigration," in Fleming, Documentary History of Reconstruction, II, 310; 
Shankman, pp. 68, 73-75, 81, 86-88. 
• State Department of Agriculture, Commerce, and Immigration, Handbook of South Carolina-· 
Resources, Institutions and Industries of The State. A Summary of the Statistics of Agriculture, 
Manufactures, Geography, Climate, Geology and Physiography, Minerals and Mining, Education, 
Transportation, Commerce, Government, Elc., E.J. Watson, Commissioner, 1907 (Columbia, South 
Carolina: The State Paper Company, 1907), pp. 513, 516, 509-23, 322-23, 531; Proceedings of the Con-
vention Of Governors Held in the City of Richmond, Virginia, on April 12th and 13th, 1893. With 
86 The South Carolina Historical Association 
Papers Prepared by the Governors of Arkansas, Alabama, South Carolina, and Virginia, in Regard to 
the Physical Resources of their Respective States (Richmond: C.N. Williams, Printer, 1893), pp. 9-10, 
67. In 1898, Italians established Homewood colony in Horry County, South Carolina, and successfully 
marketed strawberries and vegetables. See Mildred Louise Pettus, "European Immigration to South 
Carolina, 1881-1908," Master's Thesis University of South Carolina 1954, pp. 20-21. 
' B.R. Tillman, U.S. Senator, Address Delivered by Invitation Before the South Carolina House of 
Representatives, January 24, 1908 (Columbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1908), pp. 6, 
13-14, 16, 3-23; and Tillman, quoted in Hugh MacRae, "Bringing Immigrants to the South," Address 
Delivered Before the North Carolina Society of New York, December 7, 1908, p. 10 (copy in Hugh 
MacRae Papers 21-H, Box: Volumes, folders Printed Material, Manuscript Department, William R. 
Perkins Library, Duke University). 
' The best study to date of Commissioner E.J. Watson's efforts to recruit immigrants is Pettus' 
Master's thesis on "European Immigration to South Carolina," pp. 36-37. See also Handbook of South 
Carolina (1907), pp. 520-23; and First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Annual Report of the Commis-
sioner of Agriculture, Commerce, and Immigration of the State of South Carolina, in 1904, 1905, 1906, 
1907, and 1908, in Reports and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina (Col-
umbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1905-09). 
' Arnold Shankman, "Happyville, the Forgotten Colony," American Jewish Archives, 30, No. 
(April 1978), 3-19; Pettus, pp. 24-25; and The Aiken Journal and Review, May 25, June I, 8, August 31, 
September 4, 7, November 6, 23, December 11, 14, 18, 1906; August 9, 23, 27, 30, September 3, 6, 13, 
October 4, 29, November 26, 1907. See Blue Book of Southern Progress--1923 (Baltimore, MD.: 1923), 
pp. 57-59. 
• R. Beverly Herbert, "Immigration to South Carolina," c. 1910; and another version, "Immigration 
to South Carolina," Paper read before the Kosmos Club in Columbia, c. 1920, enclosed in an August 24, 
1923, letter from Herbert to David R. Coker, in the David R. Coker Papers, South Caroliniana Library, 
Columbia. See also E.J. Watson, Fifth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce 
and Immigration of the State of South Carolina, 1908, in Reports and Resolutions of the General 
Assembly of the State of South Carolina, Vol. I (Columbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 
1909), p. 1041; and Pettus, p. 57. 
' Herbert, "Immigration to South Carolina," version sent to Coker in 1923; S.M. Derrick, Farm 
Tenure in South Carolina, Bulletin of the University of South Carolina, No. 89 (August 1920), pp. 9-11, 
21-22, 31-32. In 1910, blacks were 55.20Jo of South Carolina's population and 68.60Jo of its tenants. See 
W.W. Long to David R. Coker, February 25, 1924, and May 12, 1924, with copy of an article he wrote 
for the Spartanburg Herald; D.R. Coker, Confidential Crop Memorandum, May 31, 1923; and clipping, 
"Delta Not Alone in Problem of Labor," The Commercial Advertiser, May 14, 1923, David R. Coker 
Papers. See Elwood Mead, "Community Farming," The New Republic, 41, No. 533 (February 18, 
1925), 329. 
10 Lester C. Lamon, "Document, W.T. Andrews Explains the Causes of Black Migration from the 
South," The Journal of Negro History, 63, No. 4 (Fall 1978), 365-72; Mead, pp. 329-30, 327-32, and in 
the same issue, editorial on "Remaking Farm Life," pp. 325-26. Roy V. Scott, "Land Utilization and 
American Railroads in the 20th Century: A Forgotten Phase of Agricultural History," Annual Meeting 
of the Organization of American Historians, New Orleans, April 13, 1979, which was published as "Land 
Use and American Railroads in the Twentieth Century," Agricultural History, 53, No. 4 (October 1979), 
683-703, provided useful information on the role of the railroads in sponsoring colonization. 
11 The following theses and paper were helpful to my research on Hugh MacRae: John Faris Corey, 
"The Colonization and Contributions of Emmigranls to Southeastern North Carolina by Hugh 
MacRae," Master's Thesis Appalachian State Teachers College 1957; Stanley Tebbs Prewitt, "Hugh 
MacRae's Agricultural Project: An Example of the Tensions between the Jeffersonian Ideal and the 
"Replacing 'Sambo': Could White Immigrants Solve 
the Labor Problem in the Carolinas?" 
87 
Planners' Ethic," Honor's Thesis University of North Carolina at Chapel HilI 1974; Robert D. Darden, 
"The Economic and Social Signifigance of the Hugh MacRae Colonies," Paper for Rural Economics 14, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill September 1924, North Carolina Collection Louise R. 
Wilson Library, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. See also George Byrne, "Hugh MacRae's 
Pratical Application of Common Sense in Colonization," Reprinted from Manufacturer Record, Vol. 
61, No. 22 (May 30, 1912), 8-13, in Box: Printed Materials (2); and Map of Eastern States Showing Loca-
tion of Narrow Belt Along the South Atlantic Coast Designated by the United States Department of 
Agriculture as the "Great Winter Garden," in "Report on Wilmington, North Carolina and Tidewater 
Power Co. Furnishing Electric Transportation, Light, Power, and Gas to this City," November 1919, 
Compiled by Frank J. Buckley, 14 Wall St., New York City, Box: Printed Materials (1), folder 2, Hugh 
MacRae Papers. 
11 MacRae, pp. 9-11. 
" Edwin Bjorkman, "Hugh MacRae: Builder of Human Happiness, A Study in Agricoltural 
Engineering," Federal Writers' Project Papers, 1936-1940, Box 29, folder 316: 529, on Reel 3, microfilm 
copy, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, pp. 19-20, 1-31. In the 
Hugh MacRae Papers, see "How to Own a Truck Farm in the Eastern North Carolina Colonies," 
Carolina Trucking Developement Co., Wilmington, N.C.; "Prospering in the Eastern North Carolina 
Colonies"; "A Carolina Trucking Developement Co., telepeinek leirasa, Wilmington, N.C., Kozeleben, 
Eredeti feny kepeszeti folvetelekkel" (New York: Louis A. Rosswaag's Stuyvesant Press); "Polska 
Kolonija, W Marathon, North Carolina"; "Van Eeden-Kolonie in N. Carolina U.S.A." (Amsterdam: 
W. Versluys, 1912), in Box: Printed Material (2). See also in MacRae Papers, "Prospectus of the St. 
Helena Colony Company, March 20, 1908," Box: Printed Materials (1), folder l; and "Price List Castle 
Haynes Colony Farms, Castle Haynes, North Carolina, February 2, 1914," "Price List St. Helena 
Farms, July 20, 1914," "Lista Dei Prezzu Delle Farme nella Colonia di St. Helena, St. Helena, North 
Carolina, I Novembre, 1913," and "De Van Eeden Kolonie," in Box: Printed Materials (1), folder 2. 
" Corey, Chapter III on St. Helena, pp. 34-53. 
" Ibid., pp. 9, 23-33, 54-57 (Chapter IV, Van Eeden); 58-71 (Chapter V, Castle Hayne); 72-73 
(Chapter VI, Marathon), 74-77 (Chapter VII, Newberlin); 78 (Artesia); 79-83. See Bjorkman, pp. 7, 
20-21; Muriel L. Wolff, "Castle Hayne," 7 pp., folder 311: 521, and "Life at Castle Hayne," 55 pp., 
folder 311: 522, Box 29, Federal Writer's Project Papers, 1936-1940, on Reel 3. Alvin Johnson, 
Pioneer's Progress: An Autobiography (New York: The Viking Press, 1952). Chapter 33 Van Eeden, pp. 
357-65. "Real Estate Valuations in New Hanover Country," 1905 and 1923, enclosed in letter from Mary 
P. Bell to David R. Coker, September 12, 1923. "Acres Sold During Year 1920-Artesia Colony," box: 
Printed Material (1), folder 1, Hugh MacRae Papers. See the following cllpping in folders on Hugh 
MacRae in North Carolina Colection, Wilson Library: "The MacRae Colonies in North Carolina," 
World Agriculture, February 1921; J.R. Pillsbury, "More about the MacRae Colonies," News and 
Observer, October 4, 1921; Jonathan Daniel~. "M'Rae Colony Declared Model," News and Observer, 
March 6, 1927; Allen Raymond, 'Castle Hayne Is Model Of Diversified Farming," Wilmington Star, 
June 9, 1930; Maude Waddell, "Hugh MacRae Colonists Prosper ... , " Charlotte Observer, January 7, 
1934. There are also folders of material on MacRae--correspondence, clippings, and a pamphlet in the 
Louis T. Moore Collection in the Wilmington, North Carolina, Public Library. 
16 Byrne; Hugh MacRae to David R. Coker, January 8, 1924, Coker Papers; Frank Bohn, "New 
South's Farmers Have A New Teacher," New York Times, May 16, 1926, clipping in folder on Hugh 
MacRae, North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library; Bjorkman, p. 26; "How to Own a Truck Farm in 
the Eastern North Carolina Colonies," p. 13; MacRae, p. 5; Corey, pp. 20, 29' and MacRae, "Human 
Engineering," Address Delivered Before the Southern Land Congress, November II, 1918. 
" Mead, p. 329; and "A Bill To Be Entitled An Act Creating a Farm Land Board and Defining Its 
Powers and To Provide Funds for the Purchase of Land Farms for Home Ownership in the State of 
88 The South Carolina Historical Association 
North Carolina," Introduced by Senator [D.F.J Giles, Second Substitute for S.B. No. 18; Session 1923, 
General Assembly of North Carolina, Box: Printed Materials (2), MacRae Papers. See also Special 
legislative Committee Astonished by the Success of the New Hanover Farm Colonies" and "Landless 
Man the Subject of Dinner Talks Last Evening," February 18, 1923, and "MacRae Lays Before the 
Danish Commissioner of Agriculture His Project," Wilmington Star, December 3, 1923. "Secure Data 
on Farming Colony," News and Observer, February 18, 1923, and untitled clipping, February 23, 1923, 
and "MacRae Wants Farmers of Northern Europe Brought to Eastern Part of State," The Asheville 
Citizen, June 6, 1924, folder on MacRae, North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library. 
11 Land Settlement, Report of the South Carolina Land Settlement Commission, 1923 (Columbia, 
S.C.: The State Company, 1923), pp. 3-5, 8-19; and Journal of the House of Representatives of the First 
Session of the 75th General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, Being the Regular Session, beginn-
ing Tuesday, January 9, 1923 (Columbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1923), pp. 824-25, 
865, 1219. The other four members of the commission were Dr. S.J. Derrick, Mr. A.F. McKissick, Mr. 
Bright Williamson, and Mr. T .S. Wilbur. See also Hugh MacRae, "Memorandum of Remarks Made At 
Meeting of Members of the South Carolina Land Settlement Commission in Wilmington, North 
Carolina," enclosed in copy of a letter from MacRae to Richard I. Manning, September 21, 1923; and 
"foreward" and "Notes on Western Trip with South Carolina Land Settlement Commission," 
September 13, 1923, enclosed in a letter from MacRae to David R. Coker. February 7, 1934, Coker 
Papers. My research in the Coker Papers has been greatly facilitated by the excellent inventory of 
documents and index of correspondents compiled by Dr. David Carleton and Ms. Suzanne Krebsbach. 
" Land Settlement, Report, pp. 6-7. 
10 "Annual Message by Governor MacLeod," Journal of the House of Representatives of the Second 
Session of the 75th General Assembly of the State of South Carolina. being the Regular Session, Beginn-
ing Tuesday, January 8, 1924 (Columbia, S.C.: Gonzales and Bryan, State Printers, 1924), pp. S4-SS; 
also in this Journal, see pp. 604-0S, 1249-SO, 1331. For McLeod's later support of land settlement, see 
folder labeled Land Settlement Commission, Gov. McLeod & Richards Correspondence - State Boards 
and Commissions 1923-1929, Box F; and folder Material re Birmingham Reclamation Conference, 1925, 
Gov. McLeod Papers, General Subjects 1923-27, IX/9/6/Sb, South Carolina Department of Archives 
and History. In regard to Richard I. Manning's role on the Land Settlement Commission, see Robert 
Milton Burts, Richard Irvine Manning and the Progressive Movement in South Carolina (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1974), p. 208; Manning to David. R. Coker, March 4, and 8, 1924, 
and Coker to Manning, March 3 and 5, 1924, Coker Papers. Manning to The Secretary of the Interior, 
May 15, 1923; to L.M. Fisher, October 15, 1923; to Bernard Baruch, December 21, 1923, March 28, 
1924, and March 30, 1925; to W.W. Long, April 25, 1925, Microfilm R633, 2 Sept. 1927-31 Jan. 1930, 
Richard Irvine Manning Papers, South Caroliniana Library. W.W. Long, Director of Cooperative Ex-
tension Work in Agriculture and Home Economics at Clemson, was an enthusiastic advocate of land set-
tlement. He served, along, with George McCutcheon, Professor of Economics, University of South 
Carolina, as an advisory member to the South Carolina Land Settlement Commission and went on the 
trips to the other states. See Long to Coker, November 17 and 30, 1923, January 9 and IS, february 21, 
and March 11, 1924; Long to Richard I. Manning, March l, 1924; and Coker to Long, March ? 
[unreadable) and May 7, 1924, Coker Papers. See also Coker to Pierre H. Pike, May 7, 1924; "Little In-
terviews with a Farmer" [May 7, 1924]; "A Little Interview with a Farmer on Dairying" [c. May 24, 
1924), Coker Papers. "South Carolina Makes a Strong Move to Benefit Tenant Farmers and Large Land 
Owners" and "Broad Plan for Colonization South and for Making Land Owners out of Farm Tenants," 
Manufacturers Record, 84 No. 22 (November 29, 1923): 52, 57-58. 
" John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Navitism 1860-1920, Corrected and 
with a new Preface (New York: Athenuem, 1968), pp. 316-24. David R. Coker to Senator N.B. Dial, 
April 7, 1924, to Senator E.D. Smith, April 14, 1924, and to Representative James F. Brynes, June 16, 
1924; and Hugh MacRae to Coker, January 23, 1924, enclosing "Purposes" and "Principals" of the 
Selective Immigration League of America; MacRae and Coker, April 7, 1924, enclosing a copy of Senator 
Simmons' Amendment to bill (S. 2576) to limit the immigration of aliens into the United States, April 2, 
"Replacing 'Sambo': Could White Immigrants Solve 
the Labor Problem in the Carolinas?" 
89 
1924; N.B. Dial to Coker, Aril 3, 1924, and from James F. Byrnes, June 16, 1924, Coker Papers. See also 
"Restrictions of Immigration," Remarks of Hom. Nathaniel B. Dial of South Carolina In the Senate of 
the United States, Wednesday, April 9, 1924; "Resritiction of Immigration," Remarks of Hon. Ellision 
D. Smith of South Carolina In the Senate of the United States, April 9, 1924, urging the shutting of the 
door; and "Immigration Restriction," Speech of Hom. James F. Byrnes of South Carolina In the House 
of Representatives, Saturday, April S, 1924, Congressional Record, April 1-14, 1924, pp. S6S2-S4 
S960-62. See also Byrnes' comment against Italian immigrants, quoted in the Yorkville Enquirer, June 
17, 1924, as quoted in Daniel W. Hollis, "Cole L. Blease and the SenatQrial Campign of 1924," pp. 60, 
S3-68; and Winfred B. Moore, Jr. " 'Soul of the South': James F. Byrnes and the Racial Issue in 
-American Politics, 1911-1941," pp. 42-S2, in The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Associa-
tion, 1978. 
" Frank Bohn, "New South's Farmers Have a New Teacher," New York Times, May 16, 1926; and 
for Hugh MacRae's work as president of Penderlea Homesteads, Inc., a homestead subsistence project 
funded by the National Industry Recovery Act and directed by the Department of the Interior, see ''Com-
munity of Small Farms to be Created," December 17, 1933, and "Pender Homesteads Projects 
Outlined," Charlotte Observer; September 23, 1934; "MacRae Wants Farming 'Saved' Editors are 
Ready Aid Colonizer," Kingston Daily Free Press, November S, 193S, MacRae Folder, North Carolina 
Collection, Wilson Library. See Also Record Group % Farmers Home Administration, Records of 
Cooperative Associations, 193S-S4, North Carolina, Penderlea Farms Homestead Assn., Box No. SIS, 
National Archives And Records Service. Washington, D.C. 
90 THE SOUTH CAROLINA COUNCIL FOR THE COMMON GOOD 
Arnold Shankman 
Relatively little has been written about women in twentieth century South 
Carolina. Reasons for this are not difficult to uncover. Until recently archives have 
not aggressively collected the papers of contemporary South Carolina women, and 
those records that have been preserved often are incomplete. Moreover, South 
Carolina women have not been as prominent in political and social affairs as their 
peers elsewhere. Not until after World War II were Palmetto women elected to the 
state legislature, allowed to divorce, or permitted to serve on juries. Placed on a 
pedestal--perhaps even imprisoned on the pedestal--the South Carolina woman was 
rather limited in what she could achieve. 
Despite this dismal view of the progress of South Carolina women, which, alas, is 
reasonably accurate. some Palmetto women were able to crusade for social im-
provements. The American Association of University Women, the South Carolina 
Federation of Women's Clubs, the state federation of business and professional 
women's clubs, and the South Carolina Home Demonstration Council all were ac-
tive in the state by 1920. Each of these organizations and perhaps half a dozen 
others were eager to improve living conditions in South Carolina. Generally speak-
ing, their membership was composed of the woman activist described in Anne Firor 
Scott's influential book, The Southern Lady. They tended to be middle class women 
with fewer tasks at home than their mothers had. Smaller families, time-saving 
devices in the kitchen, better sanitary conditions, canned food, readymade clothing 
and an abundance of inexpensive domestic workers all made it possible for an in-
creasing number of white women to leave their homes and join voluntary associa-
tions.1 
That social change was needed in South Carolina was quite apparent. The state 
had the dubious distinction of being one of the nation's leaders in poverty, poor 
school attendance, infant and maternal mortality, tuberculosis, and inadequate 
prison facilities. Perhaps worst of all, South Carolina ranked 44th in white literacy 
and 49th in black literacy in 1930. Fully 50Jo of South Carolina's white and 260Jo of 
her black population were illiterate. In some counties, such as Allendale, nearly 
40% of black adults could not read or write. J. Strom Thurmond noted in 1936 that 
the state spent $40.65 on each school child and $211.49 on each prisoner. He believ-
ed that "the frightful surging billows of illiteracy [would] sweep our innocent ones 
into a sea of poverty, of crime, of infamy." 2 
South Carolina women's groups had often petitioned the legislature in the 1920s 
and early 1930s for progressive legislation with indifferent success. Several women 
concluded that their small organizations with modest memberships would have less 
political influence than one umbrella organization empowered to speak for all. It 
was the desire to unite women on issues of general concern that led to the formation 
of a new group on May 25, 1935, at the Columbia Hotel in the state capital. Mrs. C. 
Fred Laurence, president of the state federation of women's clubs, had summoned 
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six other women reperesenting various women's organizations to the meeting. It 
was decided to establish the Women's Council for the Common Good (Council), 3 
The purpose of the new organization was to "attempt to arouse public opinion to 
the importance of the work it is striving to do and thus make [for] safer and rich[er] 
home life, promote safety on the highways, and curb the use of liquor, and assure all 
children school training."• 
Two months later the Council adopted a constitution and dedicated itself to the 
'betterment of living conditions in South Carolina.'' The new group was open to all 
women's clubs with state-wide memberships except for those that were political or 
religious in orientation. Later it was decided that religious groups would be eligible 
for membership. 
With a treasury of $f5.00 in 1936, of which $14.90 had to be spent on postage 
and other routine expenses, it was apparent that the Council could do little on its 
own. So Mrs. Laurence contacted President Shelton Phelps of Winthrop College, 
offering to co-sponsor the Institute of Public Affairs, which the college held to pro-
mote leadership training for women. Phelps, receptive to the offer, indicated that 
those state-funded summer institutes had been discontinued because of inadequate 
appropriations for home extension work. Immediately Mrs. Laurence mobilized 
women to lobby legislators for funds for the institute and other home extention pro-
grams. This effort was successful, and an institute was held in July, 1936, which 
featured such diverse speakers as Dr. Frank Graham of the University of North 
Carolina; and civil liberties advocate Marion Wright. Topics discussed included 
school attendance, tenancy, patriotism, economics and public opinion. 6 
Similar institutes held over the next decade provided women with information on 
problems before the state and served as pep rallies to inspire participants to action. 
Supplementing these institutes were weekly columns on the women's pages of the 
Columbia State, space donated by the paper for several years, which allowed the 
Council and its member organization to reach tens of thousands of readers all over 
South Carolina. 7 
Early goals of the Council included increased appropriations for adult educa-
tion, a decent budget for the state library, better conditions for women in peniten-
tiaries, free textbooks for school children, regulations requiring that all qualified 
school teachers have college degrees, reevaluation of laws regulating interest rates 
for installment buying, and providing destitute children with "mended" but usable 
clothing.• To some extent each of these proposals was enacted into law, and the 
Council took justifiable pride in its work in behalf of such legislation. 
More controversial proposals, on the other hand, were less well received by the 
legislature. Speakers at Council meetings such as Dr. James Hayne often took as 
their topic the deplorable health conditions prevalent in the state. Infant mortality 
92 The South Carolina Historical Association 
and the presence of hereditary syphilis in children were of great concern to Council 
members. Therefore the Council favored new laws governing marriage, for its 
members blamed existing legislation for the prevalence of veneral diseases in South 
Carolina. Council members called for a three day waiting period and for a man-
datory physical examination before a couple could get married. They also favored 
requiring a Wasserman test for all would-be brides so that South Carolina could be 
rid of "the scourge which is menacing our state more every day." They also favored 
laws prohibiting intoxicated men and women to marry. On marriage reform, 
despite sending more than 1200 letters to legislators and others, they achieved no vic-
tory. Local magistrates, hotel owners, and, amazingly enough, even a few members 
of the state board of health opposed changes in the existing law. Some of this op-
position came from those who had made money from South Carolina's lax marriage 
laws; many noted that in several communities a fair bit of money was made from 
brides and grooms from North Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee who came to 
South Carolina to marry. Others opposed the law because they were not persuaded 
that it would significantly reduce veneral disease rates. For more than two decades 
Council members would lobby for reform of existing marriage laws, but with no 
luck. Bills were pigeonholed, buried in committees, or passed by one branch of the 
legislature but ignored by the other. Once, when a bill was passed, it was vetoed by 
the governor. 9 
Controversy was also evident when Council members made it known that they 
favored federal aid to education. These women were upset when they saw statistics 
showing that in some counties nearly 900/o of those enrolled in first grade never com-
pleted high school. Some even thought that an infusion of money in school systems 
could remedy this problem. As early a 1939 Mary Frayser, one of the Council's 
most active members, noted that "South Carolina is rich in children but poor in per 
capita [sic] wealth." To her, aid from Washington was the most practical way for 
the state properly to be able to harvest her "most valuable crop [which] is children." 
Maude Massey Rogers, another influential member, agreed and confided to a 
friend, "I'm not one of those who fear Federal supervision will take away some of 
our precious 'state's rights.' " Others hoped that federal funds could also be used 
for public and school libraries. 10 
South Carolina solons demonstrated relatively little interest in securing federal 
funds for education, but they did not object to--and even encouraged--efforts of 
Council women to work for federal and state legislation to ensure that grits were 
enriched and to remove taxes on margarine. In the process of making grits valuable 
nutrients were lost, and this popular breakfast food was of limited nutritional value. 
Enrichment of pearl grits, which would cost but s• per 100 pounds. restored 
vitamins and made this corn product a more nutritious food. South Carolina 
enacted a law providing for the enrichment of locally produced grits and corn meal, 
but since the state imported most of its grits from elsewhere, the law was of limited 
value. During her term as president of the Council Christine South Gee attended a 
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conference in Alabama sponsored by the National Research Council on the Enrich-
ment of Cereal Foods. "The purpose of my being invited," Mrs. Gee declared, 
"was to help spread the gospel of enrichment in which South Carolina has blazed a 
trail." In 1945 the Council waged a campaign to urge women to demand that super-
markets stock only enriched grits. More than a decade later, in the late 1950s, the 
Council was upset to learn that the federal school lunch program featured unenrich-
ed white flour, corn meal, and rice, and it presuaded South Carolina congressmen to 
sponsor a bill to provide for enrichment of school lunch products. 11 
Even more popular were Council efforts to get rid of a federal tax levied on 
margarine which dated back to 1886. Because of pressure from dairy states, colored 
oleomargarine was subjected to a to• per pound tax, and uncolored margarine, 
which had little eye appeal to consumers, was taxed at the rate of \l.i • per pound. The 
matter was more than of passing importance to South Carolinians since cotton seed 
oil was used by many margarine manufacturers. Council members such as Mrs. 
Laurence believed that "something ought to be done while the nation is so food 
conscious and the need for cheap foods for all the people is so pressing." She found 
it impossible to "understand the seeming indifference of the consumer public to let 
this injustice exist so long." Council members were not indifferent about the mat-
ter. As early as 1938 they had considered this question and invited Dr. J.S. Abbott, 
director of research for the National Association of Margarine Manufacturers, to 
address one of their meetings. He convinced the women that the government tax 
limited Southern production of cotton seed oil and unnecessarily burdened 
margarine consumers. Council members urged the public to write members of Con-
gress to sponsor legislation to get rid of the hated tax. They also solicited funds for a 
lobbying effort to promote passage of a pro-margarine bill. Over and over Council 
members reminded consumers that margarine was "a palatable fat, necessary to a 
well rounded diet for [the] American people." Eventually the tax was repealed, and 
Council members boasted that South Carolina women had done more than their 
peers from any other state to repeal the margarine tax. 12 
Much of the work done to repeal the margarine tax was done during World War 
II, which was a very trying time for Council members. The Council was lucky to 
survive the war. Many members got so involved in war-related activites that they 
had little time for Council meetings. Christine Gee, then president of the Council, 
recollected in 1961 that during the war she often presided at meetings with as few as 
six members. Her determination not to head a dying organization was largely 
responsible for increasing Council membership from six to fourteen organizations 
during the war years. Assisting her was Maude Massey Rogers, who argued that the 
Council should not be disbanded until after the war. "It seems to me," Mrs. Rogers 
insisted, "that we need to keep 'tied together' now more than ever." 13 
The way that the Council survived was to get involved in the war effort. Council 
members lobbied for increased federal funds for schools located near army bases, 
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promoted food conservation, and gave advice to counties seeking to establish con-
sumer information centers. Mary Frayser was sent to scores of counties to organize 
local chapters of the Council, to meet with existing groups, and to provide informa-
tion on how women's groups could do their part to win the war. The Council also 
made changes in its organization and opened its membership to county groups 
dedicated to promoting the common good of the state. The word "women" was 
removed from the official name of the Council, but because of force of habit, it was 
frequently used in promotional literature for several more years. By 1945 the Coun-
cil was in good shape and had a record number of members, including for the first 
time representatives from Catholic and Jewish organizations. 14 
After the war the Council increasingly became interested in issues relating to 
women, but the status of women had long been of concern. Back in the 1930s Coun-
cil members had been upset that virtually no women had been appointed to county 
boards of public welfare; women had not even been consulted when plans were be-
ing made for the construction of a women's prison. Council members were also 
displeased that employment for single women was restricted, and that married 
women, especially teachers, were expected to give up their jobs so more men could 
be employed. In 1941 Mrs. Laurence confessed that "we think in South Carolina 
that we have equal rights with men, but we do not." Mary Frayser was even more 
blunt in 1945 when she told of a conversation with a prominent doctor who ''told me 
that A.M. that he didn't think the women of S.C. had an ounce of influence in the 
state." 1 5 Surely this was something of an overstatement, but it was true that in 1945 
Palmetto women were not being elected to the legislature, were prohibited from ser-
ving on juries, 16 and could not legally divorce thier husbands. 
Council records for the years immediately after World War II were haphazardly 
preserved, but information that does exist shows increasing concern in improving 
the status of women. In the 1950s Council members repeatedly endorsed passage of 
the Equal Rights Amendment and revision of the state constitution to allow for jury 
service for women. Sara V. Liverance, who was largely responsible for women get-
ting the right to serve on state juries, once noted of the Equal Rights Amendment 
that it was "nothing new and radical, for it goes back to the forming of the original 
Council." 11 Not until the 1960s was the constitution amended to allow for jury ser-
vice for women. The Equal Rights Amendment was never ratified by the legislature. 
Interestingly enoug,h, interest in women's rights was accompanied by a desire on 
the part of the Council to admit men's organizations to membership. The Council 
was now called the South Carolina Council for the Common Good, and it revised its 
constitution to permit admission of men. The American Cancer Society, the Society 
for Crippled Children, and the South Carolina Library Association did join the 
Council, but these groups invariably sent women representatives to Council 
meetings. Men were never active in the Council; visiting speakers were the only men 
normally present at its meetings. 11 
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In addition to the Equal Rights Amendment, marriage law reform, and jury ser-
vice for women, issues of concern for the Council in the 1950s and 1960s included 
com batting juvenile delinquency, adopting a new state constitution, reforming 
adoption laws, studying the value of nuclear power, establishing a state nursing 
home for cancer patients, and calling for a national divorce law. Members also 
showed interest in world affairs and consistently supported efforts to promote the 
humanitarian activities of the United Nations. With finoocial assistance from foun-
dations, seminars were sometimes held on these and other issues. State politicians 
gladly addressed Council meetings, and newspaper coverage was given to Council 
activites. 19 
Although on most matters the Council was quite progressive, on one issue, race 
relations, it was paternalistic. There is no evidence that blacks ever participated in 
Council meetings or that their presence was particularly desired. Several Council 
members such as Mary Frayser and Christine Gee were enlightened paternalists, but 
only Alice Norwood Spearman Wright, who frequently attended Council meetings, 
was a civil rights crusader. In the early years of the Council, members successfully 
lobbied for the establishemnt of industrial schools for blacks, and its members ge-
nuinely hoped to better the condition of South Carolina Negroes. In 1943 Mrs. Gee 
even attended a meeting that helped pave the way for the establishment of the 
Southern Regional Council. Council members, however were cautious about 
discussing civil rights. They resented Northern criticism of Southern racial practices 
and admitted that Dixie's black and white leaders needed to meet to discuss common 
problems. Council members insisted that all such meetings "be handled with the 
greatest good judgement, delicacy and insight. There must be freedom from publici-
ty in our deliberation." Nonetheless, Council members seldom themselves showed 
delicacy in their statements. For example, during World War II the Council's 
forthright stand for eradication of syphilis was based in part on the realization that 
many blacks were being "turned down for military service because of veneral 
diseases." Therefore white men were forced "to make the quota for the armed 
forces. We must see that these negroes ase treated and can perform ... needed 
military service.'' 20 
In 1948 the Council championed an educational requirement for voters. The 
reason for this was to prevent ''illiterate negroes [from being] admitted to the 
1;>olls." Since Negro exclusion from the Democratic primary had been outlawed, 
Ruth Roettinger, chairman of the Council's Committee on County Government, 
feared that there might be "a heavy vote by negroes who are illiterate and thus an 
easy prey to corrupt political machines.' Miss Roettinger did not seem to object to 
having a seventh grade educational requirement apply to both blacks and whites 
voting in primaries, but otherwise she showed little sensitivity to the needs of blacks. 
Sensitivity was also lacking on the part of the other Council members, who as late as 
the 1960s, refused to capitalize "Negro" in their correspondence or in official 
Council documents. The civil rights movement seems to have been ignored by many 
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Council members except in a negative sense. For example, legislators were warned 
to reform laws to let women serve on juries before a federal court ordered such a 
change on the grounds that it violated the civil rights of black women. 21 It would be 
wrong, however, to conclude that the Council was composed of insensitive racists, 
but it is true that Council members could have done more to help South Carolina 
solve its racial problems. 
In defense of the Council, it might be noted that one possible reason for its lack 
of involvement in civil rights is that during the 1960s the organization was itself fac-
ing serious problems. Membership was declining, the treasury seldom had more 
than $350.00, and attendance at meetings was dismal. In 1960 the Winthrop Alum-
nae Association, one of the charter members of the Council, dropped its member-
ship because of lack of funds. Three years later the Woman's Christian Temperance 
Union and the South Carolina Council of Parents and Teachers' Associations 
discontinued membership. In the spring of 1968 Mrs. Augusta Wolff reported that 
only one of thirteen organizations invited to join the Council accepted her invita-
tion. Even worse, Council meetings and seminars were poorly attended. In 1970, 
when the Council received money from the Sears Roebuck Foundation to hold a 
seminar, Mrs. Wolff sadly reported to Clyde Ware of Sears, ''Reservations are com-
ing in very slowly. Do hope there will be more there than me and thee." Dora 
McNeill wondered if Council members were so involved on other activites that they 
had no time for its meetings. She sadly confessed in 1968 that it was so hard to get 
the executive committee together that decisions often had to be made through mail 
referendums. This meant that heads of member organizations had less opportunity 
to communicate face to face with one another. Mrs. Bee Chochran agreed and 
wrote Sara Liverance that "direct communication [often] might mean the difference 
between sucess and failure of a project." 22 
The situation did not improve in the 1970s. In 1973 the Council lacked the funds 
needed to print its annual bulletin. Moreover, several of the leaders of the Council 
were the same women who had organized the group in 1935. To be sure, there were 
some new faces at annual meetings, but many young women seemed uninterested in 
the Council. In 1976 one meeting had to be cancelled for lack of attendance, and it 
became impossible to find qualified members to fill Council offices. Meetings 
seldom had more than ten in attendance, and it was apparent to all that the Council 
was becoming less and less effective. In 1977 Dixie Baxter wrote other Council 
members that "our organization had faltered to the point of collapsing." She 
therefore proposed that a meeting be held to decide whether it would be best to 
dissolve the Council. On April 2, 1977, that meeting was held and those present 
voted to disband. The organization accepted the invitation of Ronald J. Chepesiuk, 
Winthrop College archivist, to deposit its records at Winthrop. The balance of the 
Council treasury was donated to the ERA-South Carolina. The South Carolina 
Council for the Common Good thereby ended its existence. 23 
During its forty-two year existence the South Carolina Council for the Common 
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Good brought about several needed changes to the state. Its members "wanted the 
extension of government further into the areas of education, health, labor, and 
social welfare." Like the women described by J. Stanley Lemons in his book, The 
Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s, the Council was founded to promote 
progressivism. 2• By our standards some of the Council's achievements, such as 
enrichment of grits or establishing training schools, may seem modest achievements, 
but considering conditions in South Carolina in the 1930s they represented major 
improvements for the Palmetto state. Admittedly the race question received inade-
quate attention from many Council members, but perhaps it is unreasonable to ex-
pect that middle and upper class women in South Carolina would be passionate ad-
vocates of intergration. After a quarter of a century of successful activities the 
Council became somewhat stodgy and failed to attract enough new blood to main-
tain its vitality. Nonetheless, even in its waning years the Council fought a good 
fight for such causes as jury service for women and the Equal Rights Amendment. 
All in all, the Palemtto State today is a better place to live because of the work of the 
South Carolina Council for the Common Good. 
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JOHN SAUNDERS, A LOYALIST CAPTAIN IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 
1780-1782 
Kenneth Donovan 
A fourth generation American Loyalist and one of the few distinguished Virgi-
nians who fought for the British during the American Revolution,John Saunders 
was born June 1, 1753, in Princess Anne County, Virginia, the only son of Jonathan 
and Elizabeth Saunders. Descended from an English royalist family, John 
Saunders' great grandfather, the immigrant Jonathan Saunders, acquired a large 
landed estate in Princess Anne County and was ordained the Church of England 
Minister for Lynnhaven Parish of the same county in 1695. 1 By the time the Revolu-
tion began in Virginia, John Saunders had inherited a large plantation of over eight 
hundred acres in the vicinity of Norfolk. Saunders was among the most wealthy 
Virginia Loyalists, for he was one of only eight native-born Americans to have 
claimed over £5,000 for losses suffered in the Revolution.2 
John Saunders was only twelve years old when his father died in 1765 at the age 
of thirty-nine. Jacob Ellegood, Saunders' brother-in-law and owner of a large adja-
cent plantation, became Saunders' guardian for the six years of his minority from 
1765 to 1771. Besides maintaining the estate, Ellegood provided £442 for Saunders' 
education from 1769 to 1775, for which he was later reimbursed by Saunders after 
the war.• A statement of guardianship in 1775 noted that "Jacob Ellegood was 
obliged to borrow money which he had interest on for years [and that he] had not 
charged anything as yet for his trouble in attending on the estate and seeing the pro· 
duce got to the market."' Ellegood, who later described himself as "the first native 
of America who raised a regimental corps during the war for the defence and sup-
port of his majesty's government," doubtless influenced the young boy. 6 Because 
Ellegood was Saunders' guardian for six years and paid for his education for 
another four until he reached the age of twenty-two, their relationship appears to 
have been more father-son than brothers-in-law. The date of John Saunders' birth 
was recorded in a family Bible which in 1834 was in the possession of Ellegood. 7 
Following in the footsteps of his father, who had served as county lieutenant for 
Princess Anne, Ellegood became the colonel of militia for the county. As colonel of 
militia, he seems to have had some responsibility for recruitment because Governor 
Lord Dunmore wrote to Ellegood "to request him to take part with the British 
Government" immediately upon the outbreak of hositlites. • 
John Saunders appears to have decided for the Loyalist cause well before the 
Revolutionary War erupted in Virginia. In July, 1774, the young Virginian 
manifested his anti-Whig sentiments at a meeting in Princess Anne County when 
"he alone raised his voice in opposition" to the proposal to send delegates to a Whig 
convention at Williamsburg.' Despite Saunders' objection, delegates were chosen to 
attend the convention which was to be held in August, 1775. Saunders also refused 
to sign any of the patriotic resolutions passed by the meeting. 10 
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The Whigs continued their meetings in the summer of 1775 and eventually form-
ed a Virginian Provinical Association. Although Saunders usually attended these 
meetings, he refused to sanction any resolutions which they adopted. Saunders re-
mained adamant in his opposition throughout 1775; he rejected the Continental 
Association on the grounds that its method of procedure was illegal. Deciding to 
"deal gently with him" because of his youth, the county committee offered Sanders 
an opportunity to retract his refusal. In spite of the persuasion of his friends, the 
young student declared himself to be a Loyalist. Saunders, Benjamin Dingly Gray, 
and Mitchell Phillips were brought before the county committee and branded as 
public enemies. Gray had been a non-associator, while Philips had used his in-
fluence as a militia captain to deter men from signing the Association. 11 The con-
tempt of John Saunders "for the revolutionary party in his county aroused such ill-
feeling" that he and two Loyalist friends, Gray and Phillips, "were not only 
regarded as inimical to the liberties of America, but their neighbours were recom-
mended to cease from supplying them with necessities of all kinds, including 
food." 12 Consequently, John Saunders, who previously "had the proud reputation 
of being the finest host," became an outcast among the people of his own county. 13 
John Saunders joined Lord Dunmore at the height of his ascendancy on 
November 16, 1775, one day after the Governor's forces had defeated a patriot 
militia at Kemp's Landing. 14 According to Saunders, Lord Dunmore, "being anx-
ious to support His Majesty's just rights, which were then openly and avowedly at-
tacked," proclaimed martial law on November 7 and summoned all citizens to help 
him maintain his authority. "Conceiving it to be my bounden duty, I did not 
hesitate a moment, but immediately left a valuable establishment and obeyed the 
call." 1' Saunders raised a troop of cavalry at his own expense and was appointed a 
captain on November 25 in the Queen's Own Loyal Virginia Regiment, commanded 
by his brother-in-law, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Ellegood. 16 
Dunmore's ascendancy was short lived because the Governor's forces were 
defeated at the Great Bridge on December 9, 1775. The patriot victory proved 
decisive; most of Dunmore's erstwhile supporters cast off their superficial loyalism. 
The more genuine Loyalists, Saunders included, departed for New York in July, 
1776. When Saunders returned to Virginia in 1780, he commanded three troops of 
regimental cavalry for special service under General Alexander Leslie. 11 Unfor-
tunately for Saunders, he did not have much to return to, as his property had been 
confiscated and even some of his former slaves had been imprisoned as tories. 11 
The officers and militia of the Queen's Own Loyal Virginia Regiment were in-
corporated into the Queen's Rangers, a Loyalist corps, shortly after their arrival in 
New York. The officers of the Virginia Regiment had been permitted to maintain 
their rank in the new corps, and thus Saunders was appointed captain in the infantry 
division of the Queen's Rangers in August, 1776. 19 
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In October, 1780, Sir Henry Clinton ordered a detachment of the Queen's 
Rangers to proceed with General Leslie on an expedition for the pacification of 
Virginia. Captain Saunders' troop of regimental dragoons was selected to sail with 
Leslie. Although the unit was not up to strength, Saunders hoped to recruit more 
men in his native county of Princess Anne. Accompanying Saunders were his of-
ficers, Lieutenant John Wilson, Cornet Thomas Meritt, Quartermaster Stephen Jar-
vis, and sixteen troopers. 20 Saunders and his men were destined not to rejoin the 
Queen's Rangers until active operations had ended. 
In terms of British strategy, General Leslie had been expected to remain in 
Virginia for the purpose of creating a diversion in favour of Lord Cornwallis. With 
this diversion in mind, Leslie's forces began to establish British outposts in some of 
the seaboard counties of Virginia. Captain Saunders and three troops of regimental 
cavalry under his command were instructed to set up a post in Saunder's native 
county of Princess Anne. Saunders hardly expected his fellow Virginians to join im-
mediately the King's standard. In a letter to Colonel John Graves Simcoe, the com-
mander of the Queen's Rangers, Saunders stated that he wanted to march through 
Princess Anne "for the purpose of taking some of the most violent leaders of the 
rebels in that county.'' The removal of partisan leaders was a preparatory move for 
an eventual recruitment of a Loyalist militia. Shortly after his advance through 
Princess Anne, Saunders was granted permission to occupy the post at Kemp's Lan-
ding because of his "intimate knowledge of the people, and of the county." 21 
Whatever Saunder's intentions concerning the recruitment of a miltitia in Virginia, 
they were interrupted by a recall of Leslie's men to join Cornwallis in the Carolinas, 
and thus the British left Virginia on November 19, less than a month after arrival in 
the Commonwealth. 
II 
Upon arnvmg at Charleston, South Carolina, Colonel Nisbett Balfour, the 
British commander, instructed to proceed northward to Georgetown. According to 
Saunders, Colonel Balfour "ordered my officers and my men up to Georgetown; as 
he told me that he had not authority to permit the return of myself and party to the 
regiment, I found it necessary to go to Winnsboro (one hundred and eighty miles) 
where Lord Cornwallis was encamped, to solicit his leave." 22 With Cornwallis' ap-
proval, Balfour ordered Saunders to proceed to Moncks Corner on January 16, 
1781. Lieutenant-Colonel George Campbell, the commander of the Loyalist corps at 
Georgetown, the King's American Regiment, was to meet Saunders at Moncks Cor-
ner and to escort him to the post. Balfour instructed Saunders to be at the Corner by 
"daybreak on Monday morning, as the 3rd Regt. wait your arrival." 23 The next day 
Saunders and his men were prepared to embark in the Romulous when an express ar-
rived with the news of General Banastre Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens. The 
Americans, commanded by General Daniel Morgan, routed the British and wound-
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ed, captured, or killed at least 600 of Tarleton's men. The American victory, noted 
Saunders, "induced Colonel Balfour to countermand the embarkation and to detain 
us till the impression made by this unfortunate event should be done away. " 2• 
Balfour assigned new instructions to Saunders on January 24 and requested 
Campbell to meet Saunders at the Lower Ferry on the Santee.Campbell was destined 
not to rendezvous with Saunders, for he was captured by Brigadier General Francis 
Marion on the night of January 24 in a surprise attack a!§ainst Georgetown. 25 On 
the day of Campbell's capture the British commander informed him that he ap-
preciated the necessity of the dragoons on Georgetown and he congratulated Camp-
bell on having recently defeated an enemy privateer. 26 The following day Balfour 
expressed his concern for the circumstances at Georgetown; he believed that Captain 
Saunders' dragoons would provide an experienced reinforcement. Balfour stated: 
" I have directed Capt. Saunders with his party of the Queen's Rangers to return to 
you, that officer will therefore take on him the command of all the cavalry in your 
district and I must request your assistance to him in carrying on the recruiting 
service. " 2 ' 
Colonel Balfour had thus sent Captain Saunders to Georgetown believing that he 
would recruit a Loyalist militia. According to Stephen Jarvis, who served as 
Saunders' quartermaster from August, 1780, to March, 1781, Saunders intended to 
increase his company by recruitment in the Georgetown district. 2• Jarvis, however, 
' 'was ordered to remain at Charleston to oversee 3 or 4 Tailors who were employed 
to make clothing for the men and other recruits as they might be wanted." Saunders 
had requested Jarvis to enlist as many men as possible in the Charleston area, but 
this venture proved impossible, for Saunders had not provided Jarvis with any funds 
to offer as a bounty to potential recruits. 2' 
Within two weeks of his arrival in Georgetown, Captain Saunders was unof-
ficially appointed commander of the post in a dispatch issued February 8, 1781. 
Saunders was to be in charge only while Major Grant, the former commander, was 
absent. 10 The condition attached to Saunders' command proved to be a mere for-
mality, as Major Grant did not return to Georgetown. Stephen Jarvis, who 
delivered the message of the change in command from Charleston, described Cap-
tain Saunders' new post in dismal terms. The garrison was in "great confusion": 
The men belonging to Captain Saunders Troop much 
dissatisfied, complained much of the inattention of the Of-
ficers, and in short were nearly in a state of Mutiny. They 
were men who had served in the Regiment for many years 
with much credit to themselves, and from what I noticed I 
was fearful of what really took place, many of them deserted 
to the enemy. 31 
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III 
One of the foremost obstacles encountered by the British in their attempt to raise 
a Loyalist militia in the Southern Colonies involved the conduct of the army and its 
treatment of the civilian population. In his study of the importance of the Loyalists 
in British planning, Paul Smith noted that "Pillaging and plundering were more 
widespread in the South than in any other area in America. " 32 Throughout the 
winter and spring of 1781 Balfour's most consistent theme in his correspondence 
with Saunders was the behaviour of the garrison and its relationship with the 
cilvilian population. In the dispatch of February 8, 1781, appointing Saunders as 
commander of Georgetown, Balfour stressed the importance of getting men 
mounted but "without doing harsh things or imposing disagreeably upon the in-
habitants." In a postscript the Colonel emphasized that horses were to be assigned a 
value if taken from the townspeople. 33 
At best, the British achieved limited success in their attempts to raise a Loyalist 
militia in South Carolina. Major difficulties plagued the recruiting effort. Small 
arms and cavalry horses were constantly in short supply, and the British com-
manders were placed in the precarious position of having to obtain horses from the 
local inhabitants, yet maintain good relations. Mounted troops were essential to 
prevent the rebels from coercing the Loyalists in the back country. Despite 
numerous difficulties, Balfour had reported to Cornwallis in mid-July, 1780, that 
fifteen hundred men could be counted on to march with the army. 34 The potential 
strength of the Loyalist militia impressed Balfour, for he maintained an optimistic 
attitude towards the recruitment of a local militia in his letters to Saunders. 
The Loyalists of the Little Peedee region were among the few sections of South 
Carolina that maintained themselves without constant military aid from the British. 
The posts of Georgetown and Wilmington supplied these Loyalists with ammuni-
tion, and they also received aid from neighboring Loyalists in North Carolina. The 
Little Peedee Loyalists acted as a neutralizing force against many of the manoeuvres 
of the rebels of the Cheraw district and prevented them from giving assistance to the 
partisan leader, Brigadier-General Francis Marion. These Loyalists often went to 
Georgetown and performed valuable service for the British. 35 In November, 1780, 
"Marion would have succeeded in capturing Georgetown if two hundred loyalists 
from the Little Peedee had not arrived the day before he attacked." 36 Since 
Marion's assault on Georgetown only preceded Saunders' arrival by two months, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the British hopes of recruiting a Loyalist militia in the 
Georgetown area were far from illusionary. 
In early December, 1780, Marion established his headquarters at Snow's Island 
in the midst of the Peedee. Marion seldom moved out of the Gergetown district dur-
ing the remainder of the war, for it was at Georgetown that he hoped to secure sup-
plies of ammunition, clothing, and salt which he desperately required. 37 During his 
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command at Georgetown from early February to late June, 1781, Saunders and 
Marion became bitter adversaries in a war of wit and guerilla actions. 
At Marion's request Saunders began negotiations for a partial exchange of 
prisoners on February 12, 1781. In a message to Marion Saunders stated: "I am 
authorised to offer in exchange for Sergeants Burt and Hudgins of the Queen's 
Rangers Dragoons and Joseph Sherwood, John Farrington and William Moore, 
privates in the King's American Regiment, and 2 Sergeants and 3 privates in 
Charleston." 31 Saunders' letter may have been delayed because Balfour informed 
Saunders on February 13 that both Marion and Light Horse Harry Lee had moved 
out of the area. Balfour assumed that Saunders could now take more offensive ac-
tion, as "the small party I hope that remain will not prevent your getting a little 
more possesion of the country." Balfour promised to "send more ammunition by 
the very first water conveyance. " 39 Two days later Saunders received orders to 
prepare to march with as many men as posible. Balfour was quite explicit in em-
phasizing the need for "conciliating conduct with respect to the Gentlemen of the 
Country." To ensure a peaceful solution of "civil matters", Balfour and Corn-
wallis commended to Saunders the conduct of Colonel James Cassells, who was to 
"decide all matters in dispute amongst the inhabitants. " 40 
Throughout the winter of 1781 the hope of recruiting Loyalist militia remained 
conspicuous in the orders emanating from Charleston. Despite Balfour's expecta-
tions, Saunders had not encountered any of Marion's remaining 'small party". Ob-
viously disappointed that an opportunity had been missed to defeat the rebels, 
Balfour wrote to Saunders on February 19: "I am sorry that you missed Marion's 
people, one stroke at them would be much of service, and give spirits to our 
friends." 41 Within the same letter the Colonel forwarded Lord Francis Rawdon's 
instructions for the commander at Georgetown. 
Saunders was ordered to march every available man to the Lower Ferry on the 
Santee and then proceed to Nelson's Ferry where they would receive further instruc-
tions plus provisions and ammunition. In Balfour's estimation the march would 
take at least five days, and thus he cautioned Saunders to guard against poor 
discipline among "the men and officers. And as the inhabitants on the road have 
given up their horses for the good of the service I am to require, that no officers do 
take or force any horse from an inhabitant. " 42 Any officers that disobeyed these 
retrictions were to be reported for later punishment. In a later dispatch of the same 
day Balfour reiterated that he was under "strict instructions from Lord Cornwallis" 
to punish any offenders against the people. 0 But it must be kept in mind that Corn-
wallis and Balfour had a perfectly good reason for not wanting to molest the in-
habitants on the road to Nelson's Ferry. Because of the poor navigation on the 
Wateree River, the British had to convey their goods by the overland route from 
Lower Ferry to Nelson's Ferry and then on to Camden. 44 In order to keep the inland 
post at Camden supplied with rum, salt, ammunition, and clothing, the overland 
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route had to be protected; a hostile countryside along the route to Camden would 
only hamper efforts to transport supplies. 
February, 1781, proved to be a most exasperating month for the new commander 
at Georgetown; conditions at the post became alarming enough to warrant a re-
quest from Saunders to be relieved of his command. Writing on February 26, 
Saunders reported that "3 nights ago" he had dispatched Cornet Thomas Merritt 
and ten privates to secure stray cattle which he ''had brought in from the other side 
of the Black River. " 4 ' This small detachment was surprised by a force under the 
command of Peter Horry, a colonel of Marion's brigade, at White's Bridge near 
Georgetown. 46 According to Saunders his men were defeated because of the 
"superiority in goodness of horses and numbers" of the rebels. Of the eleven men 
sent out, they were "killed, wounded or taken except for 1 officer and 1 private", 
which Saunders considered to be "an unfortunate affair ... not a disgraceful one." 
Saunders nevertheless felt responsible for the loss of the patrol and he informed 
Balfour: "I am willing to deliver my service yet beg leave to mention to you that my 
[illegible] and inclination point to that of the field as long as you judge it 
expedient. " 47 Colonel Horry's relatively small victory seemed to infuse new spirit 
into the patriot cause and "had a more decisive effect than could have been expected 
at the time. " 0 
IV 
Conditions had steadily deteriorated at Georgetown during the first month of 
Saunders' command. Not only had Marion reinforced his militia, but Georgetown 
had experienced a wave of desertions to the enemy. Because of poor morale of the 
garrison and the increased rebel activity, Balfour ordered Saunders not to send out 
small forces on patrol: "The detaching [of] any small force is by no means proper, 
at a time when these dispicable banditti have been taught from the bad behaviour of 
our own people at that post." 49 
Stephen Jarvis described the garrison at Georgetown in despairing terms at the 
beginning of February, 1781. Desertions were not uncommon among the garrison, 
and Jarvis believed that the post was on the verge of a "state of mutiny. "'0 By the 
end of February Saunders, disillusioned with his command, requested a position of 
more active service, and permission was granted for him to return to Charleston. 
Balfour wrote: 
In respect to the command there when you was entrusted 
with it, I suppose it might have been on a more intensive 
scale, and that cavalry might have. been employed in more 
considerable numbers in the field ... You have therefore my 
leave to return to Charleston, if you continue in the same opi-
nion respecting your command." 
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Discouraged with mere patrols and guerilla warfare, Saunders wished to rejoin the 
Queen's Rangers; the regiment had arrived in Virginia on January 4, 1781, under the 
command of Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold. ' 2 Balfour asked Saunders to re-
main at Georgetown until conditions improved, but he assured Saunders "that the 
first good opportunity that offers, you shall not be detained from joining your regi-
ment but until that happens we are really hard put to it, for cavalry." 53 
Even as late as April Colonel Balfour was still hot,eful that a Loyalist militia 
could be raised in the Georgetown area. Apparently, Cornwallis had not yet become 
completely disenchanted with the Loyalists, for he empowered Balfour to raise a 
troop of provincial light dragoons. Balfour suggested to Saunders on April 2 that 
two of his men, Lieutenant John Wilson and Cornet Thomas Merritt, who had been 
"both recommended as good and active officers", could command the new troop. 
The Colonel continued: "If you agree with me in opinion that a troope could be 
raised in or near Georgetown I should have no hesitation in making the appoint-
ment."'• 
The British position in South Carolina had deteriorated steadily during the 
preceding eight months; the military plans formulated in Charleston no longer bore 
marks of optimism and assurance concerning the Loyalists. Balfour considered it 
" vain to attempt" recruitment in most parts of the country," but Georgetown con-
tinued to be a centre of optimsim in an otherwise bleak picture. What were the 
sources of this continuing optimism? Balfour hinted at them in two separate letters 
to Saunders in the spring of 1781. 
Initially Balfour was encouraged in his belief that a militia could be recruited in 
the Georgetown district by a man named Jones. On April 2 Balfour informed 
Saunders that he promised to make Jones a Cornet because "he thinks he can raise 
his men." In a report that he had just received from Lord Rawdon Balfour also 
enclosed the good news that Colonel Welbore Doyle and the New York Volunteers 
had destroyed Marion's baggage at Snow's Island. Writing in an elated tone, the 
Colonel added: "It is now time to chase these gentry from the country, if a little ex-
ertion is made ... I would hope the Loyalist Militia of the other side [of Lynch's 
Creek] will assist in driving them off."" 
Another factor which undoubtedly encouraged Balfour's belief that a Loyalist 
militia could be recruited was Captain Campbell's successful recruitment of a pro-
vincial troop in mid-March, 1781. Stephen Jarvis, Saunders' quartermaster, had 
been continuously stationed at Charleston. In March, 1781, Jarvis "received a very 
flattering letter" from Captain Saunders approving of Jarvis's acceptance of an of-
fer of a Lieutenancy from Captain Campbell in his new troop." On March 5 
Balfour explained to Saunders that "Captain Campbell fears he will not succeed in 
his recruiting business at Georgetown," and thus the British commander gave 
Campbell permission to leave the post in order to complete his troop at 
108 The South Carolina Historical Association 
Charleston." Balfour seems to have interpreted Campbell's move to Charleston as 
a mere augmentation of an almost completed force. Jarvis supported this view; he 
reported that Campbell soon reached his quota of twenty-five men by the use of 
plenty of money at Charleston." Futhermore, Campbell had completed pratically 
all of his recruiting within Georgetown itself;'° recruitment in the surrounding coun-
tryside had not even been attempted on a large scale. A combination of a number of 
factors thus induced Balfour to believe that a provincial troop might be raised in the 
Georgetown district in the spring of 1781. 
On April 6 Saunders delivered the death blow to the illusion of Loyalist aid. In a 
letter to Balfour Saunders described the policy of Loyalist recruitment as an act of 
fultility: 
The raising of Provincial Cavalry at this place and its 
vicinity is a subject I have often thought of and have mention-
ed it several times to Colonel Cassels and Colonel Gordon 
who agree perfectly with me that it is impossible to be done 
here. I do not believe that even a half dozen could be 
recruited in this whole district. 61 
Saunders allowed one exception for the vicinity of Georgetown: "I have been told 
that the most likely place would be at the loyal settlement on [the] Peedee." As for 
Jones' belief tht he could raise a provincial corps in Georgetown, Saunders conclud-
ed: "I rather think Mr. Jones too sanguine." This letter of April 6 had considerable 
effect; two days later orders were received from Charleston to cease all attempts to 
raise a provincial cavalry. 
V 
South Carolina appeared to be under firm British control in the early part of 
1781, but the appearance of things was not quite the reality. The harassing action of 
men like Francis Marion, Thomas Sumter, and John Rutledge were successful to 
such a degree that before long it was "doubtful that the British controlled ground 
beyond that upon which they stood."'2 Saunders' correspondence to Balfour em-
phasized that the Georgetown district was no different from the rest of South 
Carolina because the British faced an unfriendly, if not hostile countryside. 
Gradually becoming more daring, Marion and Lee were openly attacking British 
outposts by mid- April, 1781. On April 16, Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, encamped 
on the Peedee, warned Saunders of a possible attack on Georgetown. Lee was sup-
posed to have joined Marion with three hundred men, but the "country folks of 
course say 4 or 500." Watson advised Saunders to secure all the salt and ammuni-
tion in the town "for Marion had neither at present"; the British Lieutenant-
Colonel feared that Marion and Lee's combined forces would attempt to seize the 
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stores at Georgetown. 63 
Watson's report of enemy troop movements were confirmed three days later 
when it was learned that the rebels had crossed the Peedee in force. General 
Nathaniel Greene was marching towards Camden with a large army of fifteen hun-
dred men, all Continentals except for two hundred and fifty North Carolina 
militia. 6 ' Receiving news of Greene's approach, Balfour impressed upon Saunders 
"the neccessity of keeping to your post and being extremely alert. " 65 The following 
day, April 20, Balfour informed Sir Henry Clinton, the commander-in-chief at New 
York, that some of Greene's light troops had passed the Peedee. ''The object of this 
movement there is every reason to believe is Camden which, at present, is but weak, 
Lord Rawdon having detached Lieut-Col. Watson, with 2 battalions from that 
post." Balfour also added that Greene's movement "may considerably change 
Lord Cornwallis's views who is now at Wilmington." 66 Meanwhile, Rawdon 
prepared for his defence at Camden against Greene's anticipated attack. 
With time of the essence, Balfour ordered to proceed to Rawdon's aid by the 
'best, safest, and most expeditious" route. 67 But Watson was in a desperate situa-
tion because he was located on the east side of the Waccamaw River and had no 
means to transport his men and equipment across to proceed to Camden. On April 
19 Watson sent an urgent message to Saunders requesting "that instantly upon the 
receipt of this you will collect every kind of canoe, flat, rowing or sailing boat that 
can be got and let them be mored in the river under cover of the Galley, you will ... 
bring them to Cogdales at Wacamaw ... so that she [the Galley] can cover our em-
barkation at daybreak. " 61 Watson acknowledged two days later that the mission 
had succeeded. Most of Watson's horses and cattle had also been transported across 
the river by flatboats. 69 
Having crossed the Waccamaw, Watson arrived at Screen's landing on April 24 
and decided to send a reinforcement of forty men to Captain Saunders. According 
to Watson's frank appraisal of the detachment, they "were not fit for severe duty," 
but they were capable and willing to fight. 10 Without further delay, Watson pro-
ceeded to Camden. On April 21 word reached the American commander, General 
Greene, of the imminent arrival of Colonel Watson and five hundred men. Two 
days later, however, Greene received no more reliable information concerning Wat-
son's movements. 11 It had proved impossible to move an army of over five 
hundred men, encumbered with its baggage, from the Waccamaw River to Camden 
within a week. Greene could rest assured on April 23; Watson would not arrive at 
Camden for another fifteen days, and thus Rawdon was left to his own fate. 12 
Although Greene's force outnumbered his own by six hundred, Rawdon decided to 
attack, and on the morning of April 25 his forces met Greene's at Hobkirk's Hill 
and won the field of battle. 73 
In the first week of May, 1781, Colonel Balfour gave a pessimistic description of 
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the British military position in a letter to Sir Henry Clinton. Colonel Balfour realiz-
ed that Rawdon's defeat over Green had not been decisive. "Notwithstanding this 
brilliant success," Balfour wrote to Sir Henry Clinton, "I must inform Your Ex-
cellency that the general state of the country is most distressing." The letter con-
tinued with a bleak description of the British posts: Augusta and Ninety-Six were 
under heavy attack and communication by land to Savannah no longer existed. In 
concluding, the Colonel added: "Indeed I should betray the duty I owe Your Ex-
cellency, did I not represent the Defection of this province so universal that I know 
of no mode short of depopulation, to retain it."" 
Balfour's description was not only correct, but almost prophetic. Although 
British prospects had imporved after Hobkirk;s Hill, Greene was on the eve of 
sweeping the British from the Carolinas, excepting only Charleston. After a realistic 
appraisal, Rawdon decided for drastic action and thus abandoned Camden on May 
9, 1781. 75 Besides being cut off from food and forage by partisan bands, Rawdon 
had been disappointed by Watson's detachment, which had joined him at Camden 
on May 7, because it was "much reduced in Number, thro' Casualties, Sickness and 
a Reinforcement which he had left at Georgetown. " 76 
On May 8, the day prior to Rawdon's abandonment of Camden, Balfour offered 
the command of Charleston to Captain Saunders. "I am now to propose to you," 
wrote Balfour, "the superintending and commanding [of] all the cavalry that we 
have from this garrison on different parts of the province." Balfour obviously had 
confidence in Saunders' leadership; the Colonel stressed that cavalry was to be the 
"principal defence" and he promised Saunders more men "upon any plan you 
might think advisable." Saunders was requested to proceed immediately to 
Charleston, as there were others seeking the command. Captain Gray was to 
become the new commander of Georgetown in Saunders' absence. 77 
Unfortunately for Saunders, Charleston, British headquarters for the war in the 
South, was in an extremely weakened state. Five days after he had abandoned 
Camden Rawdon reported to Cornwallis that Colonel Balfour had met him at 
Nelson's Ferry and described the conditions at Charleston. The old works at the 
fort had been levelled to make way for new ones, but they had not yet been con-
structed. Equally important, Balfour has stressed "that his Garrison was inadequate 
to oppose any Force of consequence, and that the disaffection of the Towns People 
shewed itself in a thousand instances. " 1' Balfour's description of Charleston did 
not augur well for the future of Saunders' proposed new command. In the end, 
Saunders did not accept the offer of promotion to command Charleston, probably 
because Balfour remained as commander longer than anticipated. 
Shortly after Balfour had met Rawdon on May 14 at Nelson's Ferry, a detatch-
ment of Balfour's men had been dispatched to Dorchester, located fifteen miles 
from Charleston, under the command of Stephen Jarvis. 79 Jarvis was met at Dor-
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chester by a militia under the command of Alexander Chesney, a South Carolina 
Loyalist. 1° Captain Saunders also arrived from Georgetown with a portion of his 
troop and took command of the assembled forces. Saunders subsequently received 
orders to proceed to William Snipes' plantation to disperse a force under his com-
mand. 11 Snipes was a major of the Horse Shoe Company of the Colleton County 
Regiment of South Carolina. 12 
The one and only serious condemnation of Saunders' character during his entire 
military career resulted from this attack on Snipes' plantation. The British came 
upon the rebel force at sunrise, and in the ensuing engagement Snipes escaped, but 
twenty of his men were killed. According to Jarvis: 
Only one man was taken prisoner and he was ordered to 
be killed by Captain Saunders. The most disgraceful thing I 
ever heard of a British officer. The poor fellow was severely 
hacked, but whether he died of his wounds or not I do not 
know. I once pulled out my pistol to put the poor fellow out 
of his misery but I had not the power to discharge. 11 
Saunders' order to have this soldier killed can be interpreted as an act of exaspera-
tion as a result of recent British defeats. By May 14 Saunders was aware that 
Greene's army had captured or destroyed the once-formidable British chain of posts 
which included Camden, Watson, Motte, Granby, Nelson's Ferry, and Orangeburg. 
Greene had almost complete control of South Carolina except for Charleston, 
Savannah, Georgetown, and Ninety-Six. 14 
Saunders was still at Dorchester when he received a letter from Balfour commen-
ding his command of the successful encounter at Snipes' plantation. Balfour's letter 
of June 5 was not only over-optimistic, but full of false hopes. Balfour stated: "The 
cutting up these few, will have excellent effect, and we only want a few more 
dragoons with enterprising officers to clear the country. The cavalry of this Corps 
will be mounted from the horses you took at Snipes." Balfour also assured 
Saunders that he and Lord Rawdon were "extremely sensible of your activity and 
ability."" Fifteen days later Saunders ordered his men to evacuate Georgetown; the 
garrison escaped by sea to Charleston on the first night of General Marion's ap-
proach. 16 Another post had succumbed to the American onslaught; two months 
after Hobkirk's Hill the British retained only Charleston and Ninety-Six in South 
Carolina. 11 
After arriving at Charleston on or near June 21, 1781, Saunders and his troop 
were sent to Dorchester, where they remained until the last major battle was fought 
in South Carolina at Eutaw Springs on September 8, 1781. One of the most fierce 
engagements of the war, the battle was extremely costly in casualties in proportion 
to the number of men that fought. Although there was no decisive victory for either 
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side, the results of the engagement were more favourable to Greene, because it 
forced the British to retreat to the immediate vicinity of Charleston." 
Sixteen days after the battle of Eutaw Springs Balfour ordered Saunders to pro-
ceed northward in the last letter of the Saunders' manuscript for 1781. The Colonel 
stated: "You will immediately make every possible inquiry respecting Lord Corn-
walis' movements as I expect he may come near to you in which case you will join 
him with all possible expedition if practicable. " 19 Balfour advised Saunders to re-
main in or near Georgetown because Greene was reported to be at Camden. But 
Cornwallis never returned to South Carolina after he marched into Virginia on April 
23, 1781. He continued on to Yorktown, where his army was eventually forced to 
capitulate on October 19, 1781. Peace was more than a year away, however, and the 
troops of both sides continued to fight, although there were no major battles. 
Saunders remained at Charleston until April, 1782, when he sailed for New Ydrk 
and took command of the remnant of his regiment saved from the surrender at 
Yorktown. 90 Thus ended the active military career of Captain John Saunders, who 
remained in command of the Queen's Rangers until the return of Major Armstrong 
from captivity. 91 
John Saunders was a fourth generation American, yet he fought against his 
fellow colonists for approximately six years in the first American Civil War. As with 
most Loyalists who took up arms against the Revolution, there was no turning back. 
John Saunders had fully committed himself in November, 1776, when he had raised 
a company of men and joined Lord Dunmore; he had no choice but to leave Virginia 
in July, 1776. A combination of conviction and circumstances thus forced Saunders 
to fight faithfully for the British in the Revolution. 
Saunders had returned to the South at a time when British power was in decline. 
As early as June, 1780, the British posts were constantly endangered by partisan 
leaders and their guerilla tactics. Saunders and his dragoons had been a regular 
fighting unit and they were unprepared for the guerilla-style warfare of the 
Georgetown district. Consequently, Saunders became disillusioned with his com-
mand at Georgetown and requested a position of more active service. 
The Saunders' manuscript provides a view of the Revolutionary War in the 
South from the losing side. There are only two letters in the manuscript which 
Balfour wrote to Saunders from June to December, 1781, because Saunders and his 
troop, as with all British forces in South Carolina, had been forced to retreat to 
Charleston in the latter half of 1781. 
One related theme to the general military situation included the recruitment of a 
Loyalist militia. Saunders demonstrated his despair in the spring of 1781 when he 
informed Balfour that the attempt to recruit a Loyalist militia was futile. Yet, 
Saunders continued to fight and continued to receive commendations of his conduct 
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from Balfour and Rawdon. The trust these officers had in Saunders' ability was 
shown in May, 1781, when he was offered the command of Charleston, the British 
headquarters in the South. 
John Saunders was an American coloaist, but he had proved himself to be a 
loyal British subject. The two were not incompatible for Saunders. He fought 
against the Revolution for what he believed to be the best interests of the American 
colonies. As a wealthy young man he had gone to war aRd fought with the British to 
protect the colonies from revolution. Few Loyalist military commanders gained the 
confidence and respect of the British officers as had Saunders. John Saunders well 
deserved the praise of the Loyalist Claims Commissioners who had described him as 
a "man of very extraordinary merit." 
' Charles F. McIntosh, "Genealogy - Saunders, Princess Anne County, Virginia", The Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography, XXXII (January, 1924), p. 92; L. Sabine, Biographical Sketches of 
Loyalists of the American Revolution, with an Historical Essay (Boston, 1864), II, p. 256; I.S. Harrell, 
Loyalism in Virginia (Durham, 1926), p. 49. 
1
· Wallace Brown, The King's Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist 
Claimants (Providence, 1966), p. 184. 
' McIntosh, "Genealogy ... ," p. 95. 
• J. Ellegood, Frederiction, 3 July 1793, to J. Saunders, MSS John Saunders, Harriet Irving Library, 
University of New Brunswick, Frederiction, New Brunswick, Canada. Hereafter cited as the Saunders' 
Papers. John Saunders eventually became a New Brunswick Supreme Court Justice. See Kenneth 
Donovan, "The Origin and Establishment of the New Brunswick Courts," Journal of the New 
Brunswick Museum (Saint John, N.B., 1980), pp. 5_7-64. 
' Statement of Guardianship of Mr. John Saunders, Orphan of Elizabeth Saunders, to Jacob 
Ellegood, his guardian, 1775, Saunders' Papers. 
' W.O. Raymond, "Loyalist in Arms, 1775-1783," Collections of the New Brunswick Historical 
Society (Saint John, N.B., 1904), p. 199. 
' Alfred Jones, ed., "The Journal of Alexander Chesney, A South Carolina Loyalist in the Revolu-
tion and After," Ohio State University Bulletin, XXVI (October, 1921), p. 108. 
' Hugh E. Egerton, The Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of American Loyalists 1783 to 
1785 (Oxford, 1915), p. 71. 
' Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney ... ", p. 109. 
'
0 H.J. Eckenrode, The Revolution In Virginia (Boston, 1916), p. 106. 
"Ibid. 
" Alfred Jones, "A Letter Regarding the Queen's Rangers", The Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography, XXX (October, 1922), p. 373. 
114 The South Carolina Historical Association 
" W.S. MacNutt, New Brunswick, A History: 17114-1867 (Toronto, 1963), p. 72. 
" Jones, "A Letter Regarding . . . ", p. 373. 
" J.W. Lawrence, The Judges of New Brunswick and their Times (n.p., 1907), p. 100. See the Journal 
of the Legislative Council of the Province of New Brunswick, Fourth Session of the Fourth General 
Assembly, July 5, 1808, p. 331. for other examples of Saunders' profession to be a loyal subject after he 
had emigrated to New Brunswick. 
" C.J. Ingles, The Queen's Rangers In the Revolutionary War, ed. H.M. Jackson (Montreal, 1956), p. 
256; Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney . . . ", p. 109. 
11 Ingles, The Queen's Rangers ... , p. 165; Keith 8. Berwick, "Moderates in Crisis: The Trials of 
Leadership in Revolutionary Virginia" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1959), p. 47. 
11 Charles F. McIntosh, ed., "Saunders", The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, XXXlll 
(January, 1925), p. 85; "Tory Prisoners Now in the Publick Goal May 6, 1776," The Virginia Magazine 
of History and Biography, XV (April, 1908), p. 414. 
~ Raymond, "Loyalist in Arms 1775-1783", p. 199; W.O. Raymond, "A.D. 1775-1783 Roll of Of-
ficers of the British American or Loyalist Corps", Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society 
(Saint John, 1904), p. 246. 
20 Ingles, The Queen's Rangers ••• , pp. 155-58; D.B. Read, The Life and Times of General John 
Graves Simcoe (Toronto, 1890), p. 72. 
21 John Graves Simcoe, Simcoe's Military Journal (Toronto, 1962), p. 139. 
22 Ibid. 
u N. Balfour, Charleston, 16 January 1781, to J . Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
" Simcoe, Military Journal, p. 139. 
" Robert D. Bass, Swamp Fox. The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marlon (New York, 
1959), pp. 135-36; George C. Rogers, The History of Georgetown County, South Carolina (Columbia, 
S.C., 1970), p. 137; Russel F. Weigley, The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782 
(Columbia, S.C., 1970), p. 55. 
26 N. Balfour, Charleston, January 24, 1781, to Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, Saunders' Papers. 
" Ibid., January 25, 1781. 
" Ingles, The Queen's Rangers . .. , p. 258. 
" Stephen Jarvis, "The Narrative of Colonel Stephen Jarvis", Loyalist Narratives from Upper 
Canada, ed. James J . Talman (Toronto, 1946), pp. 195-96. · 
•• N. Balfour, Charleston, February 8, 1781, to J . Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
,. Jarvis, "The Narrative ... ", p. 197. 
" Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats (Williamsburg, 1964), p. 140. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, February 8, 1781, to J . Saunders, Saunders' Papers. For British sensitivity 
John Saunders, A Loyalist Captain in South Carolina, 1780-1782 115 
regarding procurement in the South Carolina countryside, whether confiscations from rebels or pur-
chases from Loyalists, see R. Arthur.Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army In America 
1775-1783 (New Jersey, 197S), pp. 86-87. 
,. N. Balfour, Charleston, July 17, 1780, to Lord Cornwallis, cited in Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, 
p. 139, note # 37. 
" "Colonel Robert Gray's Observations on the War in Carolina", The South Carolina Historical and 
Genealogical Magazine, II (July, 1910), pp. 149-SO. 
" Robert W. Barnwell, "Loyalists in South Carolina, 176S-178S," (Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 
1941). 
" William D. James, A Sketch of the Life of Brigadier General Francis Marion and A History of His 
Brigade from its Rise in June 1780 until Disbanded In December 1782 (Marietta, Georgia, 1948), 
[copyright 1821), p. 6S. 
" J. Saunders, Georgetown, February 12, 1781, to F. Marion, Saunders' Papers. Some of Saunders' 
letters to Marion have been published in R. W. Gibbes, Documentary History of the American Revolution 
Consisting of Letten and Papen Relating to the Contest for Liberty, Chiefly in South Carolina In 1781 
and l'Ull (Columbia, S.C., 18S3). See also EdwMd Mccrady, History of South Carolina In the Revolu-
tion 1780-1783 (New Yrok, 1902), p. ISi. 
· " N. Balfour, Charleston, February 13, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
•• Ibid., February IS, 1781. 
" Ibid., February 19, 1781. 
" Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
" James, A Sketch of the Life of Marion ... , p. 94. 
" J. Saunders, Georgetown, February 26, 1781, to N. Balfour, Saunders' Papers. Saunders' letter to 
Balfour is a draft which is contained on the back page of the letter which Saunders had received from 
Stephen Jarvis on February 20, 1781. 
" James, A Sketch In the Life of Marion ... , p. 93 . 
" J. Saunders, Georgetown, February 26, 1781 , to N. Balfour, Saunders' Papers. 
" James, A Sketch In the Life of Marion ... , p. 93. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, February 24, 1781, to J . Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
'
0 Jarvis, "The Narrative ... ", p. 197. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, March 4, 1781, to J . Saunders, Saunders' Papers. See J. Saunders, 
Georgetown, February 26, 1781, to N. Balfour, ibid., for Saunders' request to leave Georgetown. 
" Ingles, The Queen's Rangen . .. , p. 171. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, March S, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
116 The South Carolina Historical Association 
,. Ibid., April 2, 1781. 
" Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
" Jarvis, "The Narrative ... ", p. 200. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, March 5, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
" Jarvis, "The Narrative ... ", p. 201. 
• 0 N. Balfour, Charleston, March 5, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
" J. Saunders, Georgetown, April 6, 1781, to N. Balfour, ibid. 
u John R. Alden, The South in the Revolution, 1763-1789 (Louisiana, 1957), p. 242. 
" Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, Great Peedee, Hickory Grove, April 16, 1781, to J. Saunders, 
Saunders' Papers. 
" Howard H. Peckham, The War for Independence, A Military History (Chicago, 1965), p. 160. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, April 19, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, April 20, 1718, to Sir Henry Clinton in Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., A111 Exact 
Reprint of Six Rare Pamphlets on the Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, I (London, 1888), pp. 418-19. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, April 19, 1781, to Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, Saunders' Papers. 
" Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, Waccamaw, April 19, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
" Ibid., Lawrel Hill, April 21, 1781, to J. Saunders, ibid. 
10 Ibid., Screens Landing, April 24, 1781, to J. Saunders, ibid. 
" Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, ed. John Alden (New York, 1952), p. 801. 
" F. Rawdon, Monks Corner, May 24, 1781, to Lord Cornwallis in Stevens, Clinton-Cornwallis Con-
troversy, I, p. 481. 
" Francis V. Greene, The Revolutionary War and the Military Policy of the United States (New York, 
1911), p. 246. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, May 6, 1781, to Sir H. Clinton, in Stevens, Cllnton-Cornwallls Controver-
sy, I, pp. 472-73. 
" Ward, The War of the Revolution, p. 811-. 
" F. Rawdon, Monks Corner, May 24, 1781, to Lord Cornwallis, in Stevens, Clinton-Cornwallis Con-
troversy, I, p. 481. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, May 8, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. For a description of 
Charleston during the British occupation, see George Smith Mccowen, Jr., The British Occupation of 
Charleston, 1780-82 (Columbia, S.C., 1972). 
John Saunders, A Loyalist Captain in South Carolina, 1780-1782 117 
" F. Rawdon, Monks Corner, May 24, 1781, to Lord Cornwallis, in Stevens, Cllnton-Comwallls Con-
troveny, I, p. 484. 
" Jarvis, "The Narrative ... ", p. 202. 
•• Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney", p. 24. 
11 Simcoe, Mllltary Journal, p. 143. 
" Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney", p. 24. 
" Jarvis, "The Narrative ... ", pp. 202-02. See Jerome Nadelhalft, "The Havoc of War and its After-
math in Revolutionary South Carolina", Hlstolre Soclale, XII (May, 1979), p. 98, who maintains that the 
war in the Georgetown district and the interior "may have been bloodier and more cruel than any place 
else in America." 
14 Ward, The War of the Revolution, p. 813. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, June 5, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
" Historians are confused on the date of the fall of Georgetown. According to George F. Scheer and 
Hugh F. Rankin, Rebels and Redcoats, (Cleveland and New York, 1957), p. 458, the post was abandoned 
on May 29. But Jedidiah Morse, Anals of the American Revolution (New York, 1968), [copyright 1824), 
p. 3S, believed that the post was surrendered on May 20. Ward, The War of the Revolution, p. 813, and 
Alden, The South In the Revolution, pp. 263-64, agree that the British garrison fled from Georgetown on 
June 20. 
" Alden, The South In the Revolution, pp. 263-64. 
11 Ward, The War of the Revolution, p. 834. 
" N. Balfour, Charleston, September 24, 1781, to J. Saunders, Saunders' Papers. 
•• Jones, "The Journal of Alexander Chesney", p. 110. 
" Ingles, The Queen's Rangen, p. 265. See also, W.R. Riddell, The Life of John Graves Simcoe 
(Toronto, 1892), p. 65. 
118 John Saunders, A Loyalist Captain in South Carolina, 1780-1782 
Appendix 
Captain Saunders' Troop. 1 
Captain ............................................................................. John Saunders. 
Lieutenant ............................................................................ John Wilson. 
Lieutenant ........................................................................ Thomas Merritt. 
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